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ABSTRACT
RITUALIZED RHETORIC AND HISTORICAL MEMORY IN GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY
POLICY
Sara A. Hoff 
Old Dominion University, 2014  
Director: Dr. Regina Karp
Recent changes in German foreign policy behavior have led to questions about 
Germany's European vocation. At the center of this inquiry is Germany's struggle to  
resolve the intersection between historical memory and present day international 
responsibility, especially in cases involving the use of force. This dissertation 
examines how and when historical memory has influenced, shaped, and informed 
contemporary German foreign and security policy and rhetoric by examining cases 
within tw o policy areas: out of area operations and nuclear nonproliferation. Focusing 
on the case of Libya, this dissertation also considers the cases of Kosovo, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan. Nuclear nonproliferation, a global policy issue, highlights Germany's role as 
an international actor by focusing on Germany's voice and actions during the  
negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. This dissertation hypothesizes that 
Germany has a ritualized foreign and security policy and rhetoric determ ined by 
historical memory. The argument is made that historical memory and ritualized rhetoric 
is used depending on policy area, allowing Germany to  present reason, argument, and 
justification to a variety of international security challenges, either to  support or oppose 
military involvement. This dissertation finds support for questions regarding Germany's 
European vocation. However, Germany exercises self-interests precisely within the
institutions of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. W hat has 
changed is that Germany is increasingly using rhetoric of memory and guilt in order to  
obscure that it is actually acting in its self-interests. German policy choices, as they  
relate to the future use of force will be critically guided by this rhetoric.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
"Neither memories nor histories seem objective any longer. In both cases we are learning 
to take account o f conscious or unconscious selection, interpretation and distortion. In 
both cases this selection, interpretation and distortion is socially conditioned. " 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is positioned within the international relation and political 
science literatures' continued focus on explanations of German foreign and security 
policy, diplomacy, and political rhetoric. M ore than tw enty years after the end of the  
Cold W ar and German unification, and more than ten years after the September 11 
attacks, theoretical frameworks and analyses struggle to fully explain German foreign 
policy choices, continuity and change, national interests, and the use of power. Scholars 
not only disagree over explanations of German policy behavior but further diverge on 
analyses of the current state of Germany's role in Europe and Germany's use of 
institutional power. This research will address this gap in the literature by using a 
detailed analysis of the current German foreign policy behavior and rhetorical action 
used to achieve goals in tw o selected policy areas: out of area operations and the use of 
force and nonproliferation and multilateral negotiation. This research addresses two  
important aspects of the German foreign policy debate: Germany's use of power and 
the continued influence of historical m emory by connecting theoretical explanations to
1 Peter Burke, "History as Social Memory," in History, Culture, and the M ind, ed. Thomas Butler (New York: 
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 98.
2policy choices and ritualized rhetoric through evaluations of positions employed by 
German policy makers. Germany's recent behavior, to  include the abstention from  the  
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) vote on military intervention, has called to 
question Germany's role as a responsible actor while highlighting Germany's continued 
reluctance to use force, even in humanitarian based interventions. Germany's increased 
power and continued foreign policy since unification has led to an ongoing theoretical 
debate, seeking to understand and predict Germany's policies. The 'German question' 
has resurfaced once more, focusing on Germany's national and economic interests. This 
study will analyze and detail these changes by examining how and when changes occur 
and what variables shape and influence policy outcomes. Further, this dissertation 
outlines which norms and interests are placed before the interests of the European 
Union (EU) in the selected policy areas. This dissertation contributes to  both the  
theoretical and policy geared literature on Germany's foreign policy and the use of 
power as it focuses on recent policies and rhetorical action while considering the  
continual path of Germany's foreign policy behavior despite changes in the international 
security environment.
The three theoretical frameworks selected for this research are structural 
realism, utilitarian/liberalism, and constructivism; they are used in order to combine 
explanatory variables for case analysis in describing and understanding German foreign 
policy choices. Further, these theories will be used to categorize scholars who discuss 
and analyze German foreign and security policy into comprehensive frameworks to  
determine how  contemporary German foreign policy and rhetoric is studied. These
3theories, as well as frameworks specifically geared toward explaining and understanding 
Germany's foreign policy behavior, are outlined and discussed in chapter three of this 
dissertation, and eventually applied to the case studies selected in the analysis portion 
of this dissertation within chapter six. Each case selected for this dissertation will be 
analyzed in terms of Germany's foreign policy behavior based on four selected variables 
known to be pillars of German foreign policy: M ultilateral alliance solidarity, historical 
memory and W W II legacy, domestic influence, and national interests. The cases will be 
analyzed by using primary and secondary source data. Primary sources include speeches 
and statements, voting documents, parliamentary documents to include plenary 
records, government reports, and public opinion polls. Secondary data includes German 
and English language newspapers and other media, policy evaluations, and a wide- 
ranging literature analysis including scholarly articles and books in both German and 
English. These sources were used to understand why rhetoric in German foreign policy is 
important, and what determinants contribute to differences in rhetoric and action. This 
will add to an overall understanding and interpretation of patterns of German foreign 
policy behavior and will analyze cases in which Germany is willing to  lead and or to  
shape and influence the international environment (Gestaltungswille).
Although past research has focused on the puzzle of continuity and change in 
German foreign policy, present research does not strategically analyze Germany's 
ritualized rhetoric within a foreign policy discursive fram ework with the goal o f linking 
continuous rhetoric to action and policies. Ritualized rhetoric based on W W II legacy will 
be analyzed in order to understand when and how  historical memory enters political
4debates in order to explain, justify, or excuse policy action. German foreign policy 
rhetoric is highly politicized and rarely neutral, and used in an instrumental way by both 
government officials and scholars. Therefore, research on how rhetoric is used to serve 
and support policy goals poses an im portant inquiry for the field of international 
relations. M ore broadly, this research provides a unique perspective on the current 
state of German foreign policy while taking into consideration the extensive research 
accomplished during the two decades following German unification.
RESEARCH DESIGN
This dissertation will analyze the relationship between Germany's foreign policy 
rhetoric and action based on an analysis of historical and collective memory, 
socialization, learning processes, domestic interests and influence, and Germany's role 
concept, or the relationship of identities and social structures in relation to  Germany's 
history. Scholarly analyses in the past have focused on Germany's role concept of 
civilian power and 'normal' action. The goal and purpose of this dissertation is to  
analyze which foreign policy roles employed by Germany, or different modes of action, 
guide actual foreign policy behavior in each selected case and what factors explain 
changes and continuity in rhetoric and action. Further, this study will analyze how  
rhetoric and action has been perceived by German security studies and how rhetoric 
and historical memory has been used to  make arguments about German foreign policy 
behavior. The contribution to the field o f international relations will include an 
examination of the importance of rhetoric and historical memory in German foreign
5policy, the fram ework in which this action, or /naction is interpreted, and how this 
rhetoric is used to serve German scholars. The theoretical frameworks selected will aid 
in describing patterns of behavior, especially the use of the constructivist notion that 
patterns of behavior can change by identifying rhetoric and action that appear to  
diverge from previously observed continuous foreign policy behavior.
Germany's current foreign policy choices, rhetoric, and behavior, especially 
those surrounding the European financial crisis, have been viewed as a partial return to  
great power politics. Taking a leadership position in Greece's bailout but refraining on 
the UN Security Council vote on military intervention in Libya, and opposing stronger 
sanctions for Iran has posed questions about Germany's current and future role in 
Europe and in the international security environment. This recent behavior called into 
question Germany's role as a responsible actor and Germany's prioritizing of national 
goals and interests over those of the EU. This puzzling observation, and other breaks 
with multilateralism in the past ten years, reaffirms the difficulty in explaining current 
German foreign policy choices; on the one hand Germany's continued com m itm ent 
both rhetorically and practically to  antimilitarism and indicators pointing to Germany as 
a civilian power, and in juxtaposition, foreign policy choices based on calculated pursuits 
of national interests through the use of institutional power. Has German foreign policy 
behavior changed and transformed from a structured to  an agency-based approach? 
How then can Germany's use of rhetoric be understood in influencing and prescribing 
foreign policy choices? This dissertation will test and search for corroboration and 
congruence of several overarching hypotheses that derive from  the research question.
6Focusing on Germany's policy behavior and rhetoric within the last decade and 
the analyses by German scholars and media in regards to Germany's use of rhetorical 
action, the research questions and hypotheses will be applied to tw o policy areas in 
order to examine Germany's foreign and security policy and rhetoric and to determ ine  
when or how change occurs. Out o f area operations as a policy area will provide a 
framework for understanding Germany's continued behavior for cases involving the use 
of force as a regional, internal, and multilateral issue, and an important pillar of German 
foreign policy. While the main focus is on Germany's abstention from  UNSC Resolution 
1973 for Libya in 2011, an argument is made that places the Libya case in a sequence 
with three other cases within the same policy area: Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This 
span of cases provides for a linear inquiry into Germany's foreign policy behavior and 
covers international and internal periods of change to include different coalition 
movements while allowing for a comparison of influencing variables. The second policy 
area under review, nuclear nonproliferation and Iran's nuclear program, provides an 
insight into Germany's behavior internationally towards a global and structural issue. 
While the influence of historical m em ory is the focus of this dissertation, the 
independent variables selected for all cases provide a variation to account for causal 
influences in each case. Finally, this study will analyze the frameworks used to explain 
German foreign and security policy behavior while providing for a comparison of each 
case.
7RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
This dissertation will examine variation in policy behavior and determ ine how  
Germany views, understands, and uses power. Currently, the three pillars of German 
foreign policy are economic interests, rethinking of nuclear power, and continued 
reluctance to use military force. An argument will be made of the enduring importance 
of historical memory in all issue areas of German foreign policy and action. Historical 
and collective memory is widely defined and is explained in depth in chapter tw o of this 
dissertation. Conceptually, historical memory, in this study, refers to  Germany's World 
War II (W W II) legacy as it relates to Germany's culture of restraint, com m itm ent to  
antimilitarism, and inability to project power. Thus, the research question that guided 
this study is: does historical memory determ ine German foreign policy behavior and 
rhetoric? In order to concentrate on the gaps in analyses and literature previously 
mentioned, this dissertation will examine under w hat circumstances historical memory  
influences German foreign policy and which expectations, or role concepts, ultimately  
guide Germany's behavior. Further, this study will determ ine whether German foreign 
policy rhetoric aligns with German policy action and what factors contribute to the  
process of change. As such, this dissertation includes a null hypothesis that analyzes the 
influence of historical memory on contemporary German foreign policy. This hypothesis 
addresses the argument that Germany has a ritualized foreign policy and rhetoric 
determined by historical memory, while the counter to the null hypothesis in turn  
supports an argument that Germany does not have a ritualized foreign policy and 
rhetoric that is determined by historical memory. These hypotheses offer a descriptive
case study geared towards explaining the use of policy and rhetoric based on historical 
memory, norms, culture, and identity. The four variables, used for tw o policy areas and 
within five cases total, account for instances of perceived change over tim e.
Additionally, this study will analyze which theoretical fram ework is used by 
scholars to explain German foreign policy while highlighting in which policy areas 
Germany is willing to lead and or shape the international security environment. The 
importance of the concept of power in this study will be used to address how Germany 
understands and uses its power and w hether Germany's new foreign policy is more 
'realist' than rhetoric lets us assume. This dissertation argues that Germany's previous 
foreign policy behavior involving out of area operations can be seen as a pattern  
consistent with German understanding of power; showing a gradual rather than sudden 
change, due to a reaction to the external security environment. Further, this study does 
not argue that historical memory informs German foreign policy but rather examines 
how  and when historical memory influences norms, interests, and rhetoric. In which 
framework are out of area operations discussed? Which factors, normative or material, 
have the most influence and why? In order to theoretically understand the context of 
this study and to support the argument that Germany uses institutional power to  
strengthen the environment in which policy decisions are made, a theoretical 
comparison of frameworks will be included in the analysis portion of this dissertation.
9DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION 
The second chapter of this dissertation provides the context for understanding 
important factors and variables for the analysis of both issue areas: Germany's role as a 
participant in out of area operations, and as a negotiator w ith the international security 
environment towards Iran's nuclear program. M ore specifically, chapter tw o will define 
and explain historical memory, rhetoric, power, and identity in German foreign policy.
Chapter three will address the theoretical debate about the validity of 
international relations theories. Structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism are 
outlined and defined, while a literature review on an application of theories and 
frameworks to German foreign policy is used to highlight the difficulty in accounting for 
Germany's continuity and change since unification. Further, chapter three will review  
how interests, norms, contextual change, and transformation complicate theoretical 
analyses of power and German foreign and security policy while examining the current 
state of theoretical debates within the field.
Chapter four then analyzes Germany's foreign policy behavior during out of area 
operations by first reviewing historical factors and concepts to  explain Germany's 
difficulties for cases involving the use of force. Beginning w ith Kosovo, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan, this chapter details the facts, policies, rhetoric, and consequences of 
Germany's behavior, ending with the abstention in the case of Libya. Similarly, chapter 
five uses the same criteria to detail the facts surrounding Germany's behavior during the  
negotiations towards Iran's nuclear program.
10
Chapter six analyzes both policy areas and cases by applying the variables, 
detailing the findings, and providing a discussion of the selected cases in order to  
examine the process of change. Further, this chapter also compares and contrasts both 
policy areas in order to account for variance in influential variables, outcomes, and 
behavior by providing alternative explanations. The theoretical frameworks are then  
applied to all five cases to analyze whether Germany's foreign policy behavior can be 
explained and understood through theories, while accounting for change and continuity. 
Finally, chapter seven includes a conclusion of the study along with a discussion 
detailing the limitations of this dissertation while suggesting future research.
11
CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL MEMORY, RHETORIC, POWER, AND IDENTITY IN GERMAN FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY
INTRODUCTION
The literature on German foreign policy, power, and identity is extensive and 
points to several challenges when seeking to explain how security challenges are 
discussed, handled, and met. A few  themes emerge, mainly surrounding the debate of 
Germany's use and understanding over power, especially in regards to  the concept of 
'civilian power'. Germany's security culture is inevitably bound to its past; in order to  
understand how and when historical memory enters political debates, several concepts 
have to be taken into consideration. Rhetoric, in German foreign and security policy, is 
used to explain, defend, and justify policy behavior, while normative values such as 
culture, identity, and history, inform policy choices. Further, Germany continues to  
struggle with power and its use thereof. This chapter will provide the context for the  
analysis of the selected variables for this study in order to determine w hether changes 
in German foreign policy can be categorized as an adjustment to policy, a reconstruction 
to policy, or a continuation of learned behavior and norms.
RHETORIC AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
Political rhetoric has not been used prominently by scholars of international 
relations to explain or understand political phenomena or behavior. Instead, rhetoric is
often treated as a secondary phenomenon with no causal influence itself, but 
accompanied by a physical phenomenon. Political rhetoric, therefore, is viewed in 
relation to material action, especially in regards to foreign and security policy. W ith the  
rise of constructivist approaches and analyses to international relations, the power of 
ideas, beliefs, and culture were included in contemporary arguments of their influence 
on political outcomes. Some political scientists included analyses of how m emory and 
ideas influence actors, while others included ideas and beliefs into foreign policy and 
political change analyses.1 While material power and resources dominated theoretical 
analyses of foreign policy behavior, the continuation of power requires legitimacy 
through rhetorical action.2 This rhetorical action serves as an explanation and 
justification of political agendas and can aid in understanding policy behavior, directly 
influencing political outcomes. In the past, scholars within the rationalist school of 
thought have pointed to the outcomes in cases where rhetorical promise was m et with  
policy inaction, evident thought domestic and international costs.3
In more recent analyses, and predominately through European scholars, 
persuasive political rhetoric is viewed as influencing and internalizing new beliefs 
resulting in social constructs and norms. These scholars often refer to Jurgen Habermas' 
explanation of 'communicative action' to  examine the influence of rhetoric, or, more
1 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton 
University Press, 1976). Judith Goldstein and Robert. O Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, 
Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).
2 Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power or 
Political Rhetoric," European Journal o f International Relations 13, no. 1 (2007).
3 Ibid.
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recently, Frank Schimmelfenig's analysis on 'rhetorical action'.4 According to  
Schimmelfennig, rhetorical action "provides one way of disentangling rational choice 
and ontological materialism and theorizing the context conditions of strategic action".5 
State actors in an international community setting within an institutional environm ent 
can then use norms and values to strengthen community identity in order to validate 
"self-interest".6 It is important to note that actors' strategic behavior and choices may 
be contained in the 'community trap' as the identification with ideas can lead to a 
commitment of community values and identity in order to ensure legitimacy and 
credibility. Rhetoric, especially for Germany, is at the center or the roof of politics, often  
controversial and rarely one-sided. Germany professes to stand for many things; 
showing rhetorical commitment to its allies and international causes. On which issues is 
Germany willing to lead and follow up this rhetorical promise with realized policies and 
action? For German foreign and security policy, rhetorical debates shape and influence 
political outcomes by directly involving identity, ideas, and norms. Historical memory  
directly plays into the rhetoric employed by policy makers in Germany; it is used to  
justify and explain political action and behavior.
4 Ibid. For more on communicative action, see Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 
trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1984). Thomas Risse, ""Let's Argue!": Communicative 
Action in World Politics," International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000).
5 Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern 
Enlargement of the European Union," ibid.55(2001): 77.
6 Ibid.
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HISTORICAL AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
How does our past inform our cultural identity? How is the past rem em bered, 
defined, analyzed, and shared? A differentiation between collective memory and history 
must be made, whereby the collective memory "manifests itself in the actions and 
statements of individuals" and is understood as a shared representation of the past by a 
given community or group.7 Mem ory, especially in conjunction with historical events, 
differs from individual to individual; collective (historical) memory is then 'rem em bered' 
under the shared premise of accepted versions of history. The concept o f historical or 
collective memory is certainly not unique to  Germany; disagreements of remembering  
or retelling the past exist in several forums: from small communities and villages, to 
entire countries, and over global events. Entire journals, books, studies, and courses 
have been dedicated to the study of collective memory, but historians or scholars of 
collective memory generally use French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs' theoretical 
argument to define collective memories as "collectively shared representations of the  
past".8 While Halbwachs' general definition is widely accepted, historians stress the  
importance of individual objectives and memory in shaping the collective, an aspect that 
was dismissed by Halbwachs. Instead, the French sociologist argued that individual 
memory was socially determ ined.9
7 W olf Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective M em ory  
Studies," History and Theory 41, no. 2 (2002): 180.
8 Ibid, 181. For more on Maurice Halbwachs, see Les Cadres sociaux de la memoire (Paris: Alcan, 1925), or 
a review on Halbwachs' work by Patrick Hutton, History as an Art o f M em ory  (Hanover, N.H.: University 
Press of New England, 1993), 73-90.
9 Ibid.
15
W ulf Kantsteiner explains that the unique combination of social significance and 
intellectual challenge gave rise to the increase in the study of memory in the humanities 
and social science, also referred to  as 'popular consciousness'.10 An im portant aspect of 
the study of historical and collective memory is the voice of the storyteller; traditionally  
this voice belongs to the group or people in power whereby versions of the story may 
differ to promote agendas and interests of the power holder. A common them e  
throughout most analyses and definitions of the concept is the plea to collective 
memory, by a community or individual, during times of crisis and insecurity. Historical 
memory is especially analyzed in light of W W II. Scholars have analyzed the ways the  
events of W W II have been remembered, debated, negotiated, and given meaning. 
Collective memory can be divided between communicated memory, which refers to  
orally communicated memory, and cultural memory, which can be in the form  of texts, 
art, architecture, and symbols that were created to  rem em ber the past.11
The study of collective or historical m emory is also referred to  by scholars in 
different terms, such as: "public memory", "national memory", "vernacular memory", 
and "countermemory".12 At the center stage of the study of historical, collective, and 
cultural memory is the nation-state, from which m em ory is produced, reproduced, and 
constructed in the form of language, architecture, and monuments. These productions 
and memories by the powerful class were used in ensuring the  survival o f the nation­
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid, 182
12 Ibid, 181
16
state, ideologies, and traditions.13 Closely tied to  the study o f cultural and collective 
memory is the study of identity in the social science to include cultural identity and 
political identity; yet literature discussing the link between memory and identity is rare. 
While most scholars agree that identity is influenced by historical or collective memory, 
academics insist on proof and facts in historical studies while historical events and 
representations of the past are remembered differently by individuals and groups; 
therefore, posing a theoretical challenge in analyzing the relationship between history 
and memory.14
W hile discussing traumatic experiences, such as the Holocaust, Kansteiner 
argues that trauma and repression in collective m em ory by survivors only shapes 
national memory "if their vision meets with compatible social or political objectives and 
inclinations among other important social groups, for instance, political elites or 
parties".15 In other words, historical (individual) pasts can only be rem em bered in a 
group setting when negotiated with an agenda that fits current (political and social) 
interests.16 Further, collective memory, especially historically-based memory, involves 
agency by individuals in negotiating meaning of the past through shared communicative 
practices. Such agency can result in collective memory of small groups, entire  
communities, nations, or larger geographic a reas .17
13 ibid, 183
14 Ibid, 184
15 Ibid, 187
16 See also:Yael Zerubavel and Robin Wagner-Pacifici, "Recovered Roots: Collective M em ory and the 
Making of Israeli National Tradition," The American journal o f sociology. 102, no. 1 (1996).
17 Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective M em ory Studies,"
189. The author here gives the example of a "European collective memory", referring back to works about
Again, the example of the shared experiences about the Holocaust and W W II are 
frequent subjects in collective memory analysis, as these memories have 'survived' tim e  
and have been shaped collectively through individual memory in varying degrees. 
Therefore, the events and history of W W II have become part of a global dialogue, 
shaping the identity, world view, culture, memory, and rhetoric of individuals who may 
not actually have a direct personal relationship with the events.18 As such, the study of 
collective or historical memory directly aids in understanding and analyzing social 
change while also providing knowledge and insight about discursive formations and 
limits to historical memory which have formed lasting, continuous paradigms. W ithin a 
theoretical framework, historical memory study is most often analyzed through a 
constructivist understanding of history, positioning collective memory as the  
independent variable, or object, of study.
When analyzing how or if historical m em ory can shape the mindset o f citizens, 
and ultimately influence foreign policy, constructivism outlines that "state behaviour is 
first and foremost shaped by the particular set of normative and cognitive beliefs which 
a society and its leaders hold about the nation, its role in the international system, and 
the utility o f military force in the realisation of national goals".19 Although ultim ately  
providing a different prediction, the realist and (neo)liberal schools of international
the validity of this concept by Luisa Passerini, The Question o f  European Identity: A Cultural Historical 
Approach. (Florence: European History Institute, 1998) and several others.
18 Ibid, 190
19 Thomas Berger, "The Past in the Present: Historical M em ory and German National Security Policy " 
German Politics 6, no. 1 (1997): 41.
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relations both assume that foreign policy is influenced and driven by "rational 
calculations of objective national interests", outlined by international structures; not by 
values and beliefs as the constructivist school would argue.20 While realists focus on the  
distribution of capabilities (i.e. military capabilities), neoliberals place value on the  
power of international institutions to influence foreign policy and pursue national 
interests; whereby both schools accept the view that state behavior changes when the  
international system or structure changes.21
Unlike realists and neoliberalists, constructivists argue that the political culture 
of a particular nation, to include the paths chosen to reach national goals, is "reflective 
of the broader collective consciousness of a n a tio n ".22 This political culture stems from  
an institutionalized, continuous process of remembering, analyzing, interpreting, and 
understanding history. For Germany, W W II posed a decisive event, first changing foreign 
and security policy following the war, while having a lasting influence and shadow on 
policy makers that continues to this day. The collective historical m em ory of W W II 
resulted in the rejection of traditional views towards power, military force, defense, and 
security. The next chapter will elaborate on the three theories commonly used to  
analyze German foreign policy, while also introducing other frameworks to understand 
the complexity of German foreign policy. Further, chapter tw o of this dissertation will 
explain and define the key concepts of rhetoric, historical memory, and application of 
these concepts to the study of German foreign and security policy.
20 Ibid.
21 i u - j
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The study of the influence of historic memory on German foreign and security 
policy and rhetoric is not new. Scholars have analyzed the 'shadow of the past' and its 
power to influence contemporary German policies and behavior while continuing to  
define German culture, beliefs, society, and norms. This observation, or phenomenon, is 
different from other countries' conceptions and behaviors surrounding historic memory  
as the intersections of guilt and responsibility are conceptualized, processed, and 
presented differently in countries such as Japan, th e  United States (U.S.), and Russia.
The historic memory about Germany's Nazi past directly shapes the German mindset, 
identity, and consciousness of not only the German people but the international 
community as a whole. When analyzing and discussing historical m emory and Germany, 
the issue areas most prominently examined within the academic debates surround 
foreign policy, national security, out of area operations, and the use of force. Germany's 
slow but evident changes since the end of the Cold W ar are viewed and analyzed in 
terms of Germany becoming a 'normal' actor. W hile realist and liberal scholars place no 
value on the influence of historical memory on foreign policy, instead arguing that state 
behavior changes with the changing structure, scholars within the constructivist school 
emphasize the importance of normative beliefs on a state's and society's behavior.
Germany's defense and security culture can be separated into tw o, perhaps 
three, distinctive periods, all marked by changes within the international system: 
Germany's defense culture immediately following W W II, Germany's defense culture 
after the Cold W ar, and perhaps the defense culture observed after the  September 11 
attacks through the present. While subtle changes have occurred throughout these
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periods, scholars who do not focus their analysis on the impact of historical memory  
have instead attem pted to  analyze, predict, and understand German foreign policy 
theoretically. These analyses have been grouped under the puzzle o f 'change and 
continuity', focusing on the observation that aspects of Germany's foreign and security 
policy (and rhetoric) have remained the same as changes in the system occurred. While 
this observation is partially correct, liberalism and realism fail to fully predict and explain 
this puzzle by omitting the importance of norms and historical memory. Thomas Berger 
most prominently discussed this importance and argued th at while observable changes 
occurred in 1989-1991, w ith an increased freedom  to shape and influence its 
environment, Germany has also staunchly preserved the 'newly' adapted military 
culture values of the post W W II area to include multilateralism, antimilitarism, and 
aspects of civilian power while considering the influence of Germany's domestic 
society.23 Scholars therefore argue that historical m emory will continue to  shape 
German ideas and perceptions of the international environment, and act and change 
accordingly while defining its national interests.
Although the concept of historical m emory is sometimes used as a blanket 
statement to account or explain German behavior, the term  'historical memory' itself, in 
scholarly debate and analyses and for this dissertation, directly corresponds to  
Germany's adopted values and norms towards security and defense policy during the  
reconstruction period following W W II. These values and norms, initially articulated and 
used in rhetoric, have entrenched themselves into the German mindset and have
23 Berger, "The Past in the Present: Historical Mem ory and German National Security Policy " 56.
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become a socially learned norm shared among German society and political actors. This 
mindset extends to ideas about the expansion and reconstruction of the Bundeswehr 
and Germany's security role abroad while considering Germany's responsibility to its 
allies and obligation towards the cause of peace.24 Historically, Germany foreign and 
security policies have been greatly influence by Germany's geopolitical position within  
Europe. After W W II, Germany's security policies underwent radical changes shaped by 
multilateral cooperation, focused on economic growth, and above all, a desire to show  
the international community that Germany had abandoned its Sonderweg. These 
changes in policy are evident through the core principles of 'never again', 'never alone', 
and 'through peaceful means'; collectively comprising Germany's post W W II culture of 
restraint. Perhaps most prominently, 'never again' reflected Germany's com m itm ent to 
pacifism and complete rejection of the militarization of its foreign policy. This principle 
meant no more war, no more genocide, and no more human rights abuses, and was 
reflected through several legal, political and constitutional statues.25 Further, Germany 
relinquished acquisition of nuclear weapons, joining the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
while also accepting further restriction on which conventional weapons could be 
developed by Germany.
Germany's unilateral Nazi past, and rejection thereof, is reflected in the  'never 
alone' principle, pointing to a continued com m itm ent to multilateralism and integration. 
While Germany received sovereignty in 1955, the postwar constraints placed upon the
24 "The Past in the Present: Historical M em ory and German National Security Policy " 54.
25 Hanns Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ’Civilian Power1?," Survival 42, no. 2 (2000): 66.
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German military simultaneously ensured an American security umbrella and a contained 
West German and Bundeswehr under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
command.26 The values and norms taken from 'never alone' further translate into a 
complete rejection of military interventions not sanctioned and legitimized by 
international institutions, such as the UNSC and NATO. 'Through peaceful means' 
emphasizes Germany's focus on diplomatic approaches to foreign and security policy 
and further points to Germany's opposition for military options and the use of force. 
During the Cold War, this translated into a "delicate, highly complex and dynamic 
strategy of war-avoidance through nuclear deterrence" with the American-German 
security relationship.27 Through German diplomatic efforts, such as Ostopolitik, tensions 
between the blocs reduced. The three core principles have guided Germany foreign and 
security policies during the Cold W ar and continue to  shape Germany's approach to  
international relations. The values and norms articulated through these principles 
influenced and defined Germany's interests, identity, and foreign and security policy 
objectives. Historical memory, at the core o f these principles, points to  the critical 
intersection of guilt and the projection of power, m emory and responsibility, and 
commitment and practical ability.
Historical memory is viewed as deeply imbedded in German culture and identity, 
thus difficult to change or adjust and rhetoric and political behavior is ritualized and 
perpetuated in German foreign and security policy. W hile historical or collective
26 "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?," Survival 42, no. 2 (2000): 67.
27 "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?," 69.
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memory is sometimes used broadly within contemporary analysis, scholars within the  
field of international relations explain that using an approach based on cultural and 
historical analysis will uncover the political reasoning that eventually led to constructing 
the behavior, beliefs, and institutions that contributed to  Germany's antim ilitarist 
culture emerging after W W II and continuing into contemporary policy.28 Authors predict 
that Germany will continue to adhere to  its already established pattern of behavior 
unless a "major shock", such as an ending o f Germany's alliance system, occurs; 
however, even in such a case, Germany's behavior would not align with the structuralist 
approach prediction of rational behavior.29
While also emphasizing the importance of history for Germany's foreign and 
security policy, scholars argue that German historical m emory contributed to role 
conflicts. Stepping away from the normalization debate about Germany in international 
relations, Germany has placed "its rhetorical com m itm ent to  exercising a leadership role 
and its practical ability to deliver such, especially in term s of military interventionism ".30 
The renunciation of the past marked the majority of Germany's post W W II 
reconstructive period, embedding itself into German identity and culture. During this 
period (1945-1989), Germany established much o f what is now referred to  the as the  
'civilian power' concept, focusing on a "value-based" foreign policy model, w ith a strong 
commitment to multilateral approaches and national interests based mainly on an
28 Thomas Berger, Cultures o f Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1998), 7.
29 "The Past in the Present: Historical Mem ory and German National Security Policy " 56.
30 Steve Marsh, "The Dangers of German History: Lessons from  a Decade o f Post-Cold W ar German 
Foreign and Security Policy 1," Perspectives on European Politics and Society 3, no. 3 (2002): 389.
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overall acceptance of its allies and international community.31 Most prominently, the  
concepts of 'never alone' and 'never again' paved the way for norms-based approaches 
to out of area operations and military actions, while an emphasis on collective identity, 
rather than national identity, allowed Germany to  align its interests with those of 
Europe.
These "historically socialized" principles and preferences of German foreign 
policy no longer completely aligned with German national interests after the end of the  
Cold War, yet the rhetoric continued to be based on commitments to multilateral 
approaches.32 Subtle changes were observed in the late 1990s with Chancellor 
Schroder's statements about Germany's national self-interests and in the economic 
realm, but ultimately Germany's overall foreign policies remained true to its initially 
reconstructed principles. Scholars detail how these traditional values continued past the  
structural changes of the end of the Cold W ar by analyzing Germany's key post-Cold 
W ar relationships and its checkbook policy and role. The disjuncture between  
Germany's adherence to its norm-based approaches in the past, and the changing 
climate of the international system, became evident with Germany's refusal to use force 
and participate as a responsible actor and exporter of security alongside NATO, the EU, 
and the U.S. Germany's involvement in Kosovo was viewed as Germany's change
31 "The Dangers o f German History: Lessons from a Decade of Post-Cold W ar German Foreign and Security 
Policy 1," Perspectives on European Politics and Society 3, no. 3 (2002): 391.
32 "The Dangers o f German History: Lessons from a Decade o f Post-Cold W ar German Foreign and Security 
Policy 1," 394.
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towards a 'normal' actor, and analyses by scholars within the field of international 
relations began the normalization debates.
Perhaps the initial and radical change observed in Germany's foreign and 
security policy in the Kosovo case, which also critically reinterpreted Germany's 
attachment to the 'never again w ar' concept, enabled scholars and politicians to  
question Germany's role as an international actor. The changes and policies expected of 
Germany following Kosovo simply did not align with Germany's continuous guidance by 
historical memory, therefore allowing som ewhat 'inconsistent policies'. Further, the 
importance and impact of historical m em ory was certainly placed upon Germany by the  
international community immediately following reunification, generally in rhetorical 
discussions by the international community marked by undertones of mistrust and 
mention of the 'German Question'.33 Furthermore, while historical memory shapes 
German foreign policy, and Germany's future path and place in Europe; domestic 
politics were and continue to be highly influenced by history. Specifically, the 1998 
Walser-Bubis debate and the 1999 Ostermarsche, both events directly corresponding to  
the intersections of guilt, remembrance, and normalcy, can be seen as an example of 
the continued influence of historical m em ory.34 The red-green government's break from  
Cold W ar policies, along with rhetorical breaks from Germany's international and 
national interests, resulted in push backs from scholars as well as the international 
community; responses which can be contributed to historical legacies and memories. It
33 Ibid, 405.
34 Ibid, 406.
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is therefore evident that historical and collective memory has an impact on both 
Germany as a nation, inclusive of its domestic culture and outward foreign policies, as 
well as the international community's view of Germany and reaction to Germany's 
behavior following unification.
The expectations of Germany by the international community after unification to  
contribute and commit to multilateral efforts beyond FRG's checkbook diplomacy and 
Germany's national interests at the tim e produced a dilemma and responsibility which 
Germany was unable to fulfill, thus impacting Germany's credibility.35 Scholars 
contributing to this debate also detail Germany's Bundeswehr reform, specifically the  
von Weizsacker Commission report and initial post-Cold W ar interventionism as 
examples of observed changes. Despite the possibility of these reforms to change 
Germany's participation and com m itm ent in multilateral approaches, historical memory  
severely influenced such progress in terms of "defense expenditure, the mismatch 
between promises and commitments, and the nature of the reforms themselves".36 
Similarly, John Duffield, discussing structural realists' prediction and advocacy of 
building nuclear weapons, argues that historical memory prevents any rejection of 
institutionally learned principles and desire to  civilize the Bundeswehr.37
While the use of force analysis after Germany's involvement in Kosovo 
dominated the academic debates, the past tw enty years prove that no substantial shifts
35 Ibid, 407.
36 Ibid, 408. Defense budged halved from 1990 to  2000 to around 1.4 percent of the GDP
37 John S. Duffield, "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources o f Continuity and Restraint," 
Contemporary Security Policy 15, no. 3 (1994): 179.
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in Germany's attitude towards the use of force have occurred. "Moral imperative" 
continues to trump national interests in policies regarding out of area operations as well 
as constitutional constraints, domestic influence, and continuous rhetorical references 
to the past.38 Germany's progress has been influenced and dictated by historical 
memory and socially learned norms; policies adopted during the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) have transcended well beyond unification.39 Germany's past has 
emerged in contemporary policies and rhetoric, both from  within Germany as well as 
the international community, often using history as a stark reminder for controversial 
policy areas. While Germany's national interests have changed, from Germany's 
traditional relationship and alliances to global orientations and especially Germany's 
trade relationships, Germany's foreign policy rhetoric has remained mostly the same. 
Expectations of Germany were not m et with increased responsibility physically, but 
rather history and historic memory have proven to be a burden in Germany's progress 
towards change, while reminders of Germany's troublesome past continue to be used 
for and against Germany and German foreign and security policy.40
Combing aspects of the normalization debate surrounding the concept of power 
in German foreign policy while viewing change through a historical memory lens,
38 Marsh, "The Dangers of German History: Lessons from a Decade of Post-Cold W ar German Foreign and 
Security Policy 1," 412.
39 While FRG remains the official name of Germany since 1949, the abbreviation is commonly used to 
describe Germany's history as West Germany, from 1949 until 1990.
40 Ibid, 414. The author, quoting P.V. Jakobsen explains that the international community remained 
unwilling to bestow 'normal' status upon Germany, instead realizing that "Beating Germany over the head 
with her past or questioning her loyalty to the West with Drang nach Osten rhetoric worked well....when 
they wanted to persuade her to  back down from policies they disliked" For more, see P.V. Jakobsen, 
'Myth-making and Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia', European Security 4  (1995): 
411
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Markovits and Reich examine the impact of collective memory on German foreign policy 
by providing a detailed memory map containing 'm em ory clusters', or historically 
separated events. These clusters are more prominently analyzed after 1945 and detail 
how memory, culture, and identity enter the foreign policy arena. The authors argue 
that a principal collective memory exists in contemporary Germany which continues to  
influence and shape in which fram ework policies are form ulated.41 As discussed earlier, 
this is a general challenge, or contestation, to  structural approaches which focus on the  
influence of power relations. The normalization debate, which is separate from scholars 
discussing change and continuity in German foreign and security policy, enters analyses 
about the influence of historical m em ory when examining the changes from the Bonn to 
the Berlin Republic. While Germany was 'not normal' immediately in 1989, analysts 
began to debate and examine German behavior parallel to normal action in the early 
1990s in light of Bundeswehr reform and German troop deploym ent.42
The early 1990s were marked by changes towards a more capable, responsible 
Germany, evident by statements of Germany's Foreign M inister Klaus Kinkel who  
explained, "Making Germany a partner capable o f assuming a full range of duties is a 
priority task aimed at providing for the future. Our citizens understand that the tim e  
when we were in an exceptional situation is over. W e have no need to demonstrate our 
ability for normality both at home and abroad if we do not want to sustain severe
41 Andrei S. Markovits et al., "The Contemporary Power of Mem ory: The Dilemmas for German Foreign 
Policy," Communication Review 2, no. 1 (1997): 89.
42 "The Contemporary Power of Memory: The Dilemmas for German Foreign Policy," Communication 
Review 2, no. 1 (1997): 91.
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political damage."43 As Germany was becoming more normal, scholars argued that 
German leaders should therefore act according to  realist assumptions.44 The academic 
debate, at this time, was dominated by questions as to  Germany's potential future  
trajectory and use of power, while few  took into consideration the importance of the  
historical memory-identity-foreign policy nexus.45 Historical or collective memory, which 
also informs ideology, contributes to  understanding and explaining German foreign 
policy choices. The norms and values, informed by historical memory, were  
institutionalized by Germany, thus creating a social learning process which changed 
societal memory and practices and contributed to  German national identity.
POWER AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
In order to put into context Germany's foreign and security behavior, the use of 
power has to be analyzed as well. Especially after Kosovo, scholars began to  debate  
Germany's status as a normal actor within a civilian power framework, most 
prominently outlined by Hanns Maull. Germany's identity as a 'civilian power' m eant a 
continuous promotion of multilateralism, integration, institution building, and to  
contain the use of force by advocating international law and norms.46 Germany, as a 
'tamed power' though institutional constraints has aligned its interests and developed
43 Ibid, 91. Klaus Kinkel (1993). Responsibility, realism: Providing for the future German foreign policy in a 
world undergoing a process of restructuring. Statements and Speeches, XVI, 5. New York: German 
Information Center.
44 At the tim e these arguments were first made in 1997, this was not the case. W hether Germany is acting 
"more realist" in its current foreign policy choices is a central debate of this dissertation
45 Markovits et al., "The Contemporary Power of Memory: The Dilemmas for German Foreign Policy."
46 Maull, "Germany and the Use o f Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?," 56.
its political identity parallel to the integration of Europe. W hile Germany participated in 
the Kosovo W ar, which sparked scholarly debate over Germany's status as a 'civilian 
power', analysts argue that Germany's behavior and policies during the armed conflict 
reflected the principles of a civilian power state, emphasizing Germany's involvement 
based on humanitarian assistance. Throughout the conflict, Germany took in the  
majority of the refugees and led the  dialogues to reconstruct the area while 
strengthening alliance solidarity.47 The 'normalization' debate about Germany's use of 
power and foreign and security policy began with Germany's presumed change and shift 
in policy and apparent deviation from  previously held approaches.
Scholars in the field analyze Germany's path toward normalcy by examining 
whether Germany acts according to  its level of power. Here, the assumption is that as 
Germany's power has increased due to unification and changes in the system, changes 
in Germany's national interests should follow. According to some scholars, due to the  
restraints of responsibility, a lack of understanding in defining its national interests, and 
its power, German foreign policy will not be 'norm al'.48 Scholars also point to  the  
rhetorical promises made by Germany which were not met with political action. Instead, 
scholars point to Germany's use of 'soft balancing' approaches in order to influence the  
international environment.
47 "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ’Civilian Power1?."
48 Christian Hacke, Die Aussenpoiitik Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: W eltmacht W ider Wilier? (Berlin, 
Germany: Ullstein, 1997).
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Soft Balancing
Soft balancing is a relatively new addition to the balance of power theory, 
defined by non-military forms of intervention or balancing evident since the end of the  
Cold W ar, but more specifically since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. W ithin the literature  
surrounding the balance of power, soft balancing is discussed in connection w ith hard 
balancing and bandwagoning. The concept itself has sparked a debate within the field in 
terms of its validity as an actual theory. Several political actions and policies by the EU to  
balance U.S. hegemonic power have been described as soft balancing practices; 
however, other authors in the field have dismissed such claims stating that the  
reasoning behind certain policies are not m eant to balance the U.S. as the EU is 
attempting to build an alliance partnership.
T.V. Paul argues that since the end of the Cold War, second tier major powers 
have pursued indirect balancing through diplomatic bargaining "intended to  constrain 
U.S. power" which constitutes soft balancing.49 One of the most powerful tools is the  
veto power states hold in the UN Security Council which could deny legitimacy during 
U.S. led interventions. The author also outlines specific conditions under which soft 
balancing occurs:50
(1) the hegemon's power position and military behavior are o f growing concern 
but do not yet pose a serious challenge to sovereignty of second tie r powers; (2) 
the dominant state is a major source of public goods in both the economic and 
security areas that cannot simply be replaced; and (3) the dom inant state cannot
49 T.V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 58.
50 These conditions were first introduced in T.V. Paul, "Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of 
Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevant,' in Paul, W irtz, and Fortmann, Balance o f Power, pp. 1- 
25.
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easily retaliate either because the balancing efforts o f others are not overt or 
because they do not directly challenge its power position with military means. 
While pursuing soft balancing, second tier states could engage the hegemon and 
develop institutional links with it to  ward off possible retaliatory actions.51
Soft balancing has become a strategy specifically observed during the past ten
years when second tier powers challenged the legitimacy of U.S. policies, not only
internationally but also by influencing U.S. domestic public opinion. This also affects the
legitimacy of humanitarian interventions as these missions warrant the approval of the
United Nations or other multilateral institutions. For example, the invasion of Iraq in
2002/3  can be seen as a soft-balancing effort. The veto stages during the United Nation
Security Council debates constitutes a soft balancing act at the diplomatic level resulting
in the invasion by the U.S. w ithout international approval and legitimacy. During the
events leading up to the invasion, France, Germany, Russia, and China demanded
additional time for the weapons inspections, and argued in front of the Security Council.
Germany and France also used NATO to  block the U.S.'s attem pt to use the alliance in
the invasion, therefore engaging in soft balancing tactics. Throughout this process,
France and Germany were the most outspoken, but France's position mirrored that of
its own foreign policy with a goal of a multipolar system "in which Europe acts as a pole
to balance against the U.S."52
According to scholars, Germany has engaged in soft balancing measures by using
international institutions such as the UN Security Council, NATO, and the EU, to restrain
U.S. power. Despite major opposition by second tie r major powers, the invasion of Iraq
51 Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy."
52 Ibid, 67.
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by the U.S. did not result in hard balancing against the U.S.; however, the soft balancing 
practices employed Germany and other countries make it difficult for the U.S. to gain 
peacekeeping personnel and support. Soft balancing efforts resulted in a unanimous 
approval of UN resolution 1546/2004 which outlined that the  U.S. would end its 
occupation of Iraq before June 30, 2004.53 On the other hand, other security scholars 
directly question the concept o f soft balancing, stating that the soft balancing argument 
has "no traction".54
The soft balancing argument initially became known at the end of the 1990s 
when scholars articulated the difference between the traditional balancing involving 
military action and the softer forms of balancing.55 W hile analyzing the policies of 
Germany, France, and Russia in regards to  Iraq, proponents o f the soft balancing 
approach argued that the purpose was to "constrain American power, now liberated  
from the ropes of bipolarity."56 The soft balancing argument combines aspects of 
Kenneth Waltz's structural theory and Stephen W alt's theory, and, according to  other 
scholars, has to be linked to  show a causal relationship to  the systemic power of the U.S. 
Soft balancing measures should be aimed at implicating U.S. capabilities rather than  
simply aggravating U.S. policies, otherwise the argument itself becomes illogical. The
53 Ibid, 70.
54 Robert J. Art et al., "Striking the Balance (Correspondence)," International Security 30, no. 3 (2005): 106. 
Other authors who have extensively discussed soft balancing and have been reviewed but not directly 
included in this research paper are: Robert A. Pape "Soft Balancing: How States Pursue Security in a 
Unipolar World", annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 
September 5, 2004; Stephen M . Walt, "Keeping the World Off Balance," in Ikenberry, America Unrivaled 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004).
55 The authors cited early work byJoffe and W alt which included Josef Joffe, "Defying History and Theory: 
The United States as the 'Last Superpower,'" in Ikenberry, American Unrivaled.
56 Originally cited in Joffe, "Gulliver Unbouond."
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soft balancing argument is continuously placed, by all authors, into a greater debate  
surrounding the application of balance of power theory and the current international 
system. Authors who argue against the validity o f the soft-balancing approach point to  
the lack of transparency by governments in regards to decision making processes in 
foreign policy matters.57 The soft balancing argument has also been used to  explain EU 
defense cooperation and defense policies, yet the increased EU military capability is also 
due to the U.S.'s decreased presence in Europe. In regards to the invasion of Iraq and 
opposition by states to the U.S. position, some scholars argue that the soft balancing 
argument misinterprets and oversimplifies what actually happened. According to  some 
authors, the positions taken by Germany, France, Turkey, and Russia can be explained 
based upon policy preferences and domestic and European politics, not stemming from  
the power of the U.S. Further, an argument is made for the Iraq case in regards to  
bargaining, rather than soft balancing. A distinction has to be made between policy 
bargaining and normal diplomatic friction; "Policy bargaining" refers to  behavior 
designed to obtain the best outcome for a state on a given issue or set of issues by 
deploying the most effective manner to the power assets that the state currently  
possesses. "Balancing" refers to behavior designed to  create a better range of outcomes 
for state vis-a-vis another state or coalition of states by adding to the power assets at its 
disposal, in an attem pt to offset or diminish the advantages enjoyed by that o ther state 
or coalition.58 Assets include military forces, economic power, formal and informal
57 Brooks & Wohlforth here refer to  France, Russia, and China.
58 Art et al., "Striking the Balance (Correspondence)," 184.
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alliances, and voting and veto power in international organizations, whereby the first 
three are considered hard assets and the last tw o soft assets. Therefore, when the first 
three are used it constitutes hard balancing; the last tw o, soft balancing.
IDENTITY AND GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL
IDENTITY AND EU EXPANSION 
German identity since the end of W W II was developed and constructed parallel 
to European identity, as Germany was the driving force behind integration; aligning its 
national interests with the goals and interests of Europe. This alignment has resulted in 
Germany being called "The Good European" in scholarly analysis. Identity and culture 
certainly influence domestic and international politics, and it is therefore im portant to  
include identity construction and European identity in order to  understand and explain 
German foreign policy choices.
First, a distinction has to be made for the terms "Europe" and "European Union". 
When referring to "Europe" or "European", especially in the political sense, "Europe" 
here implies a collective action by an organization, different from individual national 
actions. The European Commission's map includes 34 European countries (not including 
Turkey or the Ukraine) while the European Union consists of 27 m ember states, some 
other lists even count 40 states.59 Identities are ever changing with interests, 
preferences, and loyalties, and can be viewed in relation to others as well as a sense of
59 James A. Caporaso, "The Possibilities of a European Identity,” Brown Journal o f World Affairs 12, no. 1 
(2005).
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belonging to a society. This means that "identities are less concrete than interests but 
more substantial than preferences" in that interests have no real existence separate 
from our collective understanding of them .60. Preferences differ from  identity as 
preferences can change quickly. Further, an individual can have several identities nested 
within another; for example "I am a Rhinelander, a German, and a European " 61
In order to analyze identity within a European context, the concept of democracy 
has to be considered and analyzed. Further, a common identity among the governed is 
necessary in order for democratic forms of government to work; however, some 
scholars argue that democracy in all of Europe is impossible as no 'true' European 
identity exists. Several factors contribute the construction of the 'new' European 
identity, to include the completion of a single m arket and European M onetary Union 
(EMU), the Single European Act, and the Maastricht Treaty which resulted of a 
borderless union with freedom of the movem ent of goods, services, and capital. Beyond 
this, the EU has a flag, symbol, motto, and hymn. The question here remains w hether 
further integration requires a common European identity.
Another common way to construct identity is by identifying "the other". Recent 
debates within identity studies show that this 'other' is no longer the Soviet Union, but 
has become the U.S. Despite U.S. support of the European project since the end of 
W W II, the U.S. has been an economic com petitor to  the EU. Further, the U.S. and the EU
60 Ibid, 66. The author here uses the theoretical framework used by Thomas Risse in "European 
Institutions and Identity Change: W hat have we learned?" in Richard Hermann, Thomas Risse, and Marylin 
Brewer, Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2004), p. 148.
61 Caporaso, "The Possibilities of a European Identity," 67.
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are different in military capabilities, political structures, and ideological opposition over 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), capital punishment, the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, the Kyoto Treaty, and the Iraq w ar.62 Such differences have been particularly 
evident since September 11th and the positions held by the EU and the U.S. in regards 
to Middle East policies surrounding Israel and Palestine.
W hat is Europe and who does the EU claim to represent? These questions come 
up in conjunction with scholarly analysis about enlargement and integration. The most 
recent EU enlargement has created a golden curtain divide between a W est o f "wealth, 
affluence, a large middle class, democracy, hope, progress, the Enlightenment, 
Christianity, human rights, and civilization" whereas to  the East in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Central Asia lies "poverty, backwardness, authoritarianism, stagnation, grayness, lack of 
hope, Orthodoxy, often dismal human rights record, and lack of civilization".63 Although 
the EU membership criteria was laid out in the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, it appears that 
another crucial criteria has become an important aspect in enlargement policies: 
culture, identity, and, essentially "Europeaness". How do we define Europe? W hat is 
Europe and who is allowed to call themselves European? Scholars discuss the question 
of legitimacy and justification within the EU's enlargement policy. From these analyses, 
three different analytical reasons can be drawn to  explain enlargement: pragmatic,
62 Ibid, 72.
63 Howard Wiarda, "Where Does Europe End Now? Expanding Europe's Frontiers and the Dilemmas of 
Enlargement and Identity," Brown Journal o f World Affairs 12, no. 1 (2005): 90.Also adopted from Samuel 
Huntington's Clash o f Civilizations
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ethical-political, and moral.64 The pragmatic explanation here refers to the approach 
where policy is justified by the result of expected outcome (utility based calculations); 
the ethical-political approach relies on the idea of a "collective us" and the values 
attributed to a given community; the moral approach would justify enlargement based 
on universal standards of justice.65
When considering European identity and analyzing the rhetoric used by 
politicians in discussions towards EU membership applicants, arguments can be grouped 
on either rights-based approaches, referring back to the Copenhagen Criteria, or value 
based approaches, referring to cultural and identity factors. This is particularly true in 
the case of Turkey; cultural arguments brought forth against Turkish accession suggests 
that due to religion, history, and tradition, Turkey does not pass as 'European'. The 
German Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Austrians, along with several political 
leaders in France, have argued for a privileged partnership agreement between the EU 
and Turkey instead. The British, to include a very outspoken Tony Blair, have been in 
favor of granting Turkey EU membership. The importance of identity as an explanatory 
variable has been analyzed by scholars in both international relations as well as 
psychology, and is interesting to  consider when using Germany as a case study. W hile  
German identity is certainly unique, Germany has constructed its goals and interests in 
line with those of the EU in the past. German identity is further complicated as patriotic 
feelings have been suppressed and viewed negatively due to  Germany's Nazi past.
64 Helene Sjursen, "Why Expand?: The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the Eu's Enlargement 
Policy.," Journal o f Common M arket Studies 40(2002).
65 Ibid, 494.
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Symbolisms of German specific identity are therefore difficult to pinpoint in present 
times; flags, anthems, and patriotic behavior most likely occur during sporting events 
and are completely absent in daily activities. Despite this, identity has been used widely 
as a variable that influences foreign policy behavior.
Social Identity Theory (SIT) has been used to show that identity is the most 
important factor that influences policies which either oppose or support EU 
enlargement. According to SIT, identity is the explanatory variable in understanding 
policy preferences toward applicant countries.66 M ore specifically, SIT has been applied 
to analyze the mechanism of identity and rhetoric used by Germany, France, and Great 
Britain in the case of Turkey. Here, decision makers' support for or against accession in 
1999, 2002, and 2005 is examined. The study showed that the  traditional theory of 
rationalism currently used to explain EU expansion has not sufficiently addressed 
enlargement comprehensively.67
In the literature, expansion is often explained by way of cost-benefit analysis 
from economic standpoints. Some authors analyze EU enlargement from a more 
constructivist standpoint o f member states' understanding o f applicant states' identity  
and how such applicant states fit into their own identity. This debate has been coined 
the "great debate" within EU expansion as the relationship between rhetorical action
66 Tyler M. Curley, "Social Identity Theory and E.U. Expansion," International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 3 
(2009).The author also discusses other aspect o f social psychology and its focus on the scientific study of 
human behavior. For more on this, see Michael A. Hogg and Daniel Abrams, Social Identifications: A Social 
Psychology o f Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (London: Routlege, 1988).
67 Curley, "Social Identity Theory and E.U. Expansion," 649.
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and identity is examined.68 According to  the SIT, individuals with a strong group identity 
are inclined to oppose applicants based on "identity and likeness to  the group" whereas 
individuals with a weak group identity are supportive of allowing new applicants as long 
as they meet membership criteria.69 Using SIT to examine EU enlargement and 
Germany's response and behavior, scholars attem pt to  combine the shortcomings of the 
constructivist approach by supplementing aspects of the rational approach and 
emphasizing Alexander Wendt's idea that "identities are the basis of interests" in 
regards to EU enlargement and policy preferences.70
The rationalist approach towards assessing foreign policy choices assumes that 
actions are taken in order to  produce the best outcomes, treading individuals as the 
basic units of the analysis. Within rational choice theory, utility is defined in material 
terms, which would result in an argument that EU decision makers would prefer 
candidates whose membership would bring the most security and economic gains in the 
future. The inclusion of the identity variable in regards to foreign policy choices of 
decision makers then allows for an analysis of motives and influence for EU 
enlargement. When considering Germany's behavior towards Turkey's EU membership 
application in terms of national vs. group identity, differences from Britain's and 
France's national identity are distinct.
68 Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement 
of the European Union.”
69 Curley, "Social Identity Theory and E.U. Expansion," 650.
70 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is W hat States M ake of It: The Social Construction o f Power Politics," 
International Organization, no. 2 (1992): 398.
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Germany's national identity has been reconstructed to  overcome the  
nationalistic Nazi past of W W II. Germany's new identity, however, is not necessarily a 
direct result of EU integration, but rather complementary, overcoming "the other" and 
"a failed past" while building a "civilian power" within the fram ework of the EU.71 Policy 
makers within Germany have supported further integration, which has included support 
of the single currency. For example, when analyzing Germany's position on Turkey's 
membership application, rhetoric shows that Gerhard Schroder was strongly supportive 
of granting membership in hopes o f creating a relationship that would overlook identity, 
cultural, and religious differences between Turkey and Europe. Despite Angela Merkel's 
ties to the German Christian Democrats (CDU), which does not support accession 
negotiations with Turkey, the German Chancellor has stated that she will continue EU- 
Turkey talks.72 German identity is based on a variety of constructs, shaped and 
influenced by historical memory. For over seventy years, Germany has balanced the  
delicate relationship between guilt and responsibility, especially in regards to  foreign 
policy. While portraying the role of a security exporter on one hand, Germany also held 
on to its culture of restraint in both political rhetoric and action.
Summary
This chapter has outlined im portant concepts in order to understand German 
foreign and security policy. Political rhetoric in Germany is an important instrument
71 Curley, "Social Identity Theory and E.U. Expansion," 658.
72 Ibid, 658. Curley also analyzes statements by German foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in 2005.
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used to explain, justify, and show Germany's actions, while historical m emory forms the 
basis of my argument in this dissertation. M ore specifically, the cases examined later 
within this dissertation detail how and when historical m emory enters German rhetoric 
while explaining in which ways historical m emory shapes the course of German foreign 
policy behavior. The importance of power in international relations is a theoretical 
given. The increase in Germany's power, both economically and within an institutional 
setting, especially after unification, shows that Germany has not developed a distinct 
political identity that accounts for this increase in power. W hile Germany's political 
identity evolved parallel to EU enlargement, a distinctively complicated intersection of 
power, guilt, and responsibility remains constant in German foreign and security policy, 
especially in light of Germany's changes in interests.
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CHAPTER III
EXPLAINING GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: THE THEORETICAL DEBATE
INTRODUCTION
Before discussing specific theoretical applications and arguments to the  
examination and understanding of German foreign policy, it is im portant to define the  
three international relations theories used in the analysis portion of this dissertation to  
understand German foreign and security policy: rhetoric, the influence of historical 
memory, and the frameworks in which scholars position their analyses and arguments. 
Structural realism or neorealism is used as a fram ework of analysis in order to  provide a 
systemic analysis of German foreign policy with a focus on power and military capability 
to  reach foreign policy goals. Liberalism, or Moravcsik's liberal theory of international 
politics, will aid in understanding how domestic politics and institutions influence 
foreign policy, while constructivism will provide a fram ework to incorporate and 
emphasize how German foreign policy is shaped and constructed socially and 
historically through identity, ideas, norms, and culture. Each theoretical fram ework will 
contribute to understanding and analyzing how or if historical memory influences 
German foreign policy choices and rhetoric during the selected case studies and under 
which lenses scholars analyze political culture in Germany.
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Structural Realism
Kenneth W altz' theory of neorealism focuses on international politics and 
assumes that state behavior can be explained and understood by the distribution of 
power in the international system. Realism, a theory of international relations, makes 
three major assumptions: 1. Actors are rational units within an international structure of 
anarchy; 2. State preferences are fixed and conflicting goals lead to  continuous 
bargaining among states;1 3. M aterial capabilities influence state behavior.2 Neorealism  
differs from classical realism, which is focused human nature, in that it is concerned 
with the structure of the international system. This structure is assumed to  be anarchic 
and perpetual conflicts among states exists. Further, power is measured in terms of 
military and economic capabilities which determ ine the relationship among states.
In his influential article, Structural Realism after the Cold War, the author 
defends the theory and addresses critics of the theory who called for an end, or death, 
of realism. Waltz stresses the importance of differentiating between "changes of the  
system" and "changes in the system", whereby only the form er would constitute an end 
to realism.3 Changes in the international system are of particular importance to the  
analysis of German foreign policy, as the end of the Cold W ar and German unification 
are both seen as changes within the system, which should then result in a changed 
foreign policy objective or execution. Discussions on changes of the structure of the
1 According to Waltz, state "at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for 
universal domination". Kenneth Neal W altz, Theory o f International Politics /  Kenneth N. W altz (Boston, 
Mass. : McGraw-Hill, 1979), 118.
2 Jeffrey W . Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," International Security, no. 2 (1999): 
14-18.
3 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," ibid.25, no. 1 (2000): 5.
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system versus changes at the unit level guide W altz' central questions in search of the  
factors that could change the international system and politics entirely, which, 
according to the author, is unlikely despite influential factors such as the spread of 
democracy and international institutions. Realism, to Waltz, remains the "basic" theory  
for international relations, accounting for both historic as well as current events, and 
also predicting the future of the international system. W altz structures his defense of 
realism by analyzing scholarly literature, competing theories, and colleagues' claims, 
while injecting historic facts and explanations. In regards to democratic peace theory, 
which assumes that democracies do not wage war against one another, W altz states 
that it is easier to explain war than to  analyze and understand the conditions under 
which peace flourishes. Emphasizing the changing international system which operates 
without guarantees of alliances (today's friend, tom orrow's enemy), W altz stands by his 
early arguments of structural realism, which outline the anarchic system and its survival 
in the event of democratic states globally.4
Waltz' criticism of democratic peace theory, in support of structural realism, 
continues when the author reviews the effects of interdependence, which he refers to  
as "weak"; stating that "with zero interdependence, neither conflict nor w ar is possible. 
W ith integration, international becomes national politics".5 This central argument 
further sets up Waltz' defense of realism in conjunction with institutionalism and the  
role of institutions in shaping international politics. Institutions, according to Waltz,
4 Ibid, 10.
5 Ibid, 15
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have little effect on the international system. Using the case of NATO, the  author shows 
the difference in explaining international institutions and alliances through institutional 
theory, differentiating between functions that fluctuate as structure changes. The end 
of the cold war becomes part of W altz' analysis, when he explains why institutions, such 
as NATO, are still around despite the initial purpose for NATO appearing to be no longer 
needed. Discussing the function of NATO, and its purpose as a "vehicle for the  
application of American power and vision to  the security order in Europe", W altz 
dismisses institutionalist interpretations and instead argues that "international 
institutions serve primarily national rather than international interests".6
One of the central aspects of realism, balance of power theory, argues that 
balancing against the strongest state will occur eventually, although realist theory is 
unclear when such balancing will happen. W ith a focus on the structure of the 
international system, W altz discusses the  potential of future great power candidates 
such as Germany and the EU, China, and Russia, adding that "for a country to  choose 
not to become a great power is a structural anomaly".7 Structural changes, such as the  
end of the Cold W ar, are then predicted to  affect the behavior of states and the foreign 
policy choices made w ithout actually changing the international system.8 A m ajor flaw  
of realist theory then is its ability to  explain the EU and how the structural changes of 
going from a bipolar system to a multipolar system resulted in international institutions 
and cooperation on the European continent. Similarly, realism cannot account for the
6 Ibid, 20-21
7 Ibid, 33
8 Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 39.
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case of Germany: a great power economically but not in terms of military capability; 
instead Germany has adopted an anti-militaristic political culture since the end of 
W W II.9 Critics of structural realism also point to the absence of balancing against the  
U.S. by European countries.10
Centrally positioned in neorealist theory is the concept of anarchy and survival. 
According to Waltz, "In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured 
can states safely seek other goals as such as tranquility, profit, and pow er".11 Although 
accepting Waltz' system level theory, Keohane argues that the structural definition of 
the system itself excludes the role institutions play in shaping and influencing the  
international system.12 Other scholars also emphasize the shortcomings of neorealism  
and theory's ability to explain change in global politics, pointing to the fallacy of 
presenting a theory as universally applicable. Reviewing and comparing neorealism and 
historical materialism, scholars argue that both pay attention to conflict w ithout 
adequately including human practices.13 Overall, critics of structural realism point to the 
theory's denial of the social basis and limits of power, the lack of neorealism to  account 
for both change and continuity, and its failure to include history.
9 The case of Germany in regards to structural realism and theoretical applications will be further 
discussed within this chapter.
10 Although several scholars argue that balancing by European countries against the U.S. has occurred 
through soft balancing, such as Germany's and France's position during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
11 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power " in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. 
Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 127.
12 Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 194.
13 Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States, and W orld Orders " in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. 
Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 215.
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In a response to the rising attractiveness of institutional theories after the end of 
the Cold War, John Measheimer discusses and defines the approach for three theories 
that emphasize institutions as a crucial factor in promoting word peace: liberal 
institutionalism, collective security, and critical theory.14 Mearsheim er addresses the  
basis of disagreement between these approaches and realism, namely w hether 
institutions "affect the prospects of international stability".15 Realists assume that 
institutions are a reflection of the distribution of power, calculated by powerful states, 
and arise by calculated self-interest, whereas institutionalists assume that institutions 
can affect state behavior, are independent, and can directly influence w hether states 
pursue war.16 Mearsheimer defines institutions as "a set o f rules th at stipulate the ways 
in which states should cooperate and compete w ith each other", outlining mutually 
accepted and negotiated forms and laws of state behavior.17 To realists, the  
international environment is a continuous struggle for power and security competition, 
therefore constraining cooperation between states, whereby the state is anarchic, 
states have military capability and are uncertain about the intentions of other states, 
and state behavior is driven by a desire for survival.18 Realists assume that cooperation  
is possible, but argue that states first weigh profits and gains by thinking in either 
absolute gains or relative gains, whereby power balancing forces states to  focus on 
relative gains when contemplating cooperation. Scholars point to the limitations of
14 John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, no. 3 
(1994).
15 Ibid, 7
16 Ibid
17 Ibid, 8
18 Ibid, 10
49
cooperation, such as concerns of cheating, before discussing cooperation in the form of 
alliances that occurred historically, such as NATO.
Some realists argue that liberal institutionalism ignores security issues by 
focusing on economic issues, pointing to  flaws in Keohane's causal logic and analyzing 
the central threat of cheating when states cooperate; the prisoner's dilem m a.19 Some 
scholars therefore partially dismiss this theory, noting relative-gains concerns before 
offering several counter-arguments in reviewing cases for institutionalism, but 
essentially finding no evidence th at liberal institutionalism succeeds in answering 
central questions. Opponents of the institutionalist approach conclude that the theory  
and its practical application is bound to fail, offering the league of nations as a historic 
example and the war in Bosnia as a recent example.
Liberalism
Liberalism encompasses several schools o f thought, concepts, and theories 
which generate several strands of liberalism. International relations theorists 
differentiate between four strands of post-war liberalism: Sociological Liberalism, which 
focuses on transnational relations; Interdependence Liberalism, surrounding the idea of 
mutual dependence; Institutional Liberalism, a theory that outlines the importance and 
impact of international institutions on cooperation among states; and Republican 
Liberalism, outlining the argument that liberal democracies are more peaceful and law-
19 ibid, 17
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abiding than non-democratic countries.20 The main concern liberalist theorists have with 
realism is that although realism offers prediction into future state behavior (conflict), 
the theory does not outline "when, why, and under w hat circumstances" such conflict 
occurs.21 Unlike realism's focus on the distribution of material power and capabilities to 
drive and influence state behavior, liberalism focuses on preferences, norms, 
institutions, ideas, and perceptions to explain the international system.
Although different forms of liberalism as they apply to  the study of German 
foreign policy will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, for the purpose of the case 
study analysis part of this dissertation, Andrew Moravcsik's fram ework of liberal theory  
of international politics will applied. This fram ework outlines ways to  explain and 
understand state behavior based on the argument that state behavior is directly 
influenced by the relationship between states and the domestic and transnational civil 
society.22 According to liberal theory, state preferences have the most significant impact 
in world politics, whereby Moravcsik's fram ework further emphasizes how interests, 
institutions, and societal ideas impact state behavior by influencing state preferences 
through three core assumptions of liberalism: 1. The primary actors in international 
politics are individuals and private groups; 2. States represent domestic society; 3. The 
pattern of interdependent state preferences establishes state behavior.23 This
20 Robert H. S0rensen Georg Jackson, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
21 Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?," 27.
22 Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," 
International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513.
23 "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization 51, 
no. 4 (1997): 515-20.
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framework therefore seeks to show how state preferences are influenced by societal 
interaction and change through "transnational social context".24 The liberalist 
fram ework can explain units of analysis that include foreign policy goals and choices of 
individual actors but also the systemic results of interactions among states by focusing 
on domestic theories of preferences. According to  Moravcsik, liberal theory suggests an 
explanation for change in the international system based on historical circumstances, 
such as the influence of global economic development on social and political change.
State preferences are central to liberal analyses and differ greatly from strategies 
employed by states. State preferences, when analyzed from  a liberal fram ework, can be 
studied through "decision-making documents, trustworthy oral histories and memories, 
patterns of coalition support, and the structure of domestic institutions".25 Similarly, 
Volker Rittberger outlines how utilitarian liberalism focuses on "subsystemic 
determinants of foreign policy behavior" by examining how the preferences and 
interests of domestic actors shape foreign policy choices.26 This is in line with the  
overarching focus of liberalism of citizens in global politics, due to interdependence 
issues and technological advances, advancing the inquiry beyond the state, and instead 
analyzing the relationship between groups, societies, and private individuals.27
In summary, liberalism, unlike neorealism, theoretically focuses on how the  
individual and groups of individuals, influence and shape state behavior and global
24 Ibid, 522
25 Ibid, 544
26 Volker Rittberger, German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies (Manchester, UK: 
Manchester University Press, 2001), 4.
27 Jackson, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 111.
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politics. Further, the liberalist fram ework assumes that several concepts (such as conflict 
and cooperation) have an impact on international relations whereby a differentiation  
between sociological, interdependence, institutional, and republican liberalism can be 
made. Within the liberal fram ework, scholars may focus their analyses on actor- 
centered inquiries, which examines how domestic actors and their interests influence 
foreign policy and state behavior, or the structure-centered approach which emphasizes 
how institutional aspects of states influence international behavior.28
Constructivism
The constructivist fram ework primarily seeks to show how core concepts of 
international relations are socially constructed through a continuous process of social 
practice, learning, and interaction. Constructivism as such, provides a fram ework to  
analyze the influence of non-structural variables on state behavior, such as identity, 
ideas, norms, culture, and history. The basic assumption of constructivism is that actors 
in the international system follow the logic of appropriateness, a behavior shaped and 
learned through social norms. International and societal norms are therefore the main 
variable for foreign policy analysis within the constructivist analysis.29 Perhaps most 
prominently, Alexander W endt argues "that the structures of human association are 
determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities
28 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 105.
29 For more on logic of appropriateness, refer to James G. March and Johan P. Olson, Rediscovering 
Institutions (New York, NY: New York: Free Press, 1989).
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and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than 
given by nature".30
Constructivist scholars generally critique the  focus on material-based 
assumptions of international relations theory, instead focusing on how the social 
elements in world politics can aid in understanding change at the international level.31 
Responding to the emphasis on structure-based analysis of the realist school, 
constructivists first used the concept of 'agency' in international relations analysis, with  
an underlying argument that world politics are "a world of our making".32 The concept 
of rationality, which in realist theory is a function of individual interests, is viewed by 
constructivists as a utility of legitimacy based on shared norms within social structures.33 
As such, norms shape and constrain human behavior, and directly construct identities, 
which then have the agency to influence their environment.
Summing up the major arguments of social constructivism and the debate 
between structure and agency, Alexander W endt outlines how actors in social 
relationships are dependent on and influenced by each other's choices and responses, 
resulting in a mutually constituted environm ent.34 Although not dismissing the emphasis 
on interests in major international relations theories, constructivists continuously tie the  
predominant concepts back to the identity of actors, as the subjects, or objects, studied
30 Alexander W endt, Social Theory o f International Politics /  Alexander Wendt, Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations: 67 (Cambridge, U K ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999., 1999), 1.
31 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity, 168.
32 This idea was first brought forth by Nicholas Onuf. For more see: Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World o f  
Our Making : Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, Studies in International Relations 
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).
33 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity, 170.
34 Wendt, "Anarchy Is W hat States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 404.
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in international relations are constructed and given cultural, social, political, or historical 
meaning.35 The goal and main emphasis of constructivism is to understand the social 
meaning of human reasoning and behavior, focusing on the social (rather than the  
individual), encompassed in the W eberian concept of Verstehen.36 Further, 
constructivism focuses on the process of interaction and language among actors in the  
international system based on legitimacy and social learning.
German Foreign Policy theories and Frameworks
The end of the W W II changed German identity forever both nationally and 
internationally. Since then, the German government has taken steps to repair German 
culture by advocating a foreign policy that is aligned with international law and norms. 
Power politics, in its traditional sense, has therefore been absent from  policies, and 
Germany's heavy involvement in European integration further showed an overall 
commitment to community goals. The unification o f Germany in 1990 has raised several 
questions by scholars as to the future role Germany will play in Europe, and how  
Germany will utilize power through foreign policy choices. In analyzing these questions, 
James Sperling asks, "W hat is the best conceptual fram ework for explaining and 
predicting the future trajectory of German foreign policy?"37 The factors of changes or
35 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity, 171.
36 Ibid
37 James Sperling, "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model of a Post-Modern Major 
Power? A Review Essay " German Politics 12, no. 3 (2003): 2.
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continuity that have occurred since unification are im portant to analyze, while also 
reflecting to what extent they affect German foreign policy.
Reviewing Germany's foreign policy choices in 2003, Sperling investigates 
scholars who have answered these questions by applying different theoretical 
frameworks, all concluding that Germany acts as "something other than a realist 
power"38,39. Further claims made by the authors under review argue that German 
foreign policy has been marked by normative goals instead of material-based interest 
goals, while others emphasize the issue of continuity.40 Almost all authors under review  
reject neorealist claims and predictions, to include arguments brought forth by John 
Mearsheimer.41 Neorealist theory predicts that w ith the change in the balance of power 
that occurred in 1989, changes in German foreign policy would also be observed, which 
has not been the case. Neorealists therefore ask how this change in relative power 
presents the opportunity for a more aggressive German foreign policy that includes 
(nationalized) changes to its security policy and w hether a new defense identity will 
decrease German dependence on the U.S. Scholars explain that in order to  analyze 
these questions, and the institutional and normative restrains placed on German 
autonomy, the environment that shaped German foreign policy has to  be carefully
38 Ibid.
39 The books mentioned here are Bulmer, Jeffery, and Paterson's Germany's European Diplomacy, 
Harnisch and Maull's Germany as a Civilian Power, Hide-Price's Germany & European Order, and 
Rittberger's German Foreign Policy since Unification.
40 Sperling here mentions Schneider, Jopp, and Schmalz, Eine neue deutsche Europapolitik, Eberwein and 
Kaiser's Germany's New Foreign Policy, and Newnham's Deutsche M ark Diplomacy.
41 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).
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examined.42 Similarly, Beverly Crawford explains that realist interpretations have viewed 
policy decisions as an "exercise of self-interested behavior", especially in regards to  
military participation in Afghanistan, which is taken as a sign that the form er unchanged 
foreign policy vision of Germany has ended.43
Almost a decade later, William Paterson asked, "Does Germany still have a 
European vocation?", referring to an observation of stricter foreign policy choices by 
Germany that reflect national interests and uses institutional (and unintentional) power 
to benefit Germany's goals.44 Debates within scholarly circles in the literature about 
German foreign policy within the past ten years show a transformation from Germany's 
structured (and bound) post w ar policy choices, to  a more agency-actor based approach 
to national interests, whereby Germany's economic power and size play a major role in 
bargaining processes. Germany, often defined as the "good European", aligning its 
interests with European interests, has altered its trajectory and a "de-Europeanisation" 
in policy and discourse has been observed.45
Contextual Change and Continuity
The authors included for the review completed an outline of seven categories of 
change that occurred in German foreign policy. These changes are observed in the  
overall structure of the international system, in Germany's status, in a geopolitical
42 Sperling, "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model o f a Post-Modern M ajor Power? A 
Review Essay" 2.
43 Beverly Crawford, "The Normative Power of a Normal State.Power and Revolutionary Vision in 
Germanys Postwall Foreign Policy " German Politics and Society 95, no. 25 (2010): 168.
44 William Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," German Politics 19, no. 1 (2010).
45 Ibid, 51
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context, in the rules that govern the EU, in the international economy, in the ongoing 
relationship with the U.S., and in political restraints that translated to change in 
domestic policy.46 Overall, one of the strongest changes could be seen in Germany's 
status while the contextual change that occurred due to  the modified relationship with  
both the EU and the U.S., specifically in regards to  EU enlargement and the lack of a 
security threat by the Soviet Union, resulted in strong changes that, according to  
neorealist theory, should have caused a change in German foreign policy.47
W hile thematically analyzing change and its potential effects on German foreign 
policy, scholars address Germany as a relative power in Europe and reject the claim that 
Germany is a realist state. Rather, Germany is viewed as a post-modern state. According 
to Robert Cooper, post-modern states integrate w ith other states and are marked by 
the orderly and voluntarily erosion of sovereignty while a decline in the collective is 
observed as the state is liberated and the nation-state becomes less of an identity.48 
Post-modern states practice neutral interference in foreign policy and openness, 
transparency, and the rule of law are crucial attributes. Such states advocate human 
rights and support organizations such as the ICC. In regards to  foreign policy, post­
modern states act on behalf of the greater good rather than acting for national
46 Sperling, "The Foreign Policy o f the Berlin Republic: The Very Model o f a Post-Modern M ajor Power? A 
Review Essay" 2.
47 While discussing the change that occurred due to the impact of the domestic political process, Sperling 
addresses the addition of the five eastern Lander and the notion that the change in government from the  
Kohl era to the newly formed red-green alliance "promised" foreign policy choices that were not as bound 
to Westbindung and more towards national interest goals that includes economic partners in the east (p. 
6)
48 Mary N. Hampton, "Living in a World of Dangers and Strangers," German Politics and Society 29, no. 3 
(2011).
58
interests. The concept of civilian power aligns with the attributes of the post-modern  
state: conflicts are resolved peacefully and the use of force is not an option in regards to  
foreign policy unless an intervention is warranted on the basis of humanitarian efforts.
In analyzing Germany's role in Europe, Hyde-Price offers six roles of German 
grand strategy: civilian power, tradition-nation, m otor of European integration, loyal 
transatlantic partner, advocate of pan-European cooperation, and "m ediator between  
East and W est".49 Other authors, who also discuss Germany's roles, agree that Germany 
will assume a leadership role in Europe, citing Germany's role in the European project. 
Scholars place focus on roles but may differentiate among them  according to perceived 
power capabilities and interests.50 The change observed in relative power and continuity 
in German foreign policy has sparked the search for alternative explanations for 
observed policy choices. The author explains that Germany is viewed as mainly an 
economic power, yet economic strength has not necessarily increased since unification. 
Further, Germany has remained committed to m ultilateral operations in regards to  
policy preferences, to include NATO and EU matters.
W hile analyzing continuity and change in regards to Germany's use of power, 
Beverly Crawford questions whether the bid for a perm anent seat on the UN Security 
council can be interpreted as the Republic's way of seeking recognition as a great power 
(rather than showing an increased com m itm ent to  multilateralism). Germany's foreign
49 Adrian Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order: Enlarging Nato and the Eu. (Manchester, UK: 
Manchester University Press, 2000), 44.
50 In this section, Sperling also addresses vertical and horizontal contexts o f decision m aking, the  
European Monetary Union (EMU), and re-visits bargaining between the Federal Government and the  
Lander governments.
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policy choices can be interpreted and explained through various theoretical 
frameworks.51 Some analysts have viewed this as a break w ith multilateralism, while  
others have used the refusal of participation in the  invasion of Iraq as evidence for soft 
power balancing (against U.S. legitimacy), while constructivists have argued for a sign of 
a deepened commitment to  antimilitarism.52
Twenty years after unification, Bulmer & Paterson analyze continuity and change 
in Germany's use of power, guided by the question most dominant across all the  
literature under review: would the changes of unification and the end of the Cold W ar 
eventually lead to a change in German (European) policy? Authors approach this 
question by examining specific criteria o f structural continuity to see w hether a shift in 
the exercise of power occurred, focusing on the impact o f German domestic policy on 
the EU. Similarly, Crawford argues that although factors such as domestic politics, 
political culture, and international institutions contribute to foreign policy behavior in 
Germany, power (and the economy) is the driving force tha t defines policy choices. The 
author approaches the future of Germany's foreign policy and potential contextual 
changes from an interesting perspective: through the  lens of the German Chancellor, 
elected in 2015, pointing to  weaknesses in NATO's ability to adequately address security 
threats.
51 This has been done extensively in regards to Germany's refusal to contribute to the invasion of Iraq in 
2002 and the overall analysis of the use of force.
52 Crawford, "The Normative Power of a Normal State.Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys 
Postwall Foreign Policy " 168.
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While addressing historic continuity in foreign policy, Crawford exclaims that 
"Germany has changed, must change, and will change", examining the  driving forces 
behind these potential changes.53 Here, the debates in the past decade largely reflect 
such change in the future, and scholars have analyzed several aspects of the new  
'German Question'.54 One of these questions includes a debate surrounding w hether 
international regimes provide a "veil behind which Germany exercises self-interested  
dominance, both in Europe and on the international state".55 These questions have 
guided scholarly debates in regards to continuity and change in German foreign policy 
since the end of the Cold W ar and unification. W hile some analysts, such as Gunther 
Hellmann, John Measheimer, and Volker Rittberger, caution against self-interest and 
dominance, many other authors argue that a com m itm ent to  multilateralism and the  
rise of 'civilian power' have put aside fears of the 'German Question'.56
Interests, Identity, and Norms
The majority of the authors who fall under this category are part o f the  
Manchester University Press series titled Issues in German Politics and address the  
intersection of interest, identity, and norms. Here, an argument is made for the pursuit 
of milieu goals rather than possession goals by both the Bonn and Berlin Republics.
Here, possession goals include those actions that aim at the "preservation of one or
53 Beverly Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe (Pasingstoke 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 11.
54 The 'German Question' refers to the growth of German power that led to the provocation of World W ar 
I and World W ar II.
55 Crawford also lists several other questions, which are used throughout the entire book (p. 14).
56 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe, 15.
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more of the things to which a country attaches value", such as territory, membership in 
the UN Security Council, or tariff preferences.57 M ilieu goals include those objectives 
with results that influence international politics beyond a given country. Peace, 
international law, or the creation of international organizations fall under such goals and 
are concerned with concepts other than a country's possessions. However, such milieu 
goals are often pursued with the intention of gaining a desired possession goal at some 
point (increasing security), although a nation might, at times, simply be concerned with  
improving the overall international environment.
Scholars analyze foreign policy goals by the Berlin Republic and categorize each 
as falling either into milieu goals or possession goals. The results show that Germany has 
indeed pursued possession goals. Authors place Germany's NATO membership under a 
self-preservation possession goal and Germany influence in international economy as a 
self-extension possession goal. Other scholars analyze these goals by using three  
different theories: neorealism would argue that states pursue influence and autonomy, 
while utilitarian-liberalism would advocate a maximization o f utilizing private and state  
actors, and constructivism outlines that the state eventually conforms to norms.58 
Further, some scholars place Germany as an embedded hegemony w ithin Europe, 
describing how German national interests take precedence over European interests.59
57 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration; Essays on International Politics (Baltimore,: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1962), 74.
58 Rittberger, German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, 11.
59 The idea 'embedded hegemony' can be applied to the fact that Germany did not adhere to the Stability 
Pact rules whilst stressing to tighten the rules initially. Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: 
Embedded Hegemony in Europe.
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The discussion of norms in relation to German foreign policy is prevalent in most 
of the literature, whereby some scholars differentiate between tw o sets of norms: 
norms that govern civil societies and norms that govern interstate relations.60 
Connecting this argument to constructivist theory, when societal and foreign relation 
norms form a junction, constructivist theory can indeed explain and predict state 
behavior. However, when both norms are either absent or oppose each other, the  
theory lacks explanation. Scholars also argue that Germany's pursuit of power has been 
strategic and systemic (em powerm ent within the EU), while continuously striving for 
international cooperation and multilateralism. Therefore, most scholars under review  
argue that Germany is not a realist state. In regards to strategy, Hyde-Price analyzes 
what he refers to as the three aspects of German grand strategy; this includes the  
enlargement security community to the eastern neighborhood, the fusion of the Atlantic 
system, and the European security system that includes Russia. Crawford adds to  this 
analysis by showing how Germany's efforts in the  European integration process is 
viewed as a continuity of the Bonn Republic's vision.
Harnisch & Maull outline six different objectives that make Germany a civilian 
power. Here, the main definition calls for an active path to  replace politics that are 
based on power, with socially accepted norms, or politics based on legitimacy.61 The 
objectives used by the authors include strengthening international law, creation of
60 Simon & Paterson Bulmer, William "Germany and the European Union: From Tam ed Power' to 
Normalized Power? ," International Affairs 86, no. 5 (2010).
61 Sebastian &. Maull Harnisch, Hanns, Germany as a Civilian Power?: The Foreign Policy o f  the Berlin 
Republic (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001), 4.
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democratic security communities, facilitating democratic legitimacy between states, the  
encouragement o f interdependence, and the international division of labor.62 W hen  
discussing theoretical frameworks to explain the w hether the Berlin Republic has 
pursued milieu or possession goals, scholars examine a common debate within German 
foreign policy arguments about the intersection of norms and identity and the parallels 
of German and EU policy choices. One main argument here is that it is difficult to  
separate German national goals from European goals as Germany has aligned its 
interests with those of the European project, often being referred to as a "good 
European".63 Identity is used throughout the literature to  explain enlargem ent and 
policy choices by Germany toward integration and enlargement reform o f the EU, 
blurring the lines between German identities and European identities.64
Schroder's and Joschka Fischer's initial stance to continue Germany's traditional 
'pro-European' course is used to analyze the changes that led to differing interests in 
foreign policy choices, resulting in scholars referring to Germany's new European policy 
and interests as "weaker, leaner, m eaner".65 Here, some scholars point out that the case 
previously made for continuity in policy is weak; instead explaining that Germany's 
European policy has changed significantly. Throughout their analysis the authors refer
62 Sperling, "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model of a Post-Modern M ajor Power? A 
Review Essay " 14.
63 Ibid.
64 Sperling also explains in detail the how German identity is shaped, explaining the concept of 
Selbstbeschrankung (Germany's limitation on national interests despite a relative power advantage), 
Westbindung (the concept of being a transatlantic partner as well as a partner to  France), and 
Selbstbindung (voluntary limitation of German power in multilateral frameworks) p. 15.
65 Hanns Maull, Germany's Uncertain P ow er: Foreign Policy o f the Berlin Republic (Basingstoke [England]; 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 95-108.
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back to German interest driven behavior in policies relating to  enlargement and the  
constitutionalization of Europe, noting a shift in the structural changes of the policy 
processes and a weakening of Germany's "traditional European role".66 The arguments 
for changes in policy based on self-interest refer back to Sperling's initial analysis of 
Wolfer's milieu and possession goals, showing that Germany indeed pursues possession 
goals, or, at the least, milieu goals that benefit interests and eventually lead to  
possession goals.
Almost immediately after unification, Chancellor Helmut Kohl promised a foreign  
policy which continued a focus on global partnerships and the "peaceful balancing of 
interests" while years later Chancellor Schroder declared that Germany is willing to face 
its history and would pursue policies that "reflect its own enlightened self-interests".67 
Scholars in the field have linked statements by politicians and policy makers to  identity- 
based interests, while arguing that German identity has been constructed in parallel 
with European identity. Here, identity accounts for the main source of preferences, 
whereby a state's identity is shaped through ideas and beliefs instead of "objective 
material conditions alone".68 The liberal argument, supported by several scholars, is that
66 Ibid, 105
67 Helga Haftendorn, Coming o f Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945, Lanham Md (Rowman &  
Littlefield., 2006), 351,53.
68 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe, 25. For an in-debt 
discussion of state identity, please refer to Peter Katzenstein, Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
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Germany's participation in institutions shaped its (European) identity and interests and 
can therefore account for its foreign policy preferences.69
Other scholars take issue with this argument, explaining that Germany's core 
identity has not been shown to  be European, referring to Germany's exclusive 
citizenship rules and restrictive immigration policies.70 These scholars explain that the  
generation of political elites who initially connected German identity to  European 
identity will soon be gone.71 The most compelling argument scholars bring forth in 
opposition of identity-based interests, is that methodologically, no examples exist 
where "Germany's European identity shaped preferences that clearly ran counter to its 
exclusive national identity, or its material interests".72 Crawford, referring back to  
Katzenstein's argument that Germany's identity has become European, explains that 
this could simply be demonstrated in that m em ber states that are set to gain from  a 
stable EU will automatically identify w ith Europe. This is also true for milieu goals, as 
powers with interests in a stable political environment will often pursue interests and 
goals and identify with their region.
THEORIES OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 
German security scholars point to  the difficulties in analyzing German foreign 
policy theoretically as a differentiation between national, systemic, and supranational
59 Simon Bulmer, Jeffery, C., & Paterson, William Germany's European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional 
Milieu (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000); Katzenstein, Tamed Power: Germany in 
Europe.
70 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe.
71 Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe, 26.
72 Ibid, 27
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levels o f analysis has to be made. Once again, the scholars under review analyze 
German foreign policy from the neorealist, utilitarian-liberalist, constructivist 
approaches, as well as the Brimingham school. In regards to  foreign policy, neorealism  
analyzes the system-level variables and follows the assumption that states respond to  
shifts in the balance of material power while utilitarian-liberalism emphasizes the  
subsystem variables.73 Constructivism focuses on both variables while assuming that the  
state will follow the "logic of appropriateness" in regards to societal and international 
norms.74 The Birmingham school, which is comprised of several authors under review, 
analyzes both variables, but also assumes that states will follow the logic of 
consequentiality in combination of appropriateness. Here, and emphasis is put on the  
limiting role that international and domestic institutions have on state action.
Each author has different predictions about the future of German foreign policy. 
John Mearsheimer predicted, in neorealist fashion, that a unified Germany would 
separate itself from previous commitments to NATO and the EU. This prediction was 
based on the balance of power change that occurred after the Cold W ar, to include the  
absence of threat from the Soviet Union, therefore shifting the security arrangements. 
The neorealist position was that Germany would take full advantage of the increased 
power position and ultimately pursue power politics. The predictions under the  
utilitarian-liberalism framework is that changes only occur if the preferences of 
domestic actors changes. Here, scholars explain that the preferences of private
73 Sperling, "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model of a Post-Modern M ajor Power? A 
Review Essay" 16.
74 Ibid.
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domestic actors remained unchanged after unification, and therefore conclude that the  
foreign policies of the Bonn and Berlin Republics should not change.75
The central assumption of the constructivist theory is that identity construction 
occurs and then creates interests and norms. Further, constructivism assumes that the  
international system is both material and social, whereby material structures are 
assigned meaning the environment. This assigned meaning then provides the normative 
component to the analysis and explanation.76 In the case of Germany, constructivism  
predicts no change in foreign policy from  the Bonn Republic to  the Berlin Republic. The 
explanations and predictions made by the Birmingham school focus on three variables. 
An emphasis is given to the analysis o f the strategic (milieu) goals and draw attention to  
the limitations placed on states by institutional patterns while also examining interest 
and identity (also finding a Europeanized identity).77 Further, the Birmingham school 
analyzes the relationship between power and the exercise thereof, differentiating  
between tangible and intangible power, and deliberate or structural exercise of power. 
German economic and financial power has been structural, while offering financial 
support for states that are in compliance with German preferences is viewed as 
deliberative power.78
75 Rittberger, German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies.
76 Ibid, 17
77 Sperling, citing Bulmer, Jeffery & Paterson (2000), explains that the Birmingham School, in examining 
German foreign policy, pays particular attention to the impact of German federalism , the sectorization of 
policy making, and the impact observed by the EU in constructing German interests while simultaneously 
limiting Germany's freedom (p. 18).
78 Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order: Enlarging Nato and the Eu.
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Crawford compares and contrasts the realist and constructivist view of German 
foreign policy and offers her own approach which claims that "Germany has changed 
the way it has pursued its original vision as its power position in Europe and in 
international politics has grown".79 The author's main argument here is that changes in 
uses of power before unification were largely ignored and not viewed as power politics, 
whereas deviations from foreign policy choices after unification, and w ith increased 
overall power, were interpreted as a departure of Germany's "unique vision of 
cooperation and antimilitarism".80 Further, Crawford argues that the shifts in power that 
occurred after the end of the Cold W ar have turned Germany into a "regional hegemon" 
(in Europe) and a "great power" globally, whose power is used to guide the original 
vision that was in place before unification. Through this increased power, and continued 
vision, Germany has become a "normative power", focusing on civilian measures and 
diplomacy backed by material resources.81 Crawford then argues that Germany's foreign 
policy choices are appropriate for the current international environment, filled with new  
threats that disregard sovereignty and cannot be m et with traditional uses of national 
power.
Scholars discuss post-unification changes in foreign policy, arguing that 'post- 
Wall' behavior differs greatly from that of previous decades. Theories that address this 
puzzle of policy shifts and changes include a theoretical analysis of structural realism,
79 Crawford, "The Normative Power of a Normal State.Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys 
Postwall Foreign Policy " 169.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid, 170. Crawford here refers to Ian Manner's articulation of normative power in Normative Power 
Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? (2002).
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intergovernmentalism, liberal institutionalism, sociological/cultural explanations, 
political party structure, and domestic explanations. Scholars approach this examination  
by asking, "Are international or domestic pressures primarily responsible for German 
foreign policy decisions?", whereby the answer to  this question should include a theory  
that is able to predict and explain policy preferences.82 Crawford finds th at although 
structural realism is able to explain certain policy behavior, it lacks in accounting for 
Germany's sacrifice of self-interest in certain cases.83 Similarly, the other theories and 
explanations under review by scholars all yield valid explanations in regards to  some 
foreign policy choices by Germany since unification and in the past decade, but not one 
single theory accounts for all questions and changes. Liberal institutionalism is unable to 
account for a state's desertion of alliances and coalitions, identity-based arguments 
remain vague, and domestic explanations only account for part of policy variances 
observed.84
The Birmingham School -  The Ideal Model?
Out of all theoretical frameworks under review, the Birmingham school directly 
analyzes German specific foreign policy choices, especially in regards to  security. 
Germany's strategic goals (milieu goals) are at the center of investigation in relation to  
European security order. The Birmingham model mainly seeks to examine where  
German foreign policy is headed and w hat elements of change and continuity are
82 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe.
83 Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe, 22.
84 Ibid, 21-34. Identity based arguments refer to "identity" as being the driving force behind policy choices
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present in Germany since unification. An assumption of the model is tha t German 
interests are shaped by the configurations of institutions which also lim it Germany's 
freedom while Germany is viewed as having a Europeanized identity. The Birmingham  
school's treatm ent of power (tangible, intangible, structural, or deliberate) results in 
four contending types of power explained by German security scholars: power that 
intends to reach maximum relative gains (realist power), power that shapes institutional 
rules (indirect institutional power), power that results from  domestic policy decisions 
(unintentional power), and power to  shape the EU agenda to  maximize German  
influence (systematic em powerm ent).85
In analyzing the Birmingham model for its ability to explain and predict German 
foreign policy choices, Sterling uses several categories of analysis and a focus on 
Germany as a security actor in Europe. The author accomplishes this by examining 
policies of prevention and assurance and German compliance and contributions to EU 
missions and programs. While assessing Germany as a military actor, Sperling lists 
German defense expenditures (in comparison to those of France, Italy, and the UK) in an 
EU context as well as German participation in UN, EU, and NATO-led military operations. 
W hen comparing these analyses to the predictions and assumptions of the Birmingham  
model, Sperling shows Germany's Europeanized identity in regards to  interests, 
Germany's reserved approach to the projection of military force, and the power used by
85 James Sperling, "Germany and European Security Governance: How W ell Does the Birmingham Model 
Perform?," European Security 18, no. 2 (2009): 127.
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Germany to reach its goals.86 The evidence used further shows assumptions about 
foreign policy choices that reflect milieu goals as well as Germany's continued 
preference toward multilateral approaches.
When analyzing Germany as a security actor, the Birmingham model argues that 
Germany will act in line with its European identity, pursuing "European" goals and a 
"multilateral statecraft".87 This assumption does not account for the importance of the  
distribution of power and the relevance of power in German foreign policy. Scholars 
explain that the end of the Cold W ar, and the end of a Soviet security threat, combined 
with lowered U.S. influence, allowed Germany to seek foreign policy security goals that 
differed from those of the U.S. The author concludes that the Birmingham model lacks 
an explanation in regards to preferences and interests but does explain the reasons and 
path of German foreign policy in conjunction with policies o f assurance and prevention.
In the past decade, several authors and analysts have questioned Germany's 
European vocation. Although strongly observed during the Bonn Republic, Germany's 
European policies have been "contingent, contested, and circumscribed".88 Now, the  
pursuit of "European" goals predicted by the Birmingham model have not been chosen 
exclusively in recent years, and German national goals have taken precedence. The post- 
Kohl era has been difficult to categorize by authors in the field. While some scholars in 
defense of the Birmingham model and theory to explain German foreign policy stress a
86 Ibid, 143
87 Ibid.
88 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 41.
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contingency factor in contemporary policy rather than the structured multilateral 
approaches, others refer to this period as "de-Europeanisation".89
Peterson groups Germany's European vocation into three stages: the first stage 
involves European integration, the second stage refers to  a close union to  the EU under 
Chancellor Kohl in the early 1990s, and the third stage is referred to  as the post-Kohl 
stage.90 Here, the author explains that European identity and policy choices were  
gradual processes, whereby concepts such as security and "actorness" w ere essentially 
dictated by the political environment, leaving Germany little room to act 
independently.91 Scholars of the Birmingham school argue that contingency in German  
foreign policy occurs in the form of "restoring the goodness of fit" between the German 
domestic level and the European level, therefore arguing that Germany still has a 
European vocation.92 Here, the argument is made that Germany continues to have 
fundamental interest in European integration, and while less emphasis is put on 
multilateral institutions, Germany's agenda includes supportive choices for European 
foreign policy.93
Addressing arguments about clashing German and European interests, the  
Birmingham school scholars refer to this leveling as a potentially long period of
89 G unther. Hellmann, Germany's Eu Policy on Asylum and Defence: De-Europeanisation by Default. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), 48.
90 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?."
91 Paterson here compares and contrasts Ostpolitik to  Europapolitik, noting that Ostpolitik "could take on 
a leadership role and also be seen manifestly to  be making its own decisions" (p. 43).
92 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 49.
93 For a more in-debt discussion, please refer to  S. Harnisch and S. Schieder, 'Germany's New European 
Policy: Weaker, Leaner, Meaner', in Maull, H. (2006), Germany's Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy o f the 
Federal Republic. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
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'equilibrium'; however, Paterson et al. also note tha t the school takes a "binary" view  
towards Germany supporting "both more and less Europe".94 In contrast to  this view, 
others list changes in public opinion and coalition structures to show a deviation of 
German foreign policy to previous European interests, whereby the author accounts for 
the changes observed in German policy by relating them to changing "opportunity  
structures at the European level".95 Although the Birmingham school shares most of this 
analysis, Paterson argues that despite the changes observed, Germany continues to  
have a Europeanized identity, although governmental policy show less European driven 
interests. Paterson agrees that Germany's European vocation is "shrinking and will 
continue to do so", but adds that Germany will continue to  be committed to the  
European project, which continues to benefit German interests.95
Taking into account the shortcomings of th e  Birmingham model, and the fact 
that every other theory used to understand German foreign policy behavior lacks 
explanatory power in certain aspects, Beverly Crawford's articulation of Germany as an 
'embedded hegemony' may yield the most parsimonious approach yet. This approach 
combines the strong points of several theories under review and directly challenges 
claims that Germany is unwilling to take on a leadership role in Europe. Crawford's main 
argument is that Germany's foreign policy preferences are a reflection of its position as 
the 'regional hegemon', possessing institutional power, and the "need to protect that 
power position and satisfy dominant domestic interests" (p. 34). The author then lays
94 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 49.
95 Hellmann, Germany's Eu Policy on Asylum and Defence: De-Europeanisation by D efau lt, 50.
96 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 51.
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out a compelling argument for Germany's ability and willingness to lead which includes 
aspects of cooperation, capabilities, and economy, and ends with the prediction that 
Germany is likely to drop many of its international burdens over the next decade, 
especially if economic stagnation continues.97
Power, Security, and Transformation
The post-war period shaped Germany's foreign policy by way of occupation, 
division, and defeat, and eventually merged with European institutions and multilateral
no
regimes. M ilitary power and means w ere viewed as a last resort to  resolve conflict, 
and emphasis was given to civilian actions to foreign policy, such as peacekeeping, 
international law, human rights, foreign aid, culture, and environment. This linkage of 
concepts, referred to as "cooperate security", was based on confidence building, 
whereby German society was committed to liberal democratic practices and collective 
security. This combination, along with an obligation towards human rights and 
antimilitarism, "reshaped German political identity".99 Germany's power is often 
assessed in economic terms, but also in exercising power that contributed to  shaping 
the European integration process. The Berlin Republic asserted power in pursing policy
97 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe, 55.The entire approach 
can be found on pages 34-55, although the author uses her argument to  guide the reader throughout the  
remainder of the book.
98 Crawford, "The Normative Power of a Normal State.Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys 
Postwall Foreign Policy " 171.
" ib id .
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goals, and acting as a bridge between actors during Cold W ar disputes while also 
rebuilding old friendships with European partners.100
Germany's relative power increased after the end of the Cold W ar and 
unification while its economy became the strongest in Europe. Although Germany has 
decreased defense spending, its military is the largest in Europe and only the U.S. has 
more troops deployed worldwide.101 Germany has since been referred to  as an 
"institutional power", contributing to European integration while giving up parts of its 
independence and sovereignty. Germany's exercise of power has been continuously 
described as "normative", backed by material power, whereas Germany's military's 
purpose is territorial defense rather than the projection of power.102 Despite Germany's 
increase in power, foreign policy choices have remained the same, holding on to the 
vision of civilian and normative power.
The debate of Germany's use of power emerged due to assumption that 
Germany would eventually return to  power politics. A fter unification, Germany could 
have made foreign policy choices that were based on national interests, especially in 
regards to European integration but German leaders have continuously been committed  
to a vision of diplomacy and growing normative power.103 Beverly Crawford, after 
outlining Germany's normative power practices in regards to  twenty-first century 
challenges, asks, "Can the exercise of normative power alone reduce human rights
100 Crawford, "The Normative Power of a Normal State.Power and Revolutionary Vision in Germanys 
Postwall Foreign Policy ".The author here also discusses Ostpolitik, adding examples of policy initiatives 
that deviated from traditional power politics.
101 Ibid, 174
102 Ibid, 176
103 Ibid, 180
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abuses and manage ethnic and sectarian conflict?", then adding that a com m itm ent to  
antimilitarism may call into question the fact that Germany is the third largest arms 
exporter in the world.104 These questions, along with the aspects of cooperation, 
international governance, and the feasibility of security arrangements by German  
foreign policy choices may have to be asserted in another decade.
The discussion of Germany as a normative power, in conjunction with an overall 
discussion of the EU as a normative actor, became a trend in the literature in the early 
twenty-first century, and has remained a topic of debate ever since. Ian Manners, along 
with several other authors, analyzes the EU and Germany through normative theory  
focusing on ideational aspects rather than material or physical power. Here, a normative 
power is the ideal type of international actor. Studies and literature surrounding the  
concept seek to understand and interpret the causal and constitutive effects. Here, 
scholars ask whether Germany has shifted from  a 'tamed power' to  a normalized power, 
referring back to Peter Katzenstein's assessment of Germany as a tam ed power, arguing 
that this characterization of Germany is no longer adequate.105 In discussing power, and 
Germany European diplomacy, these scholars explain that Germany would proceed 
alone and seek alternatives in order to reach policy interests and goals.
Scholars also outline the criteria under which power of m ember states within the 
EU can be exercised in the policy cycle. Germany has been influential at the agenda-
105 Bulmer, "Germany and the European Union: From 'Tamed Power' to Normalized Power?
."Katzenstein's initial analysis of Germany's use of power focused on soft power, placing importance of 
Germany's norms and identity that became parallel to  European norms and identity.
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setting stage, advocating policy and eliminating issues off the agenda.106 Although 
Germany's power position within Europe economically is unquestioned, especially in 
Germany's role in the EU integration process, several authors discuss the lack of 
Germany's power in the defense and security policy arenas.107 Discussing the  
relationship between Germany and the EU, scholars distinguish between Germany's use 
of agent power as a member-state, and the power given by the EU as a structure of 
governance.108 Traditionally, Germany has made use of indirect institutional power 
rather than hard bargaining aspects of power politics. Although resources would have 
allowed such practices, Germany's history dictated a focus on diplomatic and 
multilateral foreign policy choices and uses of power. Here, power was used to  shape 
the direction the EU was headed.109
Power and normalization differs from previous multilateral policy choices to the  
unilateral steps taken by Germany, especially in regards to the construction of 
alliances.110 This has become increasingly possible in the past decade as m ember-states  
increased in the EU and small coalitions of countries may be more appropriate to  
address specific policy issues. Bulmer and Paterson stress tha t normalization does not 
refer to a return to realist assumptions of balance of power, but to a "balanced
107 This is particularly true in comparison to the U.K. and France, and reviewing the lack of public support 
in the intervention in Afghanistan.
108 Bulmer, "Germany and the European Union: From 'Tamed Power' to Normalized Pow er?," 1058.This 
notion of power was described as "dyadic power" by Stefano Guzzini (1993) in International 
Organizations.
109 Bulmer and Paterson also discuss 'unintentional power', which refers to the impact of German 
economy on other European countries.
110 Bulmer, "Germany and the European Union: From 'Tamed Power' to  Normalized Pow er?," 1059.
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approach in exercising power in the EU".111 The authors do not contest the overall 
argument by other scholars that Germany's foreign policy choices have remained  
unchanged, but explain that changes occurred in Germany's role in the EU. This is 
particularly true for the way Germany will conduct diplomacy in a greater European 
context in line with other major European powers.112
Scholars base their argument about the continuity and change of Germany's 
foreign policy strictly on the importance of power and the role power plays in shaping 
policy behavior. Germany's use of power has translated by ensuring cooperation in the  
EU and fostering institutions, taking on "the role o f local patron and leader".113 This 
assumption and explanation of Germany's exercise of power goes back to the authors 
initial statement of defining Germany as an 'embedded hegemony', whereby Germany 
provides institutional stability but now will also act in line w ith national interests, which 
may, at times, be in opposition to  those of its allies. Scholars support this argum ent o f 
policy shifts and deviation from previous policy patterns on three cases of diplomacy, 
security, and foreign economic policy.114
An argument for the move from structure to agency can be made in Germany's 
use of power in the past decade. Germany has used institutional power to influence 
outcomes to benefit national interests, and political leadership has been more
111 Ibid, 1060
112 Examples of this include Germany's (and Angela Merkel's) responses to  the Greek crisis and the  
Stability Pact.
113 Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe, 15.
114 These three cases include Germany's decision for diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, 
Germany's transformation of technology export control, and Germany's decision to support the EMU. For 
an in-debt discussion see Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe, 17-19.
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"purposeful in defending" these interests in Brussels.115 These changes in the use of 
power are the results of different political leadership approaches and decisions that 
emphasize domestic and national interests over a European agenda.116 Although 
Germany's multilateral approaches with the EU are still in place, they largely show a 
calculation of which outcomes best benefit German interests.117 Bulmer & Paterson 
argue that indirect institutional power used by Germany is, at this point, limited as the  
development of the EU has plateau. The authors question w hether Germany can 
actually become a normal power w ithout simultaneously having negative effects on the  
EU, especially in regards to Germany's economic power.
Although minor, Germany's security policies have also shown changes from the  
Bonn to Berlin Republic. After unification, German politicians have kept w ith the  
security policy continuity imbedded in the long standing foreign policy that outlined a 
deep commitment to multilateral action and an obvious dislike to the use of military 
force. Since the end of the Cold W ar, Germany has continued to look to both the U.S. 
and NATO as a security provider, therefore sometimes being referred to as a 'taker' of 
security. Before unification, German security policy cautiously avoided national interest 
goals that could be interpreted as veering away from  multilateral fram ework  
commitments to the greater European Community, the United Nations, and Atlantic
115 Bulmer, "Germany and the European Union: From 'Tamed Power' to  Normalized Power? ," 1072.
116 Bulmer and Paterson here give examples of Chancellor Schroder's discursive use of national interests in 
regards to bilateral energy agreements with Russia and Chancellor Merkel's decisions to  put domestic and 
national policy before German European policy.
117 Bulmer, "Germany and the European Union: From 'Tamed Power' to Normalized Pow er?," 1073.
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Alliance.118 In recent years, German security policies have been heavily influenced by 
German popular opinion, especially in regards to military forces' support for Iraq and 
Afghanistan. German security policy continues to reflect multilateralist approaches to  
security threats, which include conflict settlem ent, crisis stabilization, and 
nonproliferation efforts. Discussing security and transatlantic policies in Germany, some 
scholars note a change in German EU policy in regards to EU enlargement and market 
integration under Chancellor M erkel.119 Although future expansion (to the W estern  
Balkans) has not been ruled out, Merkel has called for stricter membership 
requirements and has been viewed as a skeptic for granting Turkey membership; 
offering a privileged partnership as an alternative.
SUMMARY
Taking into consideration the various theories and school of thoughts, the  
authors under review seem to disagree on the explanations of the current stage of 
German foreign policy. The Birmingham school authors continue their argument that 
Germany indeed still has a European vocation, aligning German interests with European 
interests in a combined German European policy, although noting that policies have 
become 'leaner and meaner'. O ther scholars make an argument to show a deviation 
from the previously observed policy cycle and rhetoric of continuity in German foreign
118 Paul Belkin, "German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications," Current 
Politics and Economics o f Europe 21, no. 2 (2009): 216.
119 "German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications," Current Politics and  
Economics o f Europe 21, no. 2 (2009). The author refers to current EU policies as a "tempered  
enthusiasm", and notes a "skepticism" toward European market integration (p. 221).
policy, and instead argue for a new 'agency based' approach of German foreign policy 
with precise calculation to best serve national interests. W hile the neorealist 
explanations, assumptions, and predictions about German foreign policy have certainly 
not been able to account for reality, it is im portant to note that the other schools lack 
the emphasis and analysis of power and how it applies to  Germany. Beverly Crawford 
overcomes this problem by making the concept of power a focus point in her theoretical 
analysis of German foreign policy, creating her articulation of 'embedded hegemony'. 
Germany has used power, both institutionally and unintentionally, to serve national 
interests and shaping the 'regional milieu goals'. An argument can be made of a gradual 
transformation from structure to  agency within German foreign policy. This gradual 
transformation and change will be analyzed in the next three chapters o f this study, by 
focusing on how change occurs, w hat variables determ ine and shape this change, and 
how this change can be explained theoretically.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYZING CHANGE IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS AND THE
USE OF FORCE
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this case study and chapter is to provide an overview of what 
perspectives explain out of area operations and security policies, specifically the use of 
force, and how the concept has contributed to Germany's changing foreign and security 
policy. The case of Libya was selected to  highlight the policy area involving the  
relationship among allies and m ultilateral operations. I argue that cases involving use of 
force discussions are sequential and fit into Germany's pattern and understanding of 
power, security, and identity. In order to analyze the policy area of out of area 
operations and the critical political dialogue in which the use of force is debated in 
German politics, three historical cases, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, will also be 
analyzed based on the same criteria. The rhetoric, action, and behavior of German  
policy makers in all cases will be examined to determ ine which independent variables 
influence and explain Germany's behavior. Alliance solidarity stands for Germany's ties 
and commitment to multilateral approaches within a NATO and EU fram ework, and 
specifically Germany's history o f aligning with the U.S. Historical m emory accounts for 
Germany's culture of restraint and adherence to W W II legacy and constructs. The 
domestic influence variable reflects the importance of public political opinion in 
Germany to influence Germany's foreign and security policy while national interests
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account for Germany's possession and milieu goals, sometimes parallel to  the EU and 
sometimes separate from the EU, to  include economic interests. I argue that the  
selective use of historical memory has become instrumental to explain, inform, and 
justify German foreign policy fo r out of area operations. In order to understand and 
explain Germany's somewhat puzzling behavior in the case of Libya, comparisons 
between previous use of force analyses in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are made to  
provide additional insight and to  link theoretical speculation to empirical evidence. Each 
selected point of crisis involving German debates and consensus reaching about the use 
of force is then categorized in term s of change and continuity while identifying the most 
influential variables. Again, these variables are: domestic influence, alliance solidarity, 
historical memory, and national interests. Beyond the primary analysis on the case of 
Libya, this study will guide in understanding how change occurs in German foreign policy 
and how this change is studied and understood in broader applications. The selected 
preceding cases involving use of force discussions provide the context for identifying 
under which circumstances historical m em ory influences German foreign policy and 
whether rhetoric supports observed policy behavior.
OUT OF AREA MILITARY OPERATION: A HISTORY OF THE USE OF FORCE IN GERMANY'S
STRATEGIC CULTURE 
Over the past tw o decades, security scholars and scholars of German foreign and 
security policy have extensively researched, analyzed, and interpreted Germany's out of 
area military operations after W W II. The "use of force" dialogue fits under the umbrella
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of NATO alliance responsibility and out of area operations, but is also bound to  
perpetuated rhetoric and explanations based on historical memory and collective ideas 
of Germany's reinvention after the holocaust. German m ilitary culture has resulted in an 
antimilitary stance towards foreign and security policies advocated by politicians and 
legitimized by German society. The use of force debate emerged strongly in early 2000  
after Germany's involvement in Kosovo; Germany's role as a civilian power was 
questioned by some while others argued for Germany's position on the 'right side of 
history'. Since then, the use of force debate has fallen into an overall puzzling 
observation of the continuities and changes; sometimes described as "inconsistent" 
policies involving foreign affairs and security. From Kosovo and Iraq to  Afghanistan and 
now Libya, Germany has adopted a strategic culture linked to  restricting the use of force 
more closely related to  the old status quo: the policy style o f the Bonn Republic.
This strategic culture, which highlights and emphasizes how the past influences 
and shapes current policy behavior, has been used as a fram ework to  analyze specific 
security policies and behavior within the past tw enty years. Analyzing change or 
continuity by examining how Germany's strategic culture evolved over tim e allows an in 
depth look at security and defense behavior specific to Germany's national identity  
based on norms, values, and historical memory. These changes in German strategic 
culture began with the newly constructed culture after W W II which included a legally 
restricted role, conscription, full integration with m ultilateral institutions, and 
democratization of civil-military relations. Further, in 1989-1990, a newly-emerged
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Germany began exporting security.1 This "radical" change after the Kosovo involvement 
directly contributed to  the continuous influence of strategic culture on the Bundeswehr, 
out of area operations, and the debates over the invasion of Iraq in 2002-2003. Scholars 
have argued that Germany's historic past, as well as its strategic culture, binds policy 
makers to a set of predisposed options.2
This strategic culture, while marked w ith continuity over the decades, 
underwent several (small) changes or shifts, especially surrounding the consensus on 
the use of force. The 1990's were marked by split party views on the use of force. The 
Social Democrats (SPD) and the Green Party advocated and promoted pacifism while the  
CDU attempted to change legal barriers that forbade German deployment of forces.3 
Kosovo changed and reconstructed how the use of force was viewed, discussed, and 
implemented for German foreign and security policy and was sanctioned by the Red- 
Green coalition. The rhetoric surrounding Kosovo, which will be analyzed in much 
greater detail in another section of this dissertation, was marked by constant references 
to the humanitarian efforts under which Germany operated in Kosovo. The consensus 
that was reached before Kosovo differed greatly from  the rhetoric and policy 
surrounding Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, although Libya appears to have all the "right" 
preconditions to warrant the use of force based on humanitarian efforts to prevent 
genocide.
1 Kerry Anne Longhurst, Germany and the Use o f Force (Manchester, UK.: Manchester University Press, 
2004), 2.
2 Germany and the Use o f Force (Manchester, UK.: Manchester University Press, 2004).
3 Brian C. Rathbun, "The Myth of German Pacifism," German Politics & Society 24, no. 2 (2006): 69.
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The CDU, immediately following unification, argued for a Bundeswehr capable of 
increased military operations in connection to NATO, under the concept of 
Handlungsfahigkeit.4 These calls to increase influence, by political leaders such as then  
Defense Minister Volker Ruhe, w ere discussed by scholars in the field under the  
normalization debate, referring to an overall 'normalization strategy' to increase 
German influence and to become a 'norm al' actor along other European countries. 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl argued that Germany should assimilate to the responsibilities of 
other 'normal' state powers, but the realization of an increased international role in 
peacekeeping missions would prove difficult due to party conflicts and consensus about 
the use of German military forces.5 Instead, Germany contributed financially to out of 
area peace operations, a policy th a t has since been referred to as 'Germany's checkbook 
diplomacy'.
The 1994 Federal Constitutional Court's (FCC) decision to reinterpret the  
previously accepted constitutional clause that forbade the deployment o f military forces 
for out of area operations unless fulfilling obligations under NATO Article V was 
monumental for the use of force discourse.6 The FCC ruled that out o f area deploym ent 
of German troops and participation for peace keeping missions was legal under 
mandates of collective security organizations such as the UN, WEU, and NATO. This
4 The term  itself means "ability to  act", referring to Germany's capability to take on military operations.
For more on this, please refer to "The Myth of German Pacifism," German Politics & Society 24, no. 2 
(2006).
5 During these initial debates, the FDP rejected a call to  send German forces in support of out of area 
operations without a constitutional amendment, the SPD agreed only to  humanitarian purposes, and the  
Greens rejected any use of the German military beyond its borders.
6 Article V outlines that members of the NATO alliance are required to aid any member that is attacked.
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meant that the court decision directly dictated the multilateral context in which such 
missions must be assumed, further contributing to the establishment, legitimization, 
and construction of rules and norms. The rhetoric, at the tim e, carefully distinguished 
between the terms 'intervention' and 'humanitarian efforts'. Most importantly, the  
constitutional court decision effectively moved the concept of the use o f force from  a 
legally forbidden act to a politically debated policy. Politicians were no longer able to  
hide behind the curtains of legality and were forced to debate, analyze, and come to a 
consensus on German troop deployment outside of Germany's borders and beyond 
territorial or alliance defense.
The details surrounding deployment and participation of the Bundeswehr in such 
efforts had to be approved through a majority vote by the German Bundestag. Despite 
the appearance of a consensus on this issue, stark disagreements among the political 
parties of Germany were observed as the concept of the use of force underwent this 
constitutional transformation. The German Left opposed the constitutional court 
decision while other European countries at the tim e (i.e. France and England) advocated 
for stronger humanitarian interventions. These early years of consensus reaching 
surrounding the use of force by German military forces reflected a collective attitude  
when met with historical memories and interpretations of w ar and the purpose thereof. 
The rhetoric, especially by SPD leaders, showed a lack of distinction between "war for 
self-interest or selfless aims", prominently argued for by Katrin Fuchs (SPD) who said, 
"Military interventions are not humanitarian actions," and cabinet minister Heidemarie
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Wieczorkek-Zeul who added that "peace enforcem ent means fighting wars."7 This early 
rhetoric was marked by pacifism, and the struggle to redefine and reconstruct 
previously held norms and beliefs was evident throughout.
Also of importance to note are the initial criteria outlined by the German 
government after the FCC's decision on out of area military deployments. According to  
these criteria, missions were limited to  Europe and had to  include a UN mandate. 
Further, missions including the Bundeswehr had to  be characterized through public 
support while a convincing threat to  Germany, Europe, and international peace had to  
exist in order for military missions beyond defense of the alliance.8 W hile these criteria 
were only used initially, the German parliament developed The Parliamentary 
Participation Act (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz) in 2005, which officially required the  
consent of parliament for out of area missions involving the Bundeswehr. Germany's 
strategic culture after W W II was marked by antimilitarism. The norms developed during 
this time carried over to the period past German unification and reflected the overall 
reluctance, and sometimes refusal "to consider military means as a legitim ate  
instrument of foreign policy".9 Pacifism and rejection of the use of military force are 
therefore apparent concepts of security and strategic culture which Germans hold in
7 Rathbun, "The Myth of German Pacifism," 72-73. Katrin Fuchs, "Militareinsatze sind keine 'humanitare  
Aktionen,",Socialdemokratischer Pressedienst, 4 8 (115). 1993, 1-3 and ,"Das Nein W ar Deutlich: Interview  
M it Der Spd-Vizechefin Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul Uber Bundeswehreinsatze," Der Spiegel, March 7, 
1994, accessed October 8, 2013, http://w w w .spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13685344.htm l.
8 Franz-Josef Meiers, "Germany: The Reluctant Power," Survival 37, no. 3 (1995): 92.
9 Harald Muller, "German Foreign Policy after Unification," in The New Germany and the New Europe, ed. 
Paul B. Stares (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), 162.
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combination with the tendency to rationalize military operations based on cost.10 These 
views, and consequently norms, towards the use of force resulted in Germany's 
continued restriction of its military role in the international environment, instead 
focusing on economic, political, and diplomatic measures to  resolve issue areas within  
the security realm. Along with the continued views towards antimilitarism, Germany's 
strategic culture was also marked by commitments to multilateralism and adamantly  
rejected unilateral approaches. Germany's focus on nationalism and unilateralism in the  
past, and the consequences thereof, resulted in a fear of pursuing a Sonderweg, or 
special path. The past few years of Germany's foreign policy, especially in light o f the  
economic crisis and the abstention of the vote on military intervention in Libya, has led 
skeptical scholars to refer to Germany's Sonderweg once again, pointing to  the more 
unilateral approaches based on national interests observed in recent German policies.
Continuity and Change since Unification in German Foreign and Security Policy
Scholars within the field have widely analyzed and examined continuity and 
change of German foreign policy since unification, focusing on the puzzling phenomena 
of structural changes that were not preceded with power political policies geared 
toward self-interest. As explained in the theoretical section of this dissertation, 
numerous frameworks are used to  understand and predict Germany's past choices in 
behavior, none of which can fully grasp and account for Germany's policies in the  past 
twenty years. Since unification in October 1990, several policy changes occurred that fall
10 Duffield, "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint."
90
into the realm of security, defense, and foreign affairs. Germany's effort to  recognize 
Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 was viewed as the first true departure from policy, raising 
questions about unilateral behavior. Germany encouraged its European Commission 
(EC) partners to consider diplomatic relationship with both countries despite resistance 
from other European countries, the U.S., and the UN. Germany's im m ediate recognition 
and violation of the EC agreement resulted in media and scholarly speculation about 
Germany's potential independent and unilateral approach to  foreign policy in the  
future.11 Germany's decision was influenced by several factors to include a desire to end 
conflict in the area, decrease Germany's risk of increased war refugees, and to act on 
domestic pressures. German society, especially the southern region, is marked by 
historical, cultural, and political ties to Slovenia and Croatia, thus sympathizing with 
Croatia while the German media focused on Serb violence.12
Examining the frameworks and arguments by scholars in the field, the  
fundamental determinant and variable for these initial changes in policy can directly be 
attributed to the changes in the external environment, resulting in new demands on 
Germany as an exporter of security. Germany's central position resulted in an increased 
expectation by its Western allies to act on ethnic and territorial conflicts, refugee 
migration, and military conflicts in the form er Communist countries as well as on crises 
outside of Europe, to include Iraq and Somalia.13 Despite these changes in the
11 "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources o f Continuity and Restraint," 185.
12 "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint." For more information 
about the factors that led Germany to  recognize Slovenia and Croatia, see pages 185-189.
13 "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint," 172.
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international environment, Germany's post-war political culture was marked by 
continuity and restraint, especially in regards to its security policy. This culture of 
restraint can be explained through the historical legacies o f Germany's Nazi past.
Further, Germany's foreign policy past W W II and before unification was considered 
"successful", thus constructing norms and rules which have been accepted, legitimized, 
and internalized by German political leaders, as well as domestic society.14
Additionally, Germany continued to stress the importance of integration into 
institutional structures of international and multilateral cooperation among its allies.
This firm integration in the post-war and post-unification years served to  fulfill 
Germany's goal of strengthening and integrating Europe, as well as lessening the fears 
of neighbors towards potential special, unilateral approaches in the future. Institutional 
theorists here refer to the shadow of the future in predicting peace and stability among 
countries which are integrated into such structures and agreements. Germany's relative 
continuous foreign policy, especially for out of area operations and involving the  
Bundeswehr, can be partially attributed to the balancing effect of the coalition politics of 
the Bundestag, resulting in a centering effect of Germany's foreign policy. This 
moderate, or center, approach by Germany has continued w ith a high degree of 
coherency throughout the 1990's and 2000's, with the exception of the use of force in 
Kosovo, Germany's strong tendencies to multilateral approaches in the last tw enty years 
has began to alter slightly, depending on the issue area, but certainly w ith some breaks 
in multilateralism in 2002.
14 Ibid.
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Germany's desire after unification to fulfill its broadened obligation and 
responsibility to the international community appears to have altered slightly as 
national interests and economic goals are pursued. John Duffield argued tw enty  years 
ago that "continuity in German security policy is partly contingent on the maintenance 
of a relatively benign and supportive external environment," and warned that hostile 
developments could trigger a divergence in security policy areas by Germ any.15 Some 
changes in German foreign and security policy were observed from the Bonn to Berlin 
Republics. The old status quo was marked with passive involvement, 
noninterventionism, and refusal on the use of force. The principles under the Berlin 
Republic after unification showed a responsible Germany, willing to support out of area 
operations and a desire to reestablish long held principles. While these changes after 
unification could be categorized as a reconstruction of policies and establishing a new  
status quo, an analysis of the sequential points of crises may offer a different, more 
consistent view. This is also true when considering other foreign policy areas, which will 
be discussed in chapter five of this dissertation.
15 "German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint," 191.
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Table 1: Germany's Status Quo
Old Status Quo>Bohn Republic New Status Quo-Berlin Republic
Respect international law and human rights Defend international law and human rights
Never use military force other than for self- 
defense
Use military force responsibly for good causes
Be peaceful and antimilitarist Protect peace and restore it, if necessary
Be committed to democratic ideals Promote democratic ideals abroad
Not harming allies and politically supporting 
them
Aid allies and militarily support them
"Never again War" "Never again Genocide"
(Source: Leithner, Anika. Shaping German Foreign Policy: History, Memory, and National Interest. Boulder,
Colorado: FirstForumPress, 2009:46)
The above chart shows how Germany's understanding and application of 
responsibility has changed, or appeared to have changed, from the Bonn Republic to the  
Berlin Republic. While this table depicts how lessons of history influence Germany's 
democratic commitment, the table can also be used to assess current com m itm ent to  
engagement and responsible behavior as observed during the two selected case studies 
for this dissertation and the analysis in this chapter about the use of force. Taking into 
consideration the past four years of German foreign and security policy, especially in 
light of the economic crisis, may alter the projected and previously observed change in 
policy; instead showing a reversal, or continuance, o f previously held ideas about 
responsible behavior. The choice to  abstain during the voting process in the case of 
Libya, thus siding with China and Russia, certainly questions several tenets of Germany's 
responsibility to its allies and the international system. This behavior, change, or 
reversal should therefore be analyzed and grouped to  determ ine w hether policy and 
action are representations either a) an adjustment to  policy; b) a learning 
process/norms, or c) a reconstruction or direct change in foreign policy. The case of
Libya will therefore be analyzed in order to examine w hether policy actions were  
informed by historic memory, thus directly connecting guilt and responsibility, whether 
a direct change occurred, w hether Germany's behavior falls into a norms based 
framework for explaining and understanding policies and rhetorical actions around 
Libya, and how this case was understood and categorized by scholars. In order to  
provide a context for an analysis surrounding the use of force consensus in the Libya 
case, the cases of Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are briefly discussed using the same 
fram ework and variables.
The Use of Force: Kosovo
While the use of force even during peacekeeping operations was still highly 
opposed by the Left, the civil wars of the 1990's contributed to an overall acceptance 
that diplomatic efforts were unable to resolve the bloody conflicts in both Bosnia and 
Rwanda. The events in Bosnia changed how politicians, especially the Greens and the 
SPD, viewed the compatibility of the concepts of 'never again war,' and 'never again 
Auschwitz'; questioning and weighing the impact not to intervene militarily would have 
on their responsibility to protect people and prevent horrific humanitarian cost.16 The 
rhetoric at the tim e, especially from Leftist politicians who initially opposed the use of 
force, showed a gradual change in reaction to  the international environment, and the
16 Rathbun, "The Myth of German Pacifism," 73.
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intersection of responsibility and guilt was publicly discussed.17 This intersection, the  
previously held consensus, and the changed which peaked in 1994, showed a gradual 
learning process that resulted in policy advocacy of approaches which made exception 
in cases and conflicts where human rights violations occurred.
The intersection of responsibility and guilt, or, responsibility and historic 
memory, eventually turned into a fear of new guilt of the consequences of not 
consenting to intervene forcefully. W hile the CDU made this change faster and more 
collective, the SPD and the Greens still differed internally on exactly which cases 
required the use of force. W hile the importance of Germany's history was considered by 
some, the SPD revolted and opposed against proposals by the  CDU to  provide Tornado 
aircraft air defense support in Bosnia in M ay 1995.18 The SPD eventually found 
consensus on the issue, being confronted w ith the afterm ath of the massacre in 
Srebrencia, and voted in support o f deployment of a NATO peace operation that 
included the use of Tornado aircraft.19 The disagreements among the political parties 
internally during Bosnia influenced by previously held norms about pacifism and 
noninterventionism, due to  historical and collective memory, met w ith new  
considerations of responsibility, necessity, and potential guilt. The learning process and
17 "The Myth of German Pacifism." The author quotes W alter Kolbow, defense spokesperson for the SPD 
who recalled that it become "increasingly difficult to stand by and watch murders take place".
18 "The Myth of German Pacifism," 74. Most notably, defense expert Norbert Gansel argued that "our 
duty to help and to militarily protect the peacekeepers now weighs more heavily than any history that 
forbids us from forcing others to their knees."
19 Rathbun discusses in detail the specifics about the differing opinions on the use of force and 
intervention in Bosnia between the SPD and the left wing of the party, in particular the public exchange of 
letters between Joschka Fischer and the left wing. Scholars have since analyzed this difference between  
the Red/Green parties and argued that differing stances on consent on th e  use of force were electorally 
driven.
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critical discussions of the mid 1990s directly contributed to  the left wing's approval of 
German contribution in the NATO air w ar against ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1998.
The importance of Germany's participation in Kosovo for its foreign and security 
policy, especially the significant reinterpretation of 'the use of force', has to  be viewed 
and analyzed in connection to humanitarianism. The most critical aspect of Kosovo (and 
Bosnia before) that allowed Germany to  reach a consensus on forceful intervention lies 
directly in the disastrous humanitarian consequences if no action w ere taken. Ethnic 
cleansing, genocide, and the death of innocent women and children w ere too  fam iliar 
and too drastic to ignore, thus trum ping the previously held "never again" norm  
towards war. While Kosovo was certainly a multilateral e ffort under the NATO umbrella, 
both parties of the German government sought guarantees from NATO th a t the  
intervention in Kosovo was not driven by territorial conflict, oil, or other self-interest 
motives.20
While the Bundeswehr's involvement in Bosnia's peacekeeping operation was 
significant, Kosovo would mark the first tim e German forces were deployed and 
participated in military operations outside German borders since W W II. The significance 
of Kosovo, and the consensus on the use of force is multifaceted: not only did the  
German public widely support the mission, the execution of the mission occurred 
without a UN mandate and under a Left governing political coalition. Although UN 
Resolution 1199 called for an im m ediate cease fire, military action under an official UN
20 Winfried Nachtwei, "Nato-Luftangriffe: Antiserbische Agression Oder Einzige Rettungchance Fur Den 
Kosovo," (Positionpaper 26 March 1999), accessed October 9, 2013, 
http://w ww .m uenster.org/frieden/luftangriffe.htm .
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mandate was impossible due to Russia's opposition, yet intervention on the basis of 
gross human rights violations and humanitarian catastrophes provided the option for 
Germany's Red-Green coalition to  act.21 In October 1998, NATO authorized airstrikes 
against Serbian military targets. Discussions among NATO members initially involved 
capability determinations in which Germany offered military support w ithout 
committing combat troops for the mission in Kosovo.
While the internal debates over the consensus reaching process of the use of 
force between the Reds and Greens offers an interesting inquisition of change within  
the German government, the importance of this process to the overall change to  
German foreign policy lies within Germany's desire to be viewed as a responsible 
partner. The new coalition was tasked w ith a difficult decision which would define 
Germany's continuity while increasing calculability and showing com m itm ent to  
multilateral alliance solidity.22 Internal differences on the question of German military 
participation continued, especially among the Green party led by ioschka Fischer. During 
debates at the Bielefeld Party Congress in M ay 1999, Fischer publicly explained that 
Germany's conflicting post-war political culture concepts of 'never again war' and 'never 
again Auschwitz' meant Germany, its citizens and politicians, had to take a stand to end 
genocide in Kosovo. These calls, and the overall argument by Fischer, showed the
21 Paul Hockenos, Joschka Fischer and the Making o f the Berlin Republic. An Alternative History o f Postwar 
Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 110.
22 Joachim Krause, "Die Deutsche Politik in Der Kosovo-Krise," in Humantiare Intervention Und 
Kooperative Sicherheit in Europa, ed. Joachim Krause (Opladen: Leske+Budich, 2000).
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intersection of guilt and responsibility, while uncovering Germany's obligation to the  
international community.
The case of Kosovo for Germany is interesting for several reasons. Germany's 
intricate history with the region and continued involvement and relationship certainly 
contributed to speculations and analysis of Germany's strong behavior. To begin,
Albania was backed by the German government through the German-Albanian 
agreement signed in 1995, which, although generally worded, was intended to  apply to  
Kosovo as well. Also, a German Information Service was set up in Tirana in order to  
assist Kosovar23 militia at the tim e. Germany assisted the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 
an ethnic-Albanian paramilitary organization, in acquiring weapons and equipm ent from  
Albania.24 Germany's continuous financial support for secessionist movements and veto 
to a weapons supply cut-off request to the KLA, placed Germany on a clear side from  
the onset of the conflicts. Rhetorically, defense minister Volker Riihe explained that any 
actor who agreed to the resolution to strengthen the borders is essentially siding with  
Milosevic, and called on the U.S. to  act against Yugoslavia during pre-w ar diplomatic 
talks. Further, Ruhe strengthened Germany's official position that Milosevic was 
carrying out ethnic cleansing. W hile the official rhetoric of Germany was often perceived 
as a collective consensus on the conflict in Kosovo, internally, discussions w ere marked 
by "incoherence, intra-coalition wrangling, and bureaucratic rivalries".25
23 Albanians of Kosovo
24 Adrian Hyde-Price, "Germany and the Kosovo W ar: Still a Civilian Power?," German Politics 10, no. 1 
(2001).
25 "Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?," German Politics 10, no. 1 (2001): 25.
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The Rambouillet Agreement, a proposed peace agreement between Kosovar 
Albanians and Yugoslavia drafted by German foreign minister Joschka Fischer and U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, was accepted by the American, Albanian, and 
British delegations and rejected by Russian and Serbian delegates. The failed and 
rejected agreement contributed to a strengthened German position which resulted in 
the first military intervention since W W II, with Chancellor Schroder arguing for 
exclusively humanitarian reasons to  explain Germany's involvement. Until then, 
Germany's foreign policy choices w ere marked by pursuing normative goals, to  include 
the universal right of self-determination. This concept, during the Kosovo crisis, was 
then used to justify the forceful intervention in Kosovo while emphasizing Germany's 
commitment and responsibility to NATO allies. Both Schroder and Fischer fe lt that 
involvement was necessary, yet Germany's involvement, at first, was difficult to  explain 
to the German public. Germany also continued its com m itm ent to diplomatic efforts to  
end conflicts by convincing Russia to  w ithdraw support from  Belgrade.
Later reports showed that the KLA was encouraged by Germany to  declare a 
humanitarian crisis in order to give legitimacy to a NATO intervention. Germany's 
behavior, action, and policies during the Kosovo crisis put Germany on the map as an 
active participant in the international community and world affairs. A fter the  
intervention, German politicians pushed for independence fo r Kosovo and contributed  
to the reconstruction of Kosovo through development of Kosovo's economy and 
infrastructure. Germany had a continuous com m itm ent of over 2,000 Bundeswehr 
troops, under NATO in Kosovo, while Germany supported the  privatization of Kosovo's
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industrial enterprise with heavy involvement by the German businesses such as 
Deutsche Bank and Siemens.26 Kosovo was recognized by Germany in 2008 and holds an 
embassy seat in Pristina while Kosovo has an embassy in Berlin and consulates in 
Frankfurt and Stuttgart.
The Use of Force: Iraq
The mission in Kosovo also differed greatly from the war in Iraq, which was 
marked by aggression and focused on weapons of mass destruction (W M D ). The 
multilateral aspect of the war in Iraq therefore did not convince Germany to support 
and participate in an intervention in Iraq. W hile initially seen as a break with  
multilateralism for Germany from its major ally, the U.S., the decision was made on the  
basis of moral legitimacy and responsibility to the international community. Initial 
examinations and comparisons between Kosovo and Iraq led scholars in the field to 
assert that the Franco-German solidarity observed during Iraq showed an almost 
multilateral European approach to  antimilitarism and intervention, which was solidified 
by Germany's stance. While domestic opposition to  the war in Iraq was certainly evident 
during and after the invasion, the importance of political party opposition became clear 
with the Left strictly advocating against the U.S.'s rhetoric. Statements by political 
leaders during the Iraq war showed and reflected the overall antimilitarist culture in 
Germany, driven partially by domestic influences, but analyses also explained the  
importance of political goals to include securing a re-election of the Red-Green coalition.
26 "Germany and the Kosovo W ar: Still a Civilian Power?."
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Perhaps most notably evidenced by Joschka Fischer's remarks of 'Excuse me, but I am  
not convinced' to Donald Rumsfield, Germany's behavior, action, and rhetoric during 
the discussions leading up to the invasion of Iraq showed Germany's 'newly'-oriented  
foreign policy. While breaks with multilateral approaches w ere evident in Kosovo, the  
anti-American undertone and behavior by Germany was certainly 'new '; however, the  
policy of noninterventionism certainly fell directly into Germany's established norm. 
Therefore, to argue that a direct change in policy occurred during and after Iraq would 
be a gross overstatement. Breaks with multilateralism occurred during Kosovo, under 
the importance of humanitarian intervention. This principle o f humanitarian  
intervention and its connection to Germany's concept of 'never again Auschwitz' 
provided a base line to assess out o f area operations involving the use of force. The case 
of Iraq provided neither a humanitarian catastrophe argum ent nor was Germany alone 
in its refusal to support the U.S.'s mission in Iraq.
Germany took the position that the UN inspections for W MDs in Iraq should be 
completed before any other decisions were made, stressing the importance of the  
diplomatic process. Besides Fischer, Chancellor Gerhard Schroder's rhetoric was 
strongly marked by opposition against the invasion of Iraq and the use of military force. 
Schroder, first speaking out against the invasion, added that Germany would not 
support military operations in Iraq even if the war was supported and legitimized 
through a UN Security Council mandate. His position largely reflected the overall anti­
war sentiment of the German population. During 2003, polls showed an 80% opposition
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to the war by the German population, highlighting the importance o f domestic 
influences on political policies.27
Germany eventually joined forces with Belgium and France to  block NATO for 
the planning of a possible war in Iraq. This break in alliance with the U.S. would mark 
the first tim e Germany opposed an American foreign policy choice since W W II. This 
division of interests can also be seen as the division in norms and beliefs which inform  
strategic culture and the use of force. The rhetoric by the U.S. at the tim e grouped 
France and Germany into the 'old Europe', while countries in the Baltic region 
supported the Bush doctrine and deploym ent to Iraq. Despite Germany's opposition and 
refusal to send troops to Iraq, Germany continued to support U.S. foreign policy in other 
parts of the world, and would eventually publically, although just rhetorically, support 
efforts in Iraq. While relations with the U.S. weakened, the relationship between  
Germany and Russia became stronger. The decision by the U.S. to invade Iraq posed 
several challenges to international order. First and foremost, the western allies 
disagreed about the war itself, its reasoning and legitimacy, and outright opposed it. As 
with most cases in this dissertation, the elem ent o f economic interests has to  be raised 
in the case of Iraq, as Germany exports goods to Iraq.28 Despite Schroeder's public 
stance against the war, Germany was bound to support a UN decision for international
27 Dieter Dettke, Germany Says "No". The Iraq W ar and the Future o f German Foreign and Security Policy 
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
28 According to the German Department of State, bilateral trade has continued to grow in recent years, 
and were at €1.3 billion in 2011.
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law purposes. A German court later ruled that the invasion of Iraq violated international 
law.29
The Use of Force: Afghanistan
Afghanistan is an important case, both in terms of Germany's continued 
progression for use of force discussion and consensus reaching, as well as Germany's 
role as a security exporter. Germany's com m itm ent to the mission in Afghanistan 
marked the first time of Bundeswehr deploym ent outside o f European borders. Initially 
presented to the German public as a mission focused on development and 
reconstruction under the humanitarian aid umbrella, operations in Afghanistan changed 
with the security environment to  a more conflict intensive mission requiring critical 
input and analysis on the role o f Germany in Afghanistan. When Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) went into effect in October 2001, the chance of German combat troop  
deployment was under discussion by members of the Bundestag.30 W hile the  
CDU/Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), SPD, and Free Democratic Party (FDP) 
reached consensus and supported the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, the Party of 
Democratic Socialism (PDS) strongly opposed it, w ith  the Green party being internally 
divided.
During the Bundestag hearing on the vote for German deployment of forces to
29 Although a case involving a German soldier's refusal to  obey and order after the invasion of Iraq did not 
receive much attention internationally, it reflects the German understanding and belief in the importance 
of legitimacy though international law (perhaps partially due to  the history surrounding the concept of 
Rechtsstaat)
30 "Einsatz Deutscher Soldaten in Der Anti-Terror Allianz Ruckt Naher," Die Welt, October 8, 2001.
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Afghanistan with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under UN Security 
Council Resolution 1368 and 1373, and in coalition with NATO, Chancellor Schroder 
stressed that specific deployment caveats would apply to the allowed 3,900 troops. The 
initial mandate allowed for a mission of twelve months with a required renewal vote by 
the Bundestag. Further, the mandate outlined full control over German forces by the  
Bundestag and stressed the humanitarian aspect o f the mission. The chancellor's 
statements emphasized the need for Germany to show com m itm ent and responsibility 
to its partners and added that participation in the mission in Afghanistan would be proof 
that the German Sonderweg was an illusion.31 This precise rhetorical linking of a W W II 
legacy term  to the possible consequences of Germany's foreign policy behavior shows 
the influence of historical memory on contemporary political discussions.32
Chancellor Schroder promised "unlimited solidarity" in both a press conference 
and to the Bundestag, to support the U.S. in finding the terrorists responsible for the  
attacks of September 11, 2001.33 This strong rhetorical support showed Germany's 
commitment to take on more responsibility and a bigger international role, while  
continuing to advocate its alliance solidarity and obligations toward global security. 
While both Schroder and Fischer articulated continued support of Germany's 
commitment to its allies, internally the Red-Green coalition did not consent on the
31 "Government Statement by Chancellor Gerhard Schroder to  the German Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 
14/198/19283.", accessed October 20, 2013, http://d ipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/14/14198.pdf#P.19283
32 "M it klarem Verstand und Ueberzeugung muessen wir sagen, dass ein deutscher Sonderweg, ein sich- 
Heraushalten in unserer W elt eine Illusion ist. Deutschland traegt Verantwortung wie andere Staaten 
dieser W elt auch." Ibid.
33 Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Quietly Chides German for His Dissension on Iraq," New York Times, August 17, 
2002.
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mission and use of force in Afghanistan. Similar to debates and discussions during the  
Kosovo war, as images and reports of the afterm ath of civilian casualties due to  the air 
strikes came pouring in, the pacifist camp of the Greens began to voice their dissent for 
continued support.34 The majority o f the Bundestag voted in November 2001 to  
contribute German forces to the OEF mission in Afghanistan. Chancellor Schroder 
supported the war on terror post 9 /1 1  and deployed forces to  Afghanistan as part of 
NATO operations. When Schroder left office in 2005, over 2,000 German troops were  
still deployed in Afghanistan, making Germany the second largest troop contributor to  
deploy its people after the U.S.35
The newly established UN mission to  contribute and assist the  Afghan 
government in security efforts as well as civil reconstruction support under International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established under the concept o f security 
assistance. The German government com m itm ent 1,200 soldiers but emphasized the  
difference between the OEF mission and the ISAF mission. While the OEF mission was 
publicly viewed in connection with the U.S.'s efforts to fight terrorism, the ISAF mission, 
under the umbrella of developmental assistance, was easier to explain and justify to  the  
German public. Further, reports of the targeted killings of Germans through suicide 
bombings resulted in public demands to  end Germany's mission in Afghanistan. By 
2008, the German government rejected U.S. demands for increased German forces to
34 It is important to  mention that the debates surrounding German force deployment for the mission in 
Macedonia in August 2001, which failed to  result in a consensual vote by the governing coalition, 
contributed to the rocky discussions in the case of Afghanistan.
35 Currently, Germany is the third largest country to commit troops to Afghanistan, behind the U.S. and 
the U.K.
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Afghanistan, but agreed to provide 200 soldiers to  relieve Norwegian forces per NATO's 
request.36 Throughout these levels of demands, the discussions and votes within the  
government and coalition remained diverse, w ithout a clear consensus on the use of 
force and German combat troop deployment to Afghanistan.
An important incident relating to  the political and theoretical discussion of the  
use of force in the case of Afghanistan involves Germany and the Kunduz airstrike that 
occurred in September 2009. An American fighter jet, per request by German forces 
stationed in the Kunduz province in northern Afghanistan, struck fuel tanks thought to  
be captured by Taliban insurgents. The airstrike killed over 100 civilians, and resulted in 
several political consequences, including restitution payments to the victims, the  
resignation of then German defense minister Franz Josef Jung, and the investigation and 
prosecution of Oberst (Colonel) Georg Klein, the commander who called in the airstrike. 
While Germany was in the midst of election after the airstrike, the afterm ath was 
marked by an influx of debates, analyses, controversial discussions, and public outcry 
over the mission in Afghanistan.
The Kunduz affair is interesting for several reasons. First, the consequences and 
action of the airstrike in Kunduz changed the perception of Germany's involvement in 
the mission in Afghanistan, which was believed to  be for reconstruction and 
development purposes. This diverging understanding of the mission by the German 
public, mixed with the engagement and fighting on the ground, resulted in rhetorical
36 "Nato Bittet Um Deutsche Kampftruppe," Suddeutsche Zeitung, May 17, 2010, accessed October 22, 
2013, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afghanistan-nato-bittet-um -deutsche-kam pftruppe-l.263484.
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changes in descriptions of the mission, and paved the way fo r a critical look into the 
German forces on the ground in Afghanistan at the  time. Secondly, the reaction of 
Germany's domestic public which included anti-w ar protests with references to Colonel 
Klein as a w ar criminal and mass murderer, an opinion shared by several authors, 
scholars, and analysts, shows a stark difference to  the treatm ent of similar cases where  
responsibility falls on the U.S. Thirdly, the Kunduz affair resulted in a critical analysis into 
the conduct of German soldiers and 'w hat a soldier is allowed to do during war', amidst 
the legal process and criminal prosecution of Colonel Klein as well as the compensation 
process for the victims of the airstrike.37 Finally, the  legacy of the Kunduz affair resulted 
in the contribution to the discourse on the use of force, the concept of 'civilian casualty', 
and the diverse analyses of the media, analysts, and security scholars. The affair was 
broadcasted on national television in a movie titled "A murderous decision" (Eine 
Morderische Entscheidung), while remaining the subject of political debates. German 
magazines heavily published analyses on the affair, most notably an extensive research 
project by the major German newspaper Der Spiegel, titled "A German Crime" (Ein 
Deutsches Verbrechen), which referred to  the incident as a 'war crime'.38
Breaking a taboo in German political rhetoric, the word “Krieg" (war) was used 
to describe Germany's involvement in ISAF after three German soldiers were killed 
during ground fighting with the Taliban. Then defense M inister Karl-Theodor zu
37 Joerg Diehl, "Kunduz-Prozess: Was Darf Ein Offizier Im Krieg?," Spiegel Online, March 20, 2013, accessed 
October 25, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-in-afghanistan-prozess-zu- 
luftangriff-von-kunduz-beginnt-a-890034.html.
38 Ulrike Von Demmer et al., "Ein Deutsches Verbrechen," D er Spiegel, February, 1, 2010, accessed 
October 22, 2013, http://w w w .spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-68885074.htm l.
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Guttenberg, publicly spoke of "war" and "warlike circumstance" instead of the usual 
language of 'armed conflict' as previously argued for by German foreign minister Guido 
W esterwelle.39 This rhetoric, by both Guttenberg and W esterwelle, reflects how political 
rhetoric is used to justify, interpret, and influence votes within political debates, 
simultaneously seeking to change previously held convictions by Germany's domestic 
society. Westerwelle, while not using the term  'w ar', was adamant in conveying the  
importance of Germany's involvement in an armed conflict situation "within the  
parameters of international law" in order to  allow German soldiers in Afghanistan to  
engage forcefully without fear of potential prosecution, adding that "we owe it to those 
who are exposing themselves to  danger on the front lines."40
THE USE OF FORCE: LIBYA 
The Arab spring movements experienced in Tunisia and Egypt eventually reached 
Libya, resulting in a full civil war on February 17, 2011 when the Armed Forces of the  
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya shot at demonstrators in Benghazi.41 The armed conflict, a 
conflict between the military and civilian forces that supported Colonel M uam m ar 
Gaddafi and opposition forces seeking to  overthrow the Gaddafi regime, spread to
39 "Tabu-Bruch: Guttenberg Spricht Von Krieg in Afghanistan," ibid., April 4, 2010, accessed on October 21, 
2013, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/tabu-bruch-guttenberg-spricht-von-krieg-in-afghanistan-a- 
687235.html.
40 "The World from Berlin: 'New Evaluation on Afghanistan Long Overdue'," Spiegel Online, February 11, 
2010, accessed October 22, 2012, http://w ww .spiegel.de/international/germ any/the-w orld-from -berlin- 
new-evaluation-on-afghanistan-long-overdue-a-677289.html.
41 These armed forces were comprised o f the Libyan Navy, Army, Air Force, and the People's militia. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual assessment of global military capabilities and defense 
economies estimated total Libyan armed forces personnel to be around 76,000.
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Tripoli a few  days later. This resulted in the establishment of the National Transitional 
Council, the de facto  government of Libya, formed in Benghazi by the opposition to  
govern over Libya during the conflict and to map out the transition of the  country. The 
council was officially recognized by France in March 2011 and viewed as a legitimate  
body representing the Libyan people by also holding the Libyan UN seat during the  
revolution. The initial resolution (1970) of the UN Security Council condemned the use 
of lethal force by the Gaddafi regime against protesters during the revolution, and 
resulted in several sanctions against Gaddafi and his supporters, to  include the freezing  
of international assets and travel bans.42
Gaddafi forces were able to counterattack militarily through western Libya, 
eventually bombing planes and tanks held by opposition forces near Benghazi. After 
reports of the brutality exercised by pro-Gaddafi supporters reached the international 
community, Libya's UN delegation, France, and the United Kingdom proposed a UN 
Security Council resolution to establish a no-fly zone and to authorize military force in 
order to protect civilians in Libya. Further, the  Arab League also directly requested that 
the UNSC impose a no-fly zone over Libya. Resolution 1973 was adopted on March 17, 
2011, with a 10-0 affirmative vote, no oppositions, and five abstentions. W hile France, 
the United Kingdom, and the U.S. voted for the resolution, Brazil, China, Germany, India, 
and Russia abstained from the official vote. The resolution authorized 'all necessary
42 Resolution 1970 United Nations Security Council, "In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes 
Touch Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters," 
February 17, 2011, accessed October 25, 2013, 
http ://w w w .un.org /N ew s/Press/docs/ll/scl0187.doc.htm .
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measures' and effectively approved the use of force in the Libyan conflict to protect 
civilian populated areas under attack by the Gaddafi regime.43
During the EU summit in Brussels in March 2011, which was marked by 
"annoyance", the validity of the newly formed council in Libya was discussed with  
several EU states questioning France's instant recognition.44 According to one report, 
the eastern and southeastern Europeans were "appalled at how ruthlessly France and 
Great Britain attempted to  push through their policies", resulting in the prevention of 
the no-fly zone clause for the initial resolution on March 11, 2011 45 A fter the escalation 
of violence and after the Arab League officially requested a military intervention, 
internal statements show that Germany, Russia, and the U.S. initially questioned the  
problems attributed to the establishment of a no-fly zone. M ore specifically, U.S.
Defense minister Robert Gates relayed his skepticism to  Thomas de Maiziere during a 
meeting, as it would "require air strikes against Libyan anti-aircraft batteries".46 The U.S. 
decision to support the no-fly zone given on March 15, 2011 was influenced through 
arguments brought forth by President Obama's advisors, UN Ambassador Susan Rice, 
and Samantha Power, who argued in line with the UN concept of "responsibility to  
protect". According to interviews, the German government was not made aware of this
43 "Security Council Authorizes 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians in Libya," UN News Centre, 
March 17, 2011, accessed October 25, 2013,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=37808#.UoUlr9JDvTo.
44 Andreas Rinke, "Screbrencia or Afghanistan? W hy Germany Abstained on the Libya Vote-Tracing the  
History of a Decision," IP Journal (2011).
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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changed position and decision, and no attem pt was made to  "explain the astonishing 
turnaround in Washington" which took German politicians "by surprise".47
While the possibility of a German "no"in the form of a veto was dismissed 
quickly, Chancellor Merkel's remarks to the Saarbrucker Zeitung (newspaper) on March  
17, 2011, outlined Germany's skepticism towards military interventions. The chancellor 
stated, "I cannot get us involved in a mission with an extremely uncertain end".48 After 
her address at a plenary session of the Bundestag, heated internal debates ensued 
about issues surrounding Germany's alliances and how the protection of the civilian 
population could be ensured. It is interesting to note that some anonymous interviews 
show the conversations and dialogue between de Maiziere and NATO Secretary General 
Andreas Fogh Rasmussen, in which Germany's com m itm ent to the alliance was ensured 
despite German abstention: Germany would provide German soldiers for the Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan which left Rasmussen 
"satisfied".49 Perhaps, these internal exchanges are to  account for the official 
statements by German politicians detailing Germany's out of area mission support after 
the news of Germany's abstention broke.
Resolution 1973, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, called for a 
ceasefire and end to  the violence and brutal attacks by the Gaddafi regime, imposed a 
no-fly zone over Libya, restricted all flights besides humanitarian aid flights, and 
strengthened a previous arms embargo imposed by the Security Council. Under an allied
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
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coalition, French military jets entered Libyan airspace to  enforce and secure the no-fly 
zone imposed by the resolution on March 19, 2011. By August 2011, rebel opposition 
forces stormed Tripoli, eventually taking control of the area. The fighting ended in 
October 2011 in the city o f Sirte where Gaddafi was first captured and eventually killed 
by rebel forces, resulting in the official liberation of Libya on October 23, 2011.50 W hile  
initial reports estimated that 30,000 people were killed and 50,000 were wounded  
during the six months of civil war, official numbers are not available. These estimates 
were eventually reduced by the National Transitional Council to about 25,000, and an 
unfinished Libyan government reported an even lower estimate in January 2013 of 
4,700 rebel fighters killed and another 2 ,100 missing, and no reports of civilian 
casualties.51 The September 2012 attack on the American consulate in Benghazi, which 
killed the American ambassador to Libya and resulted in the resignation of the American 
UN ambassador, had severe political repercussions for the U.S. While Libyans voted for 
the first tim e in parliamentary elections in July 2012, the country remains unstable and 
insecure.
50 Thomas Erdbrink and Liz Sly, "Gaddafi's Rule Crumbling as Rebels Enter Heart of Tripoli," The 
Washington Post, August 21, 2011, accessed October 23, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/libyan-rebels-converging-on- 
tripoli/ll/08/21/glQ AbF3RUJ_story.htm l.
51 Ian Black, "Libyan Revolution Casualties Lower Than Expected, Says Ne Government," The Guardian, 
January 8, 2013, accessed October 25, 2013, h ttp ://w w w .theguardian .com /w orld /13/jan/08/libyan- 
revolution-casualties-lower-expected-government.
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The German Response to Libya
Germany's abstention to  the vote on UNSC resolution 1973 was m et with  
surprise, shock, and anger from the international community. The conflict in Libya 
appeared to have all the 'right' preconditions to w arrant a legitimized approval for the  
use of force based on humanitarian intervention in a multilateral coalition, and within  
the normative framework of international law. Germany's official choice to align itself 
with China and Russia, knowing the consequences such inaction would have, left 
analysts and reporters wondering whether Germany's foreign policy is significantly 
changing. Germany's behavior, understanding, and justification of said behavior during 
the crisis may be viewed as a reconstruction or new path for its foreign and security 
policy objective; however, when viewing cases in which the use of force was debated in 
German policy within the past tw enty years, the case of Libya falls within a sequential 
path. Among the dominant variables that influence German foreign and security policy, 
multilateral alliance solidarity was certainly at the forefront o f the conflict in Libya, with  
France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. leading the charge in seeking a legitimized 
intervention in Libya with an authorization on the use of force. W hy then did Germany 
abstain from the vote to intervene in the civil w ar in Libya?
The German UN Ambassador, Peter W ittig , addressed the Security Council during 
a debate for Resolution 1973, giving Germany's official reasoning and explanation for 
abstention:
Decisions on the use of military force are always extremely difficult to  take. W e  
have very carefully considered the option of using military force — its 
implications as well as its limitations. W e see great risks. The likelihood of large- 
scale loss of life should not be underestimated. If the  steps proposed turn out to
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be ineffective, we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military 
conflict that would affect the w ider region. W e should not enter into a militarily 
confrontation on the optimistic assumption that quick results with few  casualties 
will be achieved. Germany therefore decided not to support a military option, as 
foreseen particularly in paragraphs 4 and 8 o f the resolution. Furthermore, 
Germany will not contribute to  such a military effort w ith its own forces. 
Germany therefore decided to abstain in the voting. (Peter W itting, March 17, 
2011)52
Germany's abstention was im m ediately noted, in both scholarly and media 
circles, as a clear 'NO', drawing parallels to the invasion in Iraq and Germany's support 
of humanitarian interventions in the Balkans. References of the past to  Germany's 
potential Sonderweg were mentioned by scholars and journalists alike. After the vote on 
resolution 1973, German politicians continuously articulated full support for the mission 
in Libya, yet this rhetoric proved that talk indeed is not cheap. Given the legal 
qualifications and legitimacy o f the UNSC resolution and the multilateral facet of the  
vote, backed by humanitarian reasoning, along with the support of the Arab league, 
Germany's behavior, in the Libyan case, was influenced by different variables. In order 
to explain and understand this potential variation in norm-consistent policy, it is crucial 
to examine the official rhetoric and statements o f policy makers while also considering 
the international security environment.
On March 18, 2011, Guido W esterwelle explained the German government's 
position on the Libyan crisis at the parliament. During his speech, W esterwelle was clear 
in Germany's opposition, stating that "German soldiers will not participate in combat
52 "S/Pv.6498," ed. United Nations Security Council (March 17, 2011), accessed November 2, 2013,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206498.pdf.
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mission in Libya", adding that this decision was not easy for Germany.53 Continuing his 
explanation, W esterwelle explained that, despite some differences about domestic 
political issues, the constructive debates resulted in a collective consensus against the  
dictator Gaddafi and were on the "side of international law".54 After explaining and 
outlining Germany's position in regards to the Libyan population and against Gaddafi, 
W esterwelle makes a distinct break in his speech to  separate the questions on military 
interventions and German participation in such missions. W hile Germany rhetorically 
supported the elements of resolution 1973, stressing the importance of sanctions and 
Germany's support thereof, the break with the alliance is due to Germany's 
understanding of the concept on the use of force.
Explaining that the decision to  sanction the use of force and deciding over the  
lives of German soldiers is the most difficult one to  be debated over politically, 
Westerwelle details the German choice to abstain from the UNSC vote, adding that 
there is "no such thing as a surgical strike".55 German soldiers would therefore not 
participate in military operations in Libya. Despite Germany's abstention from the vote, 
which was viewed and analyzed as a "No" rather than a refraining from voting, 
Westerwelle outlined the ways in which Germany was currently acting "responsibly" 
though the contribution of 7,000 German soldiers to  out of area operations worldwide.
53 "Regierungserklarung Bundesminister W esterwelle Vor Dem Deutschen Bundestag Zur Aktuellen 
Entwicklung in Libyen - Plenarprotokoll 17/97," Auswartiges Am t, March 18, 2011, accessed September 2, 
2013, http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/lnfoservice/Presse/Reden/ll/110318_BM_Regierungserkl%C3%A4rung_Libyen.html.
(translated)
54 "Regierungserklarung Bundesminister W esterwelle Vor Dem Deutschen Bundestag Zur Aktuellen 
Entwicklung in Libyen - Plenarprotokoll 17/97," Auswartiges Am t, March 18, 2011.
55 Ibid.
116
While the importance to remove Gaddafi from  power was stressed throughout 
Westerwelle's speech, the German government did not offer a solution or alternate  
route to reach this goal besides strengthening sanctions and focusing on diplomatic 
efforts. While this position may be difficult to  understand in light o f Germany's 
continued emphasis on humanitarian-based interventions and multilateral approaches, 
the decision falls in line with previous attitudes towards German participation in out of 
area operations involving the use of force. Libya, while difficult to analyze based on the  
legal and factual aspects, is therefore a continuous, sequential case in German 
consensus reaching on the use of force; influenced, shaped, and constructed through  
historical memories.
It is important to note that the internal debates, and the debates following  
Westerwelle's speech, did not show a clear consensus among politicians internally in 
Germany. Dr. Rolf Mutzenich (SPD) accused W esterwelle of being influenced by 
domestic politics, arguing that the UN resolution is the "right consequence" based on 
the events in Libya.56 Policy makers who opposed the abstention from  the vote argued 
that Westerwelle owes an explanation on the behavior to the  international community. 
To them, abstaining from the vote painted a poor picture of Germany to  those countries 
who voted for Germany to have a high position within the Security Council and to the  
people of the Arab world who recently supported W esterwelle on Tahir square. On the  
other hand, members of the Left party (Jan van Aken) accused the SPD of
56 "Keine Beteiligung an Kampfeinsatzen," Deutscher Bundestag W eb and Text Archive accessed 
November 5, 2013, h ttp ://w w w .bundestag .de /dokum ente /textarch iv /ll/33798136_kw ll_de_ lyb ien /.
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"warmongering", explaining that forceful interventions in Libya would lead to further 
bloodshed. The Left viewed the abstention on the UNSC resolution as advancement 
from previous decisions under the Red-Green coalition government who "blindly" 
committed to military deployment in Afghanistan.57 The CDU/CSU supported the  
decision, with Ruprecht Polenz explaining that both the UN resolution and Germany's 
abstention are justified, as "too many unexplained risks exist", adding that abstaining 
eliminates suspicion of Germany only committing troops due to the oil in the region.58
Given the statements made during debates after the decision was announced by 
Westerwelle, those party members who supported Germany's official decision agreed 
that the uncertainty of the resolution's end point contributed to the abstention, 
emphasizing the importance to consider not only NATO advice, but also that of the EU. 
While the decision was fiercely debated afterwards and included accusations and 
interruptions, parliamentary members such as Dr. Rainer Stinner (FDP) emphasized that 
while German soldiers may not participate in combat missions in Libya, Germany would 
participate in the "mission to deprive Gaddafi of power" through stronger sanctions and 
taking on Libyan refugees.59 The Green party supported the UN resolution, stressing the 
importance of the humanitarian aspect in Libya based on the concept o f human rights 
and the responsibility to protect (R2P). Renate Kunast (Green Party) referred back to a 
UN resolution of 2005, which under the headline of "Responsibility to  Protect" outlined
57 "Keine Beteiligung an Kampfeinsatzen," Deutscher Bundestag W eb and Text Archive
58 Ibid.
59 "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner," Deutscher Bundestag: accessed November 5, 2013, 
http://w w w .bundestag.de/dokum ente/textarchiv/ll/33929101_kw 23_interview _stinner/index.htm l.
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the responsibility of states to protect its people. Failure to  abide by this principle 
therefore warrants engagement and action by the international community. Kiinast 
argued that Germany must show clearly that human rights are important to  Germany  
and its foreign policy.60 While differing in internal consent on the vote is evident when  
considering the statements made by German politicians, the official German stance to  
abstain was reached by the majority vote.
The importance of W W II legacy, specifically the concept of the culture of 
restraint, is certainly evident in the Libyan case based on official rhetoric references to  
memory and experience; however, the ways in which other factors influenced the  
decision making must also be included. The importance of humanitarian preconditions, 
multilateral alliance based-approaches, responsible behavior, and legitim ized/UN  
sanctioned efforts did not sway the German vote to an affirmative "yes". Further, 
Bundeswehr reform, cost, and German soldiers currently in Afghanistan also influenced 
the decision. As Angela Merkel noted in a speech before the parliament after the  
abstained vote, instead of contributing crew members for AWACS flights over Libya, 
Germany would increase participation in Afghanistan. The chancellor commented to  
media outlets that Germany was not neutral, and, like the international community, 
aims to bring an end to the Gaddafi regime.
National or domestic interests may have influenced the decision to  abstain from  
the Libya vote, specifically Germany's general opposition to  military interventions. 
According to a poll, 85 percent of the German population opposed German soldiers'
60 "Keine Beteiligung an Kampfeinsatzen."
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participation in a Libyan intervention and tw o thirds of Germans agreed w ith the  
abstention of UNSC resolution 1973.61 W hile over 60 percent of Germans supported a 
forced military intervention against Gaddafi, the majority o f those asked rejected 
participation in such an intervention in Libya by the Bundeswehr.62 Further, another 65 
percent of Germans agreed with the official behavior of Germany not to participate in 
the intervention. The results of the domestic polling on the use of force debate over 
Libya, is a reflection of the overall struggle for Germans to define and settle the conflict 
of responsibility and guilt. Germans recognized tha t Gaddafi 'must go', but most w ere  
unwilling to do so themselves. This attitude can be explained through a variety of 
variables, mostly influenced by Germany's continued antimilitaristic outlook shaped and 
constructed through W W II legacy.
GERMANY'S BEHAVIOR: MEDIA AND SCHOLARLY RESPONSES TO LIBYA 
Germany's official position and abstention from the vote was m et with criticism 
by both international and domestic media outlets. The German press ran headlines 
pointing to the "Catastrophic Signal" to the Arab world (Der Spiegel), Richard Herzinger 
in Die W elt commented on the "shameful" way in which Germany showed that it had 
"learned nothing", and DieZeit outlined how Germany "sugar coated" the damaging
61 "A 'Catastrophic Signal1 to the Arab World: Berlin Divided over Security Council Abstention," Spiegel 
Online, March 21, 2011; Rinke, "Screbrencia or Afghanistan? Why Germany Abstained on the Libya Vote- 
Tracing the History of a Decision."
62 "Krieg Gegen Libyen: Uber 60 Prozent Der Deutschen Befiirworten Den Angriff," Bild, March 20, 2013, 
accessed November 17, 2013, h ttp ://w w w .b ild .de/po litik /ll/libyen-krise/aber-m ehrheit-lehnt- 
beteiligung-ab-16933388.bild.html.
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consequences of its isolating behavior.63 Across Europe, The Guardian, described how  
Germany marginalized itself over the abstention from  the vote while on the other side 
of the Atlantic, Roger Cohen in The New York Times, outlined the ways in which M erkel 
"shunned" her allies, lost her credibility, and erased Germany's predictability.64 The 
them e across the majority of the media coverage shows a clear consensus: Germany 
made a wrong and 'puzzling' decision to  abstain from  the vote on a Libyan intervention.
Interviews and comments given by German politicians after the abstention were  
filled with sharp critiques of the decision. Ruprecht Polenz (CDU) commented on the  
"wide operational gap" within the decision, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul called the  
abstention of the intervention a "disgrace", while some politicians with the SPD and 
Green Party supported the decision.65 Rainer Stinner (FDP) explained that Germany 
made the right decision as the majority of the Bundestag agreed not to  participate in 
military action in Libya. Further, he explained that while Germany is not committing  
ground troops to Libya, 40 percent of the AW  ACS operations are manned by German 
soldiers.66 Other official interviews and commentary on German television showed a 
them atic explanation used by politicians to justify Germany's abstention. M ore  
specifically, in regards to the argument for humanitarian intervention and the
63 "A 'Catastrophic Signal' to the Arab World: Berlin Divided over Security Council Abstention; JORG Lau, 
"Macht Mai - Ohne Unsl," Zeit Online, March 24, 2011; Richard Herzinger, "Nichts Dazugelernt," Die Welt, 
March 18, 2011.
64 Severin Weiland and Roland Nelles, "Germany Has Marginalised Itself over Libya," The Guardian, March, 
18 2011; Roger Cohen, "Merkel in Miniature," The New  York Times, April 18, 2011.
65 "Krieg Gegen Libyen: Uber 60 Prozent Der Deutschen Befurworten Den Angriff."
66 "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner."
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responsibility to protect, some policy makers explained that if one was to intervene in 
Libya, the same should go for Yemen and the Ivory Coast.67
The ways in which German domestic opinion influences foreign policy choices 
are evident by Germany's 'representative democracy' and Chancellor Merkel's 
operationalization of the concept. Several analysts and scholars commented in the 
media on Merkel's "soft" approach based on "popular mood" rather than confronting 
difficult decisions, the Libyan intervention being one of th em .68 Rhetorically, Chancellor 
Merkel has responded to debates with "there is no alternative", as outlined in an 
unflattering article in Der Spiegel, which argued that the chancellor lacked confidence 
and assertiveness to rule Germany. Guido W esterwelle's behavior during the Arab 
Spring movements was severely attacked in the media upon Germany's abstention from  
the Libya vote. While Germany pushed for harder sanctions during the movements in 
Tunisia and Egypt, France remained in the background. In previously accepted policies, 
Germany 'dealt' with issues in the East, while France was responsible for the south of 
Europe. After Westerwelle's public display of support for the  movements in Egypt and 
Tunisia and declaring that "we are on the side of the freedom  movements in the Arab 
world", his official position to abstain was contradictory.69 Perhaps Germany's strong
67 These comments were made by Ulrich Deppendorf (March 21, 2011) and by the minister for economic 
cooperation and development Dirk Nebel on two different television segments on German TV.
68 Dirk Kurbjuweit, "A Germany o f 82 Million Chancellors: W hy Angela Merke's Failures Continue to  
Multiply," Spiegel Online, April 13, 2011, accessed Novem ber 16, 2013,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-germany-of-82-million-chancellors-why-angela-merkel-s-
failures-continue-to-multiply-a-756543.html.
69 Lau, "Macht Mai - Ohne Unsl."
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initial support in the region towards freedom  and democracy contributed to the  
confusion, surprise, and anger felt by the international community and media.
While some reporters and newspapers were extremely critical of Germany's 
decisions, others, while also pointing to the damaging results, appear to  have a difficult 
time assertively arguing against Germany's abstention, instead posing questions and 
focusing on the aftermath of Germany's behavior. The official responses by politicians, 
which often included details of Germany's continued support and mission in 
Afghanistan, is also thematically included by journalists and described as a "bartered  
transaction".70 The fact that the abstention placed Germany alongside China and Russia 
is also widely analyzed and discussed in the media. Die Zeit explains that no foreign 
minister before Westerwelle allowed for Germany to be grouped with China and Russia, 
while focusing on Westerwelle's statements and behavior.71 According to  some 
journalists, W esterwelle made flawed comparison's to Iraq in 2003 by assuming that 
potential air attacks in Libya will undoubtedly lead to ground fighting within in a bloody 
civil war.72
In the German speaking media and through popular political blogs, Germany's 
isolating behavior is discussed in parallels to  Germany's irresponsible past. From 
Germany's refusal to commit more troops to  Afghanistan to  the handling of the  Euro 
crisis, the Libyan abstention only further contributed to  the murmurs about Germany's 
new German foreign policy approach marked by individualism. Interestingly, both
70 The German term, or concept for this is "Kompensationsgeschaft"
71 Lau, "Macht Mai - Ohne Unsl."
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international commentators and internal German journalists continuously question how  
Germany will be viewed by the international community. Analysts worry and wonder to  
what extend the aftermath of the Libya case will contribute to  the uncertainty felt by 
Germany's partners and neighbors. M any German writers point to Germany's economic 
power as an export nation, and calling for an end to  Germany's assumption that other 
nations will contribute to the security umbrella which kept Germany safe.73 W hile  
Germany's abstention from the vote did not prevent military intervention, journalists 
predicted dire consequences and lasting effects. To most analysts from  Germany's allies, 
the move essentially showed that Germany was unwilling to  help, while W esterwelle  
was described as "Germany's pacifist-in-chief".74 W esterwelle's stance, previous 
behavior, and arguments are thematically analyzed throughout the media's analysis of 
Germany's abstention, with journalists explaining W esterwelle's position as "out of 
touch with reality", but understanding tha t Germany's official position will be accepted 
by the electorate.75
Like the scholarly analysis of Germany's abstention shows, the  broad media 
almost exclusively described, analyzed, and understood Germany's abstention from the  
vote as a clear "Nein". This differentiation from reality, while interesting, also gives 
insight into the international community's own understanding and conceptualization of 
Germany's behavior. To discuss German behavior within a political context, it seems
73 Clemens Wergin to Flatworld - Der Aussenblog von Clemens Wergin, 2011. Accessed November 12, 
2013, http://flatw orld.w elt.de/ll/04/20/die-selbstverzw ergung-der-deutschen-ausenpolitik /.
74 Weiland and Nelles, "Germany Has Marginalised Itself over Libya."
75 Ibid.
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impossible to forget or omit history and past experience. From Germany's Sonderweg to  
the clear "Nein" that was blasted all over the media after th e  2003 invasion of Iraq, the  
media judges quickly while struggling to truly explain Germany's special position.
Instead of attempting to understand Germany's official reasoning, journalists point to  
the embarrassment Berlin should have felt, decisions M erkel did not make, and 
statements W esterwelle was supposed to leave out.
While drawing parallels to the invasion of Iraq, journalists also discuss the impact 
of the Libya abstention for the elections in Germany. Much has been debated of 
Chancellor Schroder's motives in 2002 in the midst of his national election campaign. 
Similarly, the media points to W esterwelle's potential considerations for the FDP. Given 
Merkel's tendency to vote along the populist opinion, it comes to no surprise that 
Westerwelle takes domestic positions into consideration. The continued skepticism held 
towards forceful military engagements by the German public, especially the upper 
middle class who often support the FDP, may have influenced W esterwelle's staunch 
comments even after the abstention.76 Most journalists rightly point to the crucial 
difference in Schroder's position in 2002 and W esterwelle's position after Libya: the  
form er had France and the UNSC on his side, while the latter may have dented the  
German-French relationship.
While some journalists in the German media remained neutral in reporting the  
facts and listing potential consequences of the Libyan abstention, others detailed the  
"shameful" behavior exhibited by Germany, whereby the focus was once more on
76 Ibid.
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W esterwelle. Placing Germany on the side of Gaddafi by abstaining, Richard Herzinger in 
Die Zeit dismisses Westerwelle's attem pt at selling his decision in the fram ew ork of 
'Realpolitik', instead arguing that the decision is merely a reflection of the isolationist 
sentiment of Germany.77 Instead of comparing Libya to Iraq, Herzinger points to  the  
missed intervention in the Balkans in 1992, which resulted in two massive military 
interventions that were hastily executed, as well as Afghanistan. According to  the  
journalist, Germany's prolonged w ait to act in the past resulted in involvement in 
unmanaged conflicts. Herzinger also includes Afghanistan in his comparison, arguing 
that Germany, after observing disinterest from afar, only acted once the Taliban became 
a deadly theat. The inaction detailed by some media experts led analysts to predict that 
similar consequences would occur in the case of Libya.
While some scholars critique Germany's behavior, most have a difficult tim e  
theoretically explaining and justifying Germany's behavior. The majority of journal 
articles and opinion pieces authored by scholars include an argumentative judgm ent 
mainly focusing on the afterm ath of the German decision. Some, however, remain 
neutral, instead attempting to explain by chronologically detailing the facts which led to  
Germany's abstention. In Berlin, scholars, through anonymous interviews, tried to detail 
the internal EU debates that took place at the EU summit in Brussels. A political scientist 
at Berlin's Free University said that "Germany is no longer a credible partner in the  
Atlantic alliance", while Joschka Fischer called Germany's foreign policy a "farce".78
77 Herzinger, "Nichts Dazugelernt."
78 "Germany, Russia Learn High Cost of Abstaining from Libya Un Vote,” The Australian, March 25, 2011.
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Hanns W. Maull, in a German journal article published in 2011, referred to  German 
foreign policy as "disoriented", detailing the problems associated with the  case of Libya. 
In the excellently detailed argument, the scholar compares the case of Libya to the  
Kosovo of 1998-1999, but argues, as do most scholars under review, that the  abstention 
positioned Germany against its tw o closest allies, France and the U.S. while isolating 
itself in the EU.79 In order to compensate for this shift in alliance, Germany adopted, as 
observed before in Iraq in 2003, the "politics of the guilty conscious" by committing  
soldiers to AWACS missions in Afghanistan.80 On top  of discussing the importance of the 
concepts "never alone" and "never again war", which both were fulfilled in the Libyan 
case, Maull attributes the concepts of "politics before force", or Germany's emphasis on 
diplomatic efforts, for Germany's abstention in the Libya case. Both journalists and 
scholars pointed to the importance of the elections in Baden-Wurtenberg and 
Rheinland-Pfalz, which motivated the FDP to  push the position of non-intervention  
through military force as well as German domestic opposition towards the intervention. 
Besides this, German scholars question Germany's role concept as a responsible actor in 
the EU. In the past, Germany has greatly benefited from the EU while enjoying the  
security umbrella provided by the transatlantic alliance. In recent years the cost-benefit 
scale has leveled out, and Germany therefore views the role concept and the increased 
responsibility as burdensome.81
79 Hanns W. Maull, "Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Orientierungslos," Zeitschrift fuer Politikwissenschaft 
1(2011).
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
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Security scholars further point to  several problems in Germany's foreign policy, 
evident by the Libya case. Specifically, while the international environment drastically 
changed after the end of the Cold W ar, Germany's foreign policy approach has not. 
Germany relies on cooperating partners, and, in the past, has matched its foreign policy 
approach to those of other allied nations and declaring the behavior as "normal".
Hence, debates and discussion in scholarly circles have resulted in questioning w hether 
Germany has become a 'normal actor'; however, Germany is not, and has not been, like 
any other country within the EU. According to  Hanns Maull, Germany's abstention, 
which was widely viewed as yet another 'Nein', showed that Germany chose another 
Sonderweg, damaged its hard earned trust and reliability, and broke off from  its closest 
partners.82 Most prominent German security scholars agree: Germany's abstention and 
behavior during the Libya crisis was a disaster. Harald M uller called Germany's behavior 
a "moral and political mistake", and added that while he was against the intervention in 
Kosovo and the continued missions in Afghanistan, one "must intervene when one 
should, can, and is allowed to".83 Scholars also address the cliches used by Germany in 
justifying the abstention; mainly the fear for a w ar over oil, which most scholars dismiss 
on the basis o f official numbers detailing Libya's trading partners.
Scholars who analyze Germany's behavior, both theoretically and in practice, are 
puzzled by the abstention. Some note that Germany could have 'symbolically' 
participated by voting "yes" to the no-fly zone while still ensuring no German soldiers
82 Ibid.
83 Harald Miiller, "Ein Desaster. Deutschland Und Der Fall Libyen," Hessische Stiftung Friedens-und 
Konfliktforschung. Standpunkte 2(2011).
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would participate in on-ground engagements in Libya. Scholars also point out the  
damaging image Germany exudes by being grouped with the BRIC-states (Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China). Three of the four BRIC states have political reservations about 
humanitarian-based interventions due to their own controversial movements 
internally.84 According to Muller, these states abstained, fearing that a developm ent of 
norms can positively influence secession movements. While Brazil does not have the  
same political interests as the remainder of the BRIC nations, the scholar suggests that 
Brazil was asked to abstain.85 Security scholars also focus on Germany's continued 
emphasis on diplomatic efforts, specifically the use of sanctions. In the Libya case, most 
scholars agree that sanctions, even increased sanctions, w ere not useful. Further, 
consensus among German scholars shows that Germany's position contradicts its role as 
a civilian power.
SUMMARY
This section has detailed Germany's behavior, rhetoric, and action during four 
selected cases where the use of force was discussed politically. Each case was 
controversial and highly publicized and resulted in changes in German policy. This 
chapter focused on the factual data in each case, while simultaneously presenting the  
evidence used by security scholars to argue for or against Germany's position as a global 
actor. The cases of Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan were historically analyzed in order to
84 Russia (Chechnya), India (Kaschmir), China (Tibet).
85 Muller, "Ein Desaster. Deutschland Und Der Fall Libyen."
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place the case of Libya on a linear path in Germany’s foreign policy pattern. Chapter six 
will then apply the variables to the evidence presented in this chapter in order to  
analyze and determine which variable affected the outcome in each case with the goal 
of pinpointing when and how historical m emory enters German foreign and security 
policy debates.
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CHAPTER V
ANALYZING CHANGE IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION,
SANCTIONS, AND DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF IRAN
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this case study and chapter is to provide an overview of what 
perspectives explain Germany's varied behavior towards a global issue: nuclear 
nonproliferation. Specifically, this chapter will analyze Germany's policies, rhetoric, and 
behavior during the negotiations with Iran, in light of Iran's nuclear program. This study 
will begin with a historical overview of the case, inclusive o f detailing facts surrounding 
the ten year span of negotiations. This chapter will further explain the EU-Germany-lran 
relationship, Iran's nuclear program, and German responses and behavior in the case.
The relationship between Iran and Europe, and Germany particularly, has been 
long and marked by difficulty in diplomatic and political processes since the Iranian 
revolution of 1979. These difficulties are in the areas of economic trade and agreements  
as well as human rights based issues, political relations, and most recently, the Iranian 
nuclear program. The efforts by Germany, the EU-3 (Germany, France, United Kingdom), 
the EU, and the international community to handle the potential acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by Iran has been challenging and oriented towards short-term goals. Germany 
has approached this issue in line with national nonproliferation rhetoric based on an 
argument for peace and stability in the M iddle East, which can be understood through 
Ian Manner's concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE), focusing on diplomacy,
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democracy, freedom, and human rights. Parallel to  this, Germany's own rethinking of its 
nuclear power poses an important pillar of German foreign policy objective. Germany's 
past experience with the international community regarding nuclear power informs 
Germany's behavior and choices towards the Iranian nuclear project and Germany's 
central role in establishing accountability guidelines for Iran. While Germany has been 
vocal about its opposition toward Iran's nuclear program in the past, critiques have 
highlighted Germany's inconsistent behavior towards sanctions and policy avenues for 
Iran. Nuclear weapons, as the ultim ate currency of power, and possession and 
acquisition thereof, are certainly linked to realist arguments on structurally-based 
international relations. How can Germany's behavior towards nuclear power and Iran's 
nuclear program be explained and understood? This case study hypothesizes that 
historical memory and W W II legacy has an effect on Germany's nuclear history while  
informing Germany's policy choices towards the Iranian nuclear program. Germany's 
multilateral alliance solidarity, domestic influence, and national and economic interests 
are variables that also may explain Germany foreign policy in this policy area. Germany's 
behavior is then analyzed to determ ine whether this case is an example of an 
adjustment in policy, a reconstruction of policy, a learned policy, or a norms-based 
continuation of previously employed policy.
An argument can be made that Germany's and the EU's approach to convince 
Iran to halt its uranium enrichment program is linked to the nonproliferation rhetoric 
employed by Germany which connects norms and ideas in order to strengthen 
international security through policy practice. This case study will focus on Germany's
132
rhetoric and action in combination with the EU to highlight Germany's foreign policy 
based on multilateral approaches within a global issue area. Germany's and the EU's 
effectiveness in dealing with Iran's nuclear program is difficult to assess w ithout 
considering historic relationships, theoretical analyses, and recent developments to  
prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear program. After analyzing Germany's 
nonproliferation approach in order to understand the diplomatic relationship in the past 
ten years between the EU and Iran, this study examines scholarly literature as well as 
news media to explain the EU's approach toward Iran's nuclear program, once again 
emphasizing Germany's specific role. Germany's role will be analyzed based on the  
aforementioned variables to determ ine the influence on historical m emory on German 
foreign policy in the analysis, chapter six, of this dissertation. This chapter will conclude 
with a summary of arguments and findings about nonproliferation norms, the German 
and EU voice, and the effectiveness of sanctions in light of historic relationships.
The EU-lranian Relationship
Europe's relationship with Iran is long and diverse. Iran has several relationships 
to  countries within the union, including a long-standing colonizer/imperialist 
relationship to Great Britain, or relationships rooted in long-standing friendship and 
economic ties, such as the relationship between Germany and Iran. Rather than 
outlining the relationship in terms of trade and treaties, which vary too much to  
elaborate in this chapter, I will first outline the EU's role as a mediator and global actor 
in light of Iran's nuclear program, and focus on an in-depth analysis of the German-
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Iranian relationship. Sebastian Harnisch describes the relationship between the EU and 
Iran as that of a 'mediator', with a "critical and constructive dialogue with Tehran" in 
place before Iran's nuclear fuel cycle program was exposed in 2002.1 According to some 
scholars, the EU's role as a m ediator partially failed as Iran's program did not constitute 
a threat to international stability and peace, yet was approached by the EU as such. 
Several policy offers outlining multiple, comprehensive approaches 'lacked credibility', 
as these offers did not include a security guarantee by the U.S.2 Although the EU initially 
took the lead in negotiations with Iran, the U.S.'s role and actions were central to  Iran's 
reactions and diplomatic processes and directly contributed to a halt in the  
negotiations. The institutional design of the EU and its actions are in line with a theory- 
based approach on norms that directly links to the policy advocated towards Iran. 
According to Harnish, without the U.S., Iran would have not first accepted the EU as a 
mediator, and eventually discontinued relations with the EU.
The German-lranian Relationship
Germany's prolonged and continuous relationship with Iran has been a "sore 
point" for German-American relations during the 1990's and has been attributed to a 
conflict in national interests.3 The historical relationship between Germany and Iran 
began before World W ar I when Iran began the relationship in order to counterbalance
1 Sebastian Harnisch, "Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/Eu-3 Iran 
Initiative," European Security 16, no. 1 (2007): 8.
2 "Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/Eu-3 Iran Initiative," European 
Security 16, no. 1 (2007): 18.
3 Jacob Heilbrunn, "Bonn Mots," New Republic 216, no. 20 (1997): 17.
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British and Russian influence in the area.4 The relationship extended throughout the  
1920's and 1930's, with extensive student exchange programs and military equipm ent 
supplied by Germany to Shah Reza Khan. After W W II, W est Germany continued the  
relationship with Iran and became a close ally to the Shah. Even after the Iranian 
Revolution, German firms and businesses have shared and supplied technology to Iran, 
eventually becoming Iran's main trading partner.5 In the 1990's, before the recent 
elevation of Iran's nuclear program, over 170 German firms operated in Iran, to include 
Krupp, Daimler-Benz, and Siemens. Despite international political incidents, the  
German-lranian business relationship remained strong, w ith Iran extending this 
relationship to form er East German businesses.6 The German and Iranian intelligence 
services have also shared information and cooperated closely in the 1990's, to  include 
several personal visits between the German intelligence chief Bemd Schmidbauer and 
Iranian cleric and chief of intelligence Ali Fallahian.
The German-lranian relationship was justified to Germany's western allies under 
the approach of 'critical dialogue', also referred to  as 'constructive engagement', and 
explained as an opportunity for Germany to  promote western values in Iran including 
reforming domestic politics in Iran. In the past, policy makers argued that this critical 
dialogue contributed to Iran's adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968; 
however, some scholars conclude that Germany's policy of detente as well as the U.S.
4 For the purpose of this brief overview, I have focused on the recent relationship between Germany and 
Iran, but first German missions to Persia were reported in the 16th Century.
5 Heilbrunn, "Bonn Mots," 18.
6 Such international political incidents include the 1979 seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and 
the 1992 assassination of Kurdish exiles at a restaurant in Berlin; the German business community reacted 
with "keep political matters out of business"
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policy of containment has not changed or affected the Iranian regime during that tim e.7 
German news magazines, as well as interviews w ith German analysts, point to  
Germany's promotion of a softer approach which includes less economic sanctions. 
According to German reports in 2009, Iranian imports to  Germany almost doubled, with 
German exports to Iran also increasing steadily. German media therefore reflects the  
idea of keeping business and politics separate, w ith commentators criticizing German 
policy makers for focusing on foreign policy w ithout taking into consideration the overall 
relationship, the economy, and the impact o f the business and domestic relationship.
On the other hand, German security scholars are outraged by Germany's continued 
economic relationship with Iran, calling Germany's foreign policy 'damaging' and 
'inconsistent' by opposing stronger sanctions.
According to the German Federal Foreign Office website, German exports fell by 
19 percent in 2011, with German businesses in Iran not renewing business contracts 
since the initial sanctions began in 2007. Between 2007 and 2013, German exports to  
Iran increasingly dropped (except during 2010), from  3.6 billion Euros in 2007 to  one 
billion Euros in 2013. Similarly, imports from  Iran also steadily dropped from 583 million 
Euros in 2007 to 157 million Euros in 2013, with the exception of 2010 where both 
imports and exports were at a record high.8 Beyond trade relationships and the overall 
historic relationship between Germany and Iran, German citizens still travel to Iran very
7 Heilbrunn, "Bonn Mots."
8 "Beziehungen Zu Deutschland," ed. Auswartiges Amt, accessed December 5, 2013, 
http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/sid_DCD155D9AB53D25911F278B439796DEB/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/lran/Bilate
ral_node.html#doc337586bodyText2.
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frequently. Germany has a language institute, a diplomatic school, an archeological 
institute, and a Christian community establishment in Iran, as well as a long-standing 
relationship in educating Iranian scientists in Germany, whereby official diplomatic 
relations have been established since 1952.9
Iran's Nuclear Program
Scholars and historians who analyze recent developments in Iranian foreign 
policy, and especially Iran's nuclear program, emphasize Iran's resources and history as 
a powerful empire. Themes of pride, privilege, and international standing can explain 
Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. The privilege and benefits from civilian nuclear power 
can be used to strengthen Iran's standing as a great civilization, contribute to political 
regime resilience, and influence regional and international allies. Further, civilian 
nuclear power could be used by Iran to level and tam e Europe and the U.S., making the  
acquisition thereof rather lucrative.10 Iran's nuclear program has its origins in the 1970's  
due to Iran's strategic position during the Cold W ar. Initially signing the Agreement fo r  
Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms in 1957 with the U.S., Iran received pool- 
type reactors and fuel from the U.S. in 1967, while Iranian scientists were trained at 
prestigious institutions such as the Massachusetts Institute o f Technology.11 Throughout
9 A German-Persian agreement of friendship, trade, and shipment was established in 1873, with an article 
outlining foreign policy that states Germany would support Persia in the case of potential war between  
Persia and another power.
10 Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," European 
Security 13, no. 3 (2010): 471.
11 Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear 
Power," Middle East Journal 60, no. 2 (2003).
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the Cold War, the U.S. administration visited the Shah who eventually announced plans 
to develop nuclear power capability in 1974 and initiated contracts to  build w ater  
reactors with France. By 1975, mutual investment contracts between Iran and the U.S. 
for uranium enrichment facilities in the U.S. and spent fuel reprocessing facilities in Iran 
were set into action, along with an agreement w ith Germany to establish six nuclear 
reactors. Germany began construction on the Busher reactor in 1976.12
The coup d'etat, organized by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the  
British Secret Intelligence Service (M I6), which overthrew  then prime minister of Iran 
Mohamed Mossadegh in 1953, along with the events immediately before and during the  
Iranian revolution of 1979, lead to the beginning of the continuously strained and often  
non-existent relationship between the U.S and Iran. The U.S. stopped cooperating with  
Iran in regards to their nuclear program and urged other countries to do the same. 
Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic began an overall rejection of all things "W estern" and 
eventually reduced oil exports and cancelled all nuclear projects. Ayatollah Khomeini's 
views towards nuclear technology and the effects on Iran's dependence on the W est 
contributed to the interruption of the program, but also his ethical opposition to the  
concept and idea of W M D s.13 The energy crisis and the Iran-lraq war caused Iranian 
clerics to change their stance toward the nuclear program and eventually turned to  
'new' suppliers which included Pakistan, Argentina, Spain, China, and the  Soviet Union.
In 1987, Iran and Pakistan signed an agreem ent for nuclear cooperation and opened the
12 An agreement to exchange nuclear technology ad cooperate in nuclear safety between the U.S. and Iran 
was signed in 1977, as well as the signing of the U.S.-lran Nuclear Energy Agreement in 1978.
13 Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," 472.
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Esfahan Nuclear Research Center. By 2002, the U.S. revealed secret nuclear projects 
administered by Iran, which included a uranium enrichm ent facility in Natanz and a 
w ater production facility in Arak.14
Upon this discovery, the U.S. reacted by declaring a violation of Article II of the  
NPT, followed by Iran's denial and invoking of Article IV. In 2003, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) called on Iran to  sign the Additional Protocol, which set 
into motion visits and diplomatic efforts by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom 
who visited Tehran and urged Iran to sign and comply. By 2005, Iran informed the IAEA 
of the decision to resume uranium conversion in Esfahan, halting negotiation betw een  
Iran and the EU-3. An important aspect to note is that in 2005, Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khamenei, as Khomeini before him, rejected the idea of nuclear weapons, and 
pronounced a "fatwa against the development, production, stockpiling, and use of 
nuclear weapons".15 The literature surrounding Iran's nuclear program, from  both 
theoretical as well as strategic analyses, differ in terms of Iran's right to establish a 
nuclear program. While some authors argue that Iran has the right to maintain a nuclear 
program for civilian purposes outlined under the NPT, w ith the added obligation to  
claim these activities to  the IAEA, other scholars warn against the devastating balancing 
effects a potential nuclear Iran would have on the M iddle East.15
14 Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The W est and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power."
15 "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power," 472.
16 Tom Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," European 
Security 17, no. 2 (2009): 274.
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Iranian views and motivations
Iran's motivations and reasoning behind pursing nuclear weapons include 
prestige, global respect, national pride, the perception of threat, and a 'quest for 
recognition'.17 Further, pressure from  Iran's public contributes to the  developm ent of 
Iran's nuclear program for use of collective and national defense. According to a recent 
survey, 90 percent of Iran's population is in favor of nuclear power.18 Iran's nuclear 
program is also supported by several Islamic nations, Non-Alignment M ovem ent (NAM ) 
countries, as well as some European countries which support Iran's nuclear program on 
the basis of enrichment.19 Internal Iranian views on nuclear proliferation differ and are 
separated by scholars into four categories: 1. Iran does not need nuclear weapons or 
nuclear capability, 2. Iran is entitled to  peaceful nuclear technology, 3. Iran needs to  
develop nuclear weapons capability, and 4. Iran should develop nuclear weapons 
immediately.20 The major implication seen by some scholars and political analysts is the  
potential domino effect of nuclear programs in the Middle East should Iran acquire 
nuclear weapons.
17 Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The W est and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power," 
219.
18 "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power."
19 NAM countries here further make an argument that the development of nuclear weapons would stand 
for all Muslims in the world, whereby a level of expectation exists that Iran would eventually share their 
nuclear technology with other NAM countries.
20 Kibaroglu takes these views from Dr. Nasser Hadian, and Associate Professor in the Faculaty of Law and 
Political Science at the University of Tehran.
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Germany and Iran's Nuclear Program: Germany's theoretical approach
Although France and the United Kingdom possess nuclear weapons capability, 
the EU's articulation towards Iran's nuclear program has mostly been in line w ith  
rhetoric employed by German policy makers based on nonproliferation theory. 
Statements made by Joschka Fischer in 2005 and German Foreign Minister Frank-W alter 
Steinmeier in 2006 point to  Iran as only one of the  cases which undermine the global 
nonproliferation regime, urging an increase in disarmament practices.21 Germany's 
rhetoric, and statements made by Angela M erkel, has consistently included an aspect of 
approaches that work toward a world w ithout nuclear weapons by reducing nuclear 
arsenals. Despite this, in recent years, Germany's, as well as the EU's approach, has not 
only focused on Iran's nuclear program but mostly presented nuclear issues along with  
regime change w ithout taking into consideration the Iranian perspective, especially in 
regards to  national security. The literature about the EU's theoretical approach and link 
of policies toward Iran's nuclear program shows the EU's role as a global actor in 
influencing behavior by using concrete policies in line with norms such as human rights 
and political freedoms.22
The European approach, which has numerously been referred to  in term s of Ian 
Manners' 2002 articulation of NPE, has strong aspects of asymmetry and unilateral 
direction on securitizing the issue of Iran's nuclear program by only considering the
21 Harnisch, "Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/Eu-3 Iran Initiative,"
423.
22 Lynne Dryburgh, "The European Union as a Global Actor: Exploring Eu Policy Towards Iran," ibid.17, no.
2 (2008).
European or 'W estern' view on security, and essentially ignoring Iranian concerns.23 
Referring back to statements made by Joschka Fischer in 2005 about his hopes for Iran 
to return to 'rational policy', scholars outline an argument fo r depictions and 
constructions of double standards of how nuclear and non-nuclear states are dealt with. 
Here, a clear construction of 'we' and 'they' is observed in the  dialogue between the EU 
and Iran, as well as overall international rhetoric describing Iran's nuclear program.24 
The EU, as the 'good citizen', backed by the international community, has therefore  
established a "power asymmetry" that allows for a "more decisive coercive diplomacy" 
action by the EU.25 Securitization occurred by portraying, outlining, and exposing the 
behavior of an actor who violated international law and norms; an actor unwilling to 
change and comply despite numerous changes, offers, and communicative efforts. This 
view is also supported by surveys conducted on members o f the European Parliament as 
well as European citizens, who despite viewing Iranian actions as irrational, reject a 
military option using force against Iran.
Ian Manners' articulation of NPE and the elements o f the concept theoretically 
explain and describe German and EU approaches toward the Iranian nuclear program. 
The idea of civilian power, with a focus on economic prowess rather than military 
capabilities, provided the building block for Manners' argument of the ideational impact
23 Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," ibid.13, no. 3 
(2010).
24 "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," 477.
25 Ibid.
of the "EU's international identity and role as a representative normative pow er".26 
Here, a focus is given to  the power of ideas and norms through cognitive processes that 
essentially shape 'normal' international relations and construct an identity for the EU. 
This normative approach includes a strong com m itm ent to human rights, peace, liberty, 
the rule of law, democracy, and social solidarity, concepts found in the EU's acquis 
communautaire (European Union Law), and diffused through contagion, information, 
official process, transference, and culture.27 Although Manners argues for this concept 
by applying the abolition of the death penalty, NPE can explain the current views and 
approaches toward Iran's nuclear program in that policies are constructed on a 
normative basis and with an emphasis on multilateral action in order to 'civilize' 
international relations through ideas and norms. This means that the  factor which 
shapes Germany's and the EU's role as an international actor is based upon what the  
actor is, rather than how it acts and what it says. Therefore, the EU can be viewed as a 
'changer of norms' in the international system through the exercise o f normative power, 
which has evolved from the previous concepts of civilian and military pow er as a 
categorization. This theoretical understanding and explanation of 'actorness' is 
important when analyzing Germany's will and desire to influence, shape, and change 
the international environment, and can contribute in understanding Germany's norms- 
based policy approaches.
26 Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," Journal o f Common M arket 
Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 238.
27 For specific references to these concepts in the articles and an explanation of the process of diffusion 
for these norms, please refer to "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?," Journal o f  
Common M arket Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 242-45.
On the other hand, some scholars focus on the negative effect of th e  EU's 
'coercive diplomacy approach' towards the Iranian nuclear weapons crisis.28 Here, 
diplomacy is the main instrument, whereby coercive diplomacy has three distinct 
characteristics: a demand, a threat, and tim e pressure. The demand has to  be 
formulated with the opponent and has to  be supported by a threat that requires tim e  
pressure or a deadline. The theoretical underpinnings of this approach present the  
concept as a way to persuade the opponent and to avoid war, whereby several 
questions and aspects have to be taken into consideration before linking theory to  
policy. Legitimacy of demands, credibility of the threat, credibility of tim e pressure, and 
motivation of actors all contribute to decisions within coercive diplomacy as an 
alternative between going to w ar and doing nothing. It is important to note that not all 
individual countries within Europe articulate their opposition to the Iranian nuclear 
program in line with nonproliferation rhetoric. Scholars have pointed to double­
standards and legitimacy issues under the NPT as early as 2003, especially in regards to  
the argument of the acquisition of nuclear weapons in order to  protect national 
interests. Some scholars highlight this legitimacy issue by presenting France's argument 
for national interests. National interests-based arguments for nuclear weapons 
acquisition emphasizes the difficulty in convincing a state such as Iran to  forgo 
proliferation despite being geographically situated in an unstable region.29
28 Tom Sauer, "Coercive Diplomacy by the Eu: The Iranian Nuclear Weapons Crisis," Third World Quarterly 
28, no. 3 (2007).
29 Scholars often discuss this in combination to some of the de facto  weapon states (Israel and Pakistan), 
who are allowed to keep their nuclear weapons.
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The European Union's approach towards Iran's nuclear program
Since the elevation of Iran's nuclear developments, but also since Iran signed the  
NPT Additional Protocol in October 2003, the EU has taken a constructive diplomatic 
approach; advocating diplomatic measures and offering various carrots to  Iran while 
also taking into consideration both cultural and as strategic goals. This approach is 
referred to by scholars as an example of non-politicized governance.30 After the initial 
signing in 2003, Iran along with the EU-3, signed the Paris agreement in 2004 before the 
EU-3 made a comprehensive offer to Iran in Vienna (Vienna proposal) in 2006. W hat 
followed after the proposal is the period currently under examination which began with  
several rounds of sanctions: UNSC Resolution 1737 (2006), UNSC Resolution 1747 
(2007), and UNSC Resolution 1803 (2008). The EU's foreign policy and diplomatic 
approach toward Iran and its nuclear program has gradually evolved from  the initial 
form at consisting of only Germany, the United Kingdom, and France (E3) who advocated 
diplomacy combined with the threat of sanctions, to the EU-3, consisting of the E3 and 
High Representative Javier Solana in order to  give the group EU legitimacy, and 
eventually resulting in the EU3+3, adding Russia, China, and the U.S. to  the process to  
show multilateral security governance.
When analyzing the relationship between the EU and Iran, some scholars take a 
poststructuralist approach to examine the relationship between identity, ideas, and 
policy in order to understand the foreign policy choices of each actor.31 The main
30 Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," 471.
31 "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme."
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argument is that in order to make sense of diplomatic efforts and policy, analyses have 
to include an understanding of identity and perception and the discourse thereof, which 
directly ties into constitutions of security.32 This discourse refers to  the language and 
rhetoric used between actors and contributes to  constructing concepts such as power, 
ideology, threats, and cooperation. The argument and analysis fall in line with general 
views of constructivism in the establishment of knowledge, norms, and identity outlined  
by Alexander W endt, in opposition to traditional realist balance of power explanations. 
Securitization, or the process of uncovering and understanding rhetoric structures that 
eventually become accepted as international concepts and practices, can be used to  
examine the complex relationship and diplomacy between the EU and Iran. M oreover, 
the case of Germany's relationship and foreign policy approach to Iran's nuclear 
program further underlines the importance of identity, norms, and knowledge as 
Germany's foreign policy is marked by constructed discourses.
An important aspect in understanding this relationship is the view and image 
held by Europeans and Germans of Iran, and vice versa. Here, the historic relationship 
between Europe and Iran, going back to the Persian Empire, is widely discussed by 
scholars who try to explain the current foreign policy choices made by each actor. 
Perspectives by French, British, German, and ancient historic documents paint a 
complex picture of Persians, ranging in their descriptions from 'barbarians' to 'peoples
32 Ibid. The author here refers back to an argument made by Lene Hansen (2006) in Security as practice, 
discourse analysis and the Bosnian War: "Foreign policy discourses are analytical constructions through 
which the construction and linking of identity and policy can be studied" (p. 51).
146
committed to principles such as truth and justice'.33 Throughout several analyses, a 
thematic examination by historians detail the resemblance between Persia and Europe. 
Iran's complex transformation by several authoritarian regimes within the past century, 
combined with domestic practices and policies, contribute to  the current negative view  
held by Europeans of Iran. This view transcends into rhetoric employed by policy makers 
and leaders, therefore directly constructing an 'Other' into international narratives.34 
This 'othering' of the Iranian regime translated to a distrust of Iran and its foreign policy 
by the West, whereas the EU is viewed as acting within their normative narrative and 
approach in an effort to provide stability and security within the region.35
Sanctions, recent developments, and the EU/German Voice
The EU W M D  strategy eventually became the 'manifesto' of the official EU 
approach to non-proliferation and Iran's nuclear program. In 2004, the EU3 proposed a 
deal with new negotiations and economic benefits, which was signed in Paris in 
November 2004 with Iran agreeing to  freeze its uranium enrichment program until a 
long-term agreement was reached. This offer, which included various carrots such as 
cooperation in trade, technology exchange, and security, coincided with Ahmadinejad's 
electoral victory of 2005, and the European offer was rejected and Iran's enrichment
33 "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," 469.
34 This construction, rhetoric, and narrative is not only employed by European leaders and actors. An 
argument can certainly be made of an elevated occurrence of 'othering' by the United States within the  
past ten years which has directly contributed to current views and relationships between 'The West' and 
Iran (most notably President Bush's categorization of Iran as part of the 'Axis of Evil')
35 The dichotomies of 'us' and 'them' become part of the securitization discourse through portrayal of 
values, norms, and identities internationally.
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program was re-started.36 The EU put forth another comprehensive proposal, using a 
'softer' rhetoric byJoshka Fischer, who asked Iran to  'be reasonable' but declaring that 
"if Iran were to go nuclear, it would jeopardize stability in the entire region. This is not 
only Israel's concern, but also of all of Iran's neighbors".37 After an elevation of talks 
between the IAEA and Iran in 2005, a nuclear dossier was referred to  the UNSC in 2006, 
along with a statement by the EU-3 detailing their diplomatic efforts w ith Iran. In 2006  
the EU-3 became the EU3+3, adding China, Russia, and the U.S. to the negotiation team , 
eventually formulating a proposal in Vienna with a focus on economic sanctions, which 
were believed to be most feared.38
W hat the EU (EU-3) have said in regards to  Iran's nuclear developm ent has been 
presented as a collective European view, backed by policy makers and politicians, and in 
line with policy recommendations and choices. Statements made by Javier Solana at the  
European Parliament, as well as press releases by German, French, and British policy 
makers, were presented as justifications when discussing the European relationship 
with Iran. Here, the lack of trust and transparency is cited as a reason why a 
preservation of international law is essential when dealing w ith Iran. In 2006, the EU 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana,
36 Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 276.
37 "Interview with Federal Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in the Suddeutsche Zeitung (Sz) on 6 August 
2005 on Iran, Europe and Un Reform," ed. Auswartiges Amt (2005), accessed December 10, 2013, 
http://www.auswaertiges-am t.de/EN/lnfoservice/Presse/lnterview/Archiv/05/050808- 
FischerlranEuVn.html.
38 The German foreign minister made this argument publicly, citing Iran's economic dependency with the  
West
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expressed this concern in clear terms, explaining the  root problem and cause of the
strained relationship between Iran and the EU:
The problem with Iran is essentially a problem of confidence. For many years, 
Iran, a signatory to  the NPT, carried out nuclear activities with a total lack of 
transparency. This is a legitimate source of concern for the international 
community as recognized by the Iranians themselves...The six countries have 
followed a tw o track approach: dialogue and referring the case to the UNSC. 
Dialogue could not last forever. It is up to  them  to decide w hether the tim e has 
come to follow the second track. But the door to negotiations is always open 
(Javier Solana, October 4, 2006).39
W hile the U.S. was part of the negotiations at the tim e of this statement, a clear 
distinction can be made between the predominately diplomatic approach of the EU. 
Although EU representatives also employed rhetoric of 'othering', the tone of Solana, 
and his closing comments for the above statements shows a deep understanding of the  
complex relationship in place between Iran and Europe. The lack of response by the 
Bush Administration to Ahmadinejad's May 2006 letter was criticized by the EU, and 
created friction between the EU and the U.S.40 A fter Iran officially and publicly rejected  
the Vienna proposal, the EU announced it was considering sanctions based on its 
coercive foreign policy, backed by the UNSC fram ework, and declared it would only 
negotiate if Iran suspended the enrichm ent program.
The initial rounds of sanctions in 2006 proved somewhat difficult with Russia and 
China resisting firm er measures which were advocated by the EU and the U.S. In 2007, 
the EC External Relations Commissioner gave a speech to  the European Parliament in
39 "Remarks by Javier Solana, Eu High Representative for the Cfsp, on the Latest Developments Concerning 
Iran to the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee . Brussels, 4  October 2006 ", ed. European 
Union (2006), accessed December 4, 2013,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/91168.pdf.
40 Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 278.
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regards to final findings and approaches towards Iran's nuclear program. The 
Commissioner expressed his concern about the overall state and future o f non­
proliferation globally. This delivery, which tim ely referred to  North Korean nuclear 
developments, was based on non-proliferation globally and broadly, rather than in 
securitization terms towards Iran, as observed in the past. The Commissioner did not 
outline the various security threats posed by Iran or Iran's future nuclear program, but 
instead focused on a technical analysis and fram ework of non-proliferation.41 Sanctions 
in 2007, backed by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, included a ban on arms 
sales, whereby British and French policy makers employed stronger language and 
rhetoric further advocating harsher sanctions similar to those sanctions proposed by the 
U.S., which included the Iranian banking and economic system.42
These sanctions were partially enacted in 2008 w ith UNSC Resolution 1803, 
which called for a financial freeze to individual assets of people believed to  be involved 
in the nuclear program, as well as travel bans and increased inspections of cargo bound 
to and from Iran. By 2008, even Solana used language and rhetoric that pointed to  
cultural differences between Iran and the West, focusing on the destabilizing effect a 
nuclear Iran would pose to  the M iddle East. Solana's articulation emphasized that the  
punishment in the form of sanctions was not the primary objective, but rather an 
increased effort and avenue for potential negotiations with Iran. Although the EU
41 Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," ibid.13, no. 3 
(2010): 481.
42 Although he later corrected this statement slightly, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner declared 
that "France needed to prepare for the prospect of war w ith Iran" (Santini, 2010, p. 482 and Baldwin, 
2007).
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backed the UN resolutions, policy makers advised the U.S. to  reduce rhetoric that 
included military action and the use of force, while advocating diplomacy as the only 
possible approach. By March 2008, Ahmadinejad declared that Iran would no longer 
deal with the EU and instead communicate only w ith the  IAEA.43
In June 2009 the EU3+3 offered an updated version of the initial Vienna proposal 
to Iran, which has not been acted upon. After meetings with Tehran in Geneva, and 
several statements made by EU policy makers as well as President Obama, the  
possibility of Israel striking Iranian nuclear facilities was made known internationally, 
therefore reopening the securitization debate including the use of force. The role of the  
EU since 2009 has therefore been two-fold and rather complex; on the one hand, the  
EU's (and Germany's) commitment to  its allies such as Israel is continuously reiterated  
publicly, while also balancing and 'patrolling' the M iddle East in order to avoid possible 
military conflicts 44 Throughout the process in the past decade, an articulation of Iran's 
complex and interrelated domestic and foreign policy approach has been absent in 
international discussion about Iran's nuclear program, painting the picture o f an 
irrational actor and securitizing the issue in order to legitimize future action. Some 
scholars make this argument by chronologically analyzing the language and rhetoric 
employed by European policy makers on the basis of a discursive examination of the  
concept of security and perceived threat.
43 To international surprise, the U.S. sent Under Secretary o f State William Burns to talk with the EU and 
Iran in July 2008, a policy shift which was accredited to EU pressure. Sauer, "Struggling on the World 
Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 282.
44 Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," ibid.13, no. 3 
(2010): 484.
The legitimacy and double-standard issues raised in the  early 2000s in regards to  
dealing with Iran's nuclear weapons program did not help the overall relationship 
between the EU and Iran, since France and the United Kingdom are both nuclear 
weapons states. As several scholars point out, Iran has never disputed that it is not 
allowed to have nuclear weapons; however, Iran has been very clear throughout the 
negotiations that the enrichment o f uranium is allowed according to  Article 4 o f the 
NPT.45 Drawing similarities between North Korea's nuclear program to  the process of 
Iran's nuclear program, analysts argue that although Iran can simply w ithdraw from the  
NPT and announce possession of nuclear weapons, the  intention of the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons worry the West, while the size of the  civilian nuclear program that Iran 
should be allowed to have was also under debate. In analyzing the EU's coercive 
diplomacy approach toward Iran, some scholars conclude that articulated threats do not 
always reach goals; however, the EU's, and specifically Germany's negotiations can be 
seen as elevating the EU's role as a global actor. The EU, and Germany, as a global actor, 
balances the differing advocated approaches by the U.S., Russia, and China, while acting 
in line with European identity, norms, and promoting collective, m ultilateral actions.
Other scholars examine the effectiveness of dealing with Iran by assessing a 
realization in objectives, namely the prevention of the  acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
Analyzing the EU's strategy in terms of cost and benefits analysis, an im portant aspect of 
nonproliferation logic has been neglected by EU policy makers: the prestige associated
45 Sebastian Harnisch, "Minilateral Cooperation and Transatlantic Coalition-Building: The E3/Eu-3 Iran 
Initiative," ibid.16, no. 1 (2007): 624. Sauer, "Coercive Diplomacy by the Eu: The Iranian Nuclear Weapons 
Crisis."Sauer (2007)
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with the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the symbolism and popularity at home for 
countries acquiring nuclear weapons. This symbolism and understanding of the  
underlying motives by Iran is entirely absent in EU policy makers' conception of the  
problem.46 This is partially explained by the EU's attem pt to become a global actor, 
visible and powerful in world politics beyond traditional diplomatic initiatives and in 
opposition to the U.S.'s unilateral and militaristic approach. The internal divisions within  
the EU over policies and sanctions toward Iran also contributed to the stalled or 
'ineffective' outcome of the halted negotiations. According to  a convincing argum ent by 
Tom Sauer, during the entire negotiation process, the EU "changed from  being a 
mediator to  being a coercer" w ithout offering new proposals for Iran, while 'softer' 
approaches advocated by Germany and other EU m em ber states w ere shut down 
immediately by the U.S.47
A review of the scholarly debates surrounding the effectiveness of the EU's 
approach in dealing with Iran's nuclear program, taking into consideration long standing 
relations and historic events, scholars and analysts disagree about the results and 
interpretations of the negotiating process. Some point to the  problem of double­
standards while others explain the importance of considering Iranian domestic politics, 
while yet another group highlights the lack of the EU (and others) to consider the  
national security threats articulated by Iran. Analysts critically examine the afterm ath of 
the EU's negotiation process with Iran, arguing that the EU has tried to push Iran to
46 "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 284.
47 "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 288.
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commit to rules beyond those outlined by the NPT with an approach of 'misguided 
demand', essentially denying Iran the developm ent of a national nuclear fuel cycle.48 
Part of these criticisms fall under the double-standard argument, but the underlying 
conclusion is that unlike the U.S.'s approach of counter-proliferation arguments, which 
advocate a reshaping or replacing of the existing regime, the EU lacks a clear and 
consistent strategy. Scholars suggest a full return to diplomatic institutions combined 
with an articulation and adoption of what John Herz called "Realist Liberalism" 49 
Similarly, Suzanne Maloney questions the sanctions, and carrot-and-stick policies, which 
have been more focused on the latter, and strongly urges the Obama Administration to  
focus on the diplomatic process.50
Policies, agreements, and recent developments
The policies employed by the  EU can be categorized as a securitized foreign 
policy approach marked by coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy has been defined as 
backing "one's demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment fo r non- 
compliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply
48 Sten Rynning, "Peripheral of Powerful? The European Union's Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons," ibid.16, no. 3 (2007).
49 According to Rynning (2007), Herz', 'realist liberalism' would entail a doctrine that must "weave 
together the EU's multilateral ambition and its penchant for singling out illiberal regimes for special 
treatment. More on the concept can be found at John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security 
Dilemma," World Politics 2, no. 2 (1950).
50 Suzanne Maloney, "Sanctioning Iran: If Only It W ere So Simple," Washington Quarterly 33, no. 1 (2010): 
145.
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with the demand".51 Scholars who categorize the EU's approaches towards Iran in line 
with coercive diplomatic measures show that Iran's nuclear program is an example for 
securitization. Europe and other 'W estern' countries have stopped explaining why Iran's 
nuclear ambitions are a severe security problem which may have dangerous impacts on 
the international community, instead accepting this as a security issue on a de facto  
basis. This is partly due to the images of the Iranian regime held by the W est, marked by 
authoritarianism, human rights violations, and absence of the civil liberties enjoyed by 
Europeans. Europe then becomes an agent seeking peace and security in international 
politics, based on normative foreign policy choices and a focus on democracy 
promotion; concepts that seem to directly contradict and compromise Iran's foreign 
policy.
After the 2002 shock that Iran had a secret nuclear weapons program for almost 
tw o decades in violation of the NPT, negations between Iran and Europe officially 
began. Most importantly, this discovery lead to  the EU's categorization of security over 
economic interests, creating a stronger foreign policy approach as an alternative to the  
approach employed by the Bush administration. This foreign policy approach had to  
encompass a comprehensive and multilateral policy, representative of the entire union 
in order to be viewed legitimate, but also serve as a parallel to perceived American 
hegemony for initiatives in the Middle East at the tim e.52 The European unified and
51 Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to W ar, Institute of Peace 
(Washington, D. C.1997), 4.
52 This alternative approach was also put into place in response to the EU internal crisis o f the Iraq war. 
Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 275.
proactive approach, spoken with "one voice", declared in October 2003 that they  
"would make everything possible in order to  avoid Iran becoming a nuclear state".53 
Throughout these initial negotiations, and the rhetoric employed by EU-3 
representatives Domenique de Villepin, Jack Straw, and Joschka Fischer, a clear distance 
between the European approach and the approach of the U.S. was present. M ore  
specifically, the European approach was based on concepts, aspects, and beliefs of non­
proliferation rhetoric and theory with an initial rejection of the use of force. The EU 
formulated this approach as a strategy of 'preventative engagement' w ith an emphasis 
on international law on the basis of United Nations mandates.54
GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: TRADE, RHETORIC,
ACTION, AND THE MEDIA  
As with all areas of German foreign policy, the concepts of 'never again war', 
'never alone', and 'w ith peaceful means only' have to  be taken into consideration in 
order to understand the relationship between Germany and the M iddle East. These 
concepts refer to W W II legacies and describe Germany's com m itm ent to m ultilateral 
approaches and Germany's role as a civilian power.55 Bearing these principles in mind, 
Germany's foreign policy in the Gulf region has historically been value-based and 
interest driven and focused on economic issues. Foreign policy choices by Germany
53 Ruth Santini, "European Union Discourses and Practices on Iranian Nuclear Programme," ibid.13, no. 3 
(2010): 474.
54 Ibid.
55 Eberhard Sandschneider, "German Foreign Policy Towards the Gulf Region," Emirates Lecture Series 
86(2010): 1.
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became domestically debated with the rise o f Ostpolitik and approaches based on the  
ideas of 'W andel durch Handel' (change through trade), including bilateral agreements  
with Germany's eastern neighbors.56 Germany has several strategic priorities in the  
Middle East to include an interest in political stability, cooperation towards the fight of 
terrorism, improvement and extension of Germany business, and preventing Iran from  
becoming a nuclear power.57
It is important to include the sometimes controversial policies for the period of 
1993 to 1998 throughout the Clinton-Kohl era. During this tim e, sanctions and 
diplomatic pressure due to Iran's potential nuclear program were heavily debated.
While the Clinton administration supported and advocated for economic sanctions, the  
German government refused sanctions and supported Iran's nuclear program in term s  
of its legality under the NPT.58 This analysis and stance has since changed with the 2003  
discovery of Iran's nuclear weapons program. Since then, Germany has continuously 
emphasized the principle of multilateralism when dealing w ith Iran or other states 
within the Gulf region, including issues beyond Iran's nuclear program.59 Despite this, 
Germany, in recent years, has placed national interests before those of the EU, while  
taking a separate position from other EU m em ber states. This can certainly be said for 
Germany's policies towards Iran, as Germany has often suggested softer approaches 
with less severe economic sanctions. W hile literature about the German-lranian
56 These trade agreements include countries such as Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR
57 Sandschneider, "German Foreign Policy Towards the Gulf Region."
58 Matthias Kuntzel, "Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb," The Journal o f International Security Affairs 
18, no. 39-45 (2010).
59 Such as human rights policies
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relationship in regards to trade is extensive, the more recent emphasis in scholarly 
analysis surrounds Germany's foreign policy toward Iran and the relationship between  
the two countries in light of Iran's nuclear program.
W ith a long standing diplomatic and trade relationship, Germany has taken a 
'softer' approach in the past ten years to  prevent nuclear proliferation by Iran. Although 
German foreign policy, opinions, and statements by politicians can be, at times, singled 
out as a German 'voice' or 'view', the multilateral approaches with France and the  
United Kingdom, and more recently China, Russia, and the U.S., make it difficult to  
separate German diplomatic efforts from  those under the umbrella of EU dialogue. In 
the past six years, friction between Germany and the United Kingdom and France 
occurred over Germany's consideration of Russia's proposal for Iran which included an 
allowance of limited enrichment.60 The U.S. blocked this proposal im m ediately and 
rounds of UNSC resolutions and sanctions began. In 2007, Germany again proposed a 
"softer approach", which was shut down by the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom, 
and contributed to disagreements among EU m em ber states later that year. Austria was 
also in support of a softer approach, once again rejected by France and the United 
Kingdom to which Germany reacted publicly in the media.61
In September 2007, German Minister of Foreign Affairs Steinmeier accused the  
U.S. and France of hypocrisy about earlier accusations of German firms' prolonged 
business with Iran while the U.S. and France secretly also engaged in business deals with
60 Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran," 278.
61 Spain also publicly disagreed with further sanctions.
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c y
Iran. American companies such as Microsoft, Caterpillar, and Coca-Cola operate in 
Iran, while French exports include Peugeot and Renault.63 Germany openly voted  
against new economic sanctions by the UN in 2007, which was certainly noticed by the  
international community. The influence of domestic opinion in German foreign and 
security policy is distinctively evident throughout several issue areas. A 2013 PEW 
Research on Global Attitudes Project shows that 96 percent of Germans are against Iran 
acquiring nuclear weapons; however, only 50 percent o f those asked would support 
possible military action to prevent Iran from  nuclear weapons acquisition.64 The media 
coverage and domestic reaction to  the Iranian nuclear program over the past ten years 
has not been as involved and outspoken as foreign policy involving out of area and use 
of force debates.
While Germany's rhetoric towards Iran has been mostly strong and in line with  
the EU voice, opposing nuclear weapons acquisition in Iran, Germany's allies have 
criticized Germany for the softer measures advocated by the Federal Republic. 
Specifically, Germany's economic ties with Iran have been scrutinized heavily in the  
media and through official political statements. Scholars point to Germany's policy of 
noninterventionism in regions such as Libya, Syria, and Mali, and argue that Germany's 
position as the third-largest exporter of arms creates a conflict for Germany's foreign 
policy directive. In the realm of nonproliferation, Germany's economic weight does not
62 "Iran Sanctions: Berlin Says Us and France Guilty of Hypocrisy," Der Spiegel, September 27, 2007, 
accessed December 2, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/iran-sanctions-berlin-says-us- 
and-france-guilty-of-hypocrisy-a-507443.html.
63 "Iran Sanctions: Berlin Says Us and France Guilty of Hypocrisy," Der Spiegel, September 27, 2007.
64 "Pew Research Global Attitudes Project," (2013), accessed December 8, 2013, 
http://w w w .pew global.org/13/06/ll/g lobal-view s-of-iran-overw helm ingly-negative/.
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translate to  the responsible behavior expected by the international community. 
Germany's relationship and ties to Israel further complicate Germany's ability to  level its 
foreign policy choices. In 2011, Shaul Mofaz, the chair of the Israeli Foreign Affairs and 
Defense committee, advised Germany to adopt "a clear policy towards Iran" and to  
advocate "tough sanctions".65 In an article w ritten by Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg in The 
Wall Street Journal, the form er defense minister noted Germany's "historical and moral 
responsibility to  support Israel against an Iranian threat", while Merkel, in 2008, publicly 
declared that "Israel's security is part of Germany's raison d'etre  and cannot be 
negotiated".66 It is interesting to  note that opinion polls show that the German public 
views Israel as an "aggressive country that pursues its interests w ithout consideration 
for other nations".67
On the other hand, some analysts argue that from an economic trade  
perspective, Germany's economic sanctions with Iran have only hurt the German  
industry. The "strategy of discouragement" adopted by the German governm ent 
resulted in major German economic trade partners including Deutsche Bank, Linde, and 
ThyssenKrupp to w ithdraw from Iran. The market gaps occurring from German business 
withdrawal were then filled by Chinese and Russian companies. In this case, the  
sanctions imposed by Germany did not contribute to the prevention of Iran's nuclear 
weapons acquisition, but hurt the German economy while providing business gaps to
65 "Berlin Considers Stronger Sanctions: Us and Israel Demand Greater Measures against Tehran," Spiegel 
Online, November 14, 2011.
66 Karl-Theodor Zu Guttenberg and Ulf Gartzke, "Germany Must Have Israel’s Back," The W allstreet 
Journal, April 2, 2013, accessed December 5, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com /news/articles/SB10001424127887323296504578396113845689862.
67 "Germany Must Have Israel’s Back," The Wallstreet Journal, April 2, 2013.
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the competition. Machines and systems with German origin are used by tw o thirds of 
Iranian industrial enterprises and three quarters o f small and medium sized firms, 
making Germany Iran's number one im porter.68 Furthermore, Iran's dependency on 
German suppliers was confirmed in 2008 by the German-lranian Chamber o f Industry 
and Commerce, adding that China or Russia could not easily replace this export gap.69 
Historically, the controversy surrounding the German-lranian trade relationship dates 
back to the Kohl-Clinton era, when the U.S. imposed sanctions which w ere undermined 
by Germany. The period from 2006 to 2007 was marked by resistance from Germany to  
the economic sanctions proposed by the U.S. W hile the U.S., France, and the United 
Kingdom supported stronger economic sanctions, Germany, along with China and 
Russia, rejected harsher sanctions. Germany's economic and trade interests in Iran 
certainly impacted the initial years of negotiating stronger sanctions. Further, 
independent EU sanctions were also opposed by Austria and Italy and the economic 
sanctions during this period were imposed under the UN umbrella. Moreover,
Germany's refusal to support stronger sanctions during the EU3+3 negotiations grouped 
Germany alongside Russia and China.
Rhetorically, Germany's position has been in line with alliance solidarity, 
condemning a potential nuclear Iran and advocating sanctions over military 
interventions. In November 2009, Chancellor Merkel addressed the U.S. Congress, 
stating that "a nuclear bomb in the hands of an Iranian president, who denies the
68 According to the German-lranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Tehran and affirmed in 2007  
by Berlin's Federal Agency for Foreign Trade. Kiintzel, "Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb," 40.
59 "Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb."
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Holocaust, threatens Israel, and denies Israel the right to exist, is not acceptable" and 
needs to be met with "tough economic sanctions".70 W hile the chancellor's rhetoric is 
certainly strong and shows support and alliance solidarity, the initial rhetoric observed 
by German leaders was quite different. Even upon discovery of Iran's clandestine 
nuclear program some 18 years in the making, European and German exports to Iran 
increased while Joschka Fischer explained that, "W e Europeans have always advised our 
Iranian partners that it is in their considered self-interest to  regard us as a protective 
shield."71 Beyond Germany's view towards nuclear weapons, the nuclear disaster in 
Fukushima, Japan prompted Germany to  rethink the nuclear energy program. According 
to  Westerwelle, he realized that "it was simply impossible to  return to business as 
usual" after the events in Japan.72
After some controversial accusations by the Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence 
agency, Germany banned the export of specific goods to  Iran which have been modified 
and used in questionable ways, including the conversation of German trucks to rocket 
launchers.73 While cases like these call for obvious sanctions of specific goods, the 
German government was also concerned with the hardship that sanctions could impose 
on the Iranian people, especially in regards to medical and pharmaceutical export 
sanctions. After the official report of the IAEA was released in November 2011, revealing 
alarming details about Iran's nuclear program, the international community reacted
70 "Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb," 39.
71 "Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb," 41.
72 "Spiegel Interview with German Foreign Minister," Der Spiegel, March 21, 2011, accessed December 5, 
2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/spiegel-interview-with-german-foreign-m inister- 
gadhafi-must-go-there-s-no-question-a-752164.html.
73 "Berlin Considers Stronger Sanctions: Us and Israel Demand Greater Measures against Tehran."
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with renewed concerns but little action. The reports showed that Iran actively worked  
on developing a nuclear device with a possible military elem ent. Guido W esterwelle said 
that unless Iran "conducts serious negotiations on its nuclear program, new, more 
severe sanctions would be inevitable".74 Despite this strong rhetoric on the one hand, 
W esterwelle also emphasized Germany's opposition to military action, adding that 
Germany rules out "all discussion on a possible military option".75
SUMMARY
The most recent developments in light of the election of Hassan Rouhani 
prompted Chancellor Merkel to call for a rekindling of the deepened relationship 
between Germany and Iran, opening the door for renewed constructive cooperation in 
order to promote international stability and security. Scholars and journalists continue 
to point to the inconsistencies in Germany's foreign policy behavior, categorizing 
Germany's inaction and unwillingness to  impose more severe sanctions on Iran with  
Germany's unwillingness to  participate in a military intervention in Libya. Specifically, 
the German media has focused on Germany's economic interest-based policies. In a 
highly critical German article published in D ieZeit in April 2013, journalists point to  
Germany's willingness to export arms to dictators and unwillingness to  discuss human
74 "laea Lambasts Iran Nuclear Program: Israel Hails Report as Turnaround for Atomic Watchdog," Der 
Spiegel, November 9, 2011, accessed December 5, 2013, http://w w w .spiegel.de/international/w orld /iaea- 
lambasts-iran-nuclear-progam-israel-hails-report-as-turnaround-for-atomic-watchdog-a-796849.html.
75 "laea Lambasts Iran Nuclear Program: Israel Hails Report as Turnaround for Atomic Watchdog," Der 
Spiegel, November 9, 2011.
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rights with China and Russia as this is "bad for business".76 Throughout the scholarly and 
media responses to Iran's nuclear program and Germany's behavior, analysts 
continuously point to Germany's role as the third largest arms exporter behind the U.S. 
and Russia as reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research institute (SIPRI). 
This chapter presented a historic overview o f the German-lranian relationship while 
focusing on the factual data surrounding the  approach of the EU3+3 towards Iran's 
nuclear program. Further, scholarly analysis and theoretical arguments were taken into 
consideration to understand Germany's varied behavior. The evidence presented in this 
chapter will be analyzed and applied to the selected independent variables in chapter 
six of this dissertation in order to determ ine w hether Germany's foreign policy and 
rhetoric is determined by historical memory.
76 Jochen Bittner et al., "W irTun Doch Nix..." D ieZeit, March 21, 2013, accessed December 5, 2013, 
http://www.zeit.de/13/13/Deutschland-Aussenpolitik.
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will analyze the presence and strength of the selected variables in 
each case in order to understand and explain Germany's foreign policy behavior. 
Alliance solidarity and multilateral approaches, historical memory and W W II legacy, 
domestic influence, and national interest will be examined in two policy areas, out o f 
area operations and nuclear nonproliferation. W hile the central focus of the analysis for 
out of area operations is on Germany's abstention in the case of Libya, the cases of 
Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are also included in this analysis in order to  present a 
linear, sequential case for continuity and change in Germany's behavior. For the  policy 
area involving nuclear nonproliferation, Germany's behavior during the EU3+3 
negotiations with Iran were examined based on the same criteria to  look for 
corroboration of the importance of historical memory in German foreign and security 
policy and rhetoric. The analysis will show w hether, according to the  hypotheses 
selected for these case studies, Germany has a ritualized foreign policy and rhetoric, 
determined by historical memory and identity or not. This is analysis is separated into 
four sections. The first tw o sections will present the variables and findings for the cases 
for out of area operation and nuclear nonproliferation respectively. The third section 
will compare both policy areas for the cases of Iran and Libya, highlighting whether 
Germany's recent change can be categorized as an adjustment, reconstruction, learning
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process, or norms-based continued behavior. The theoretical debates and analysis thus 
far have focused on Germany's continuity in policy despite an increase in power. The 
fourth section of this chapter will apply the three international relations theories, 
structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism, to the selected cases in order to  detail 
each framework's ability to explain the change or continuity in Germany's foreign policy 
behavior.
CASE I: OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE: LIBYA 
The question introduced at the beginning of this case study guided this research 
in determining what consensus has to  be reached in order to authorize the use of force. 
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that German foreign policy and rhetoric is either 
determined, or not determined by historical memory. An assumption is made that 
Germany has underwent a transformation from an old status quo towards a potential 
new status quo in German foreign policy execution. W ho then has to be on board to  
authorize the use of force? W hat are the main variables that influence this decision? 
Under which circumstances does historical m em ory influence German foreign policy, 
and how important is memory in the Libya case? Does German political rhetoric support 
policy action? While the majority of this case study focuses on the Libya case, the use of 
force debate for Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan w ere also included in the application of 
the variables to compare and contrast among each case briefly, and to set the  context of 
the argument.
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The following table shows the presence of the selected variables and evidence in 
recent cases where the use of force was debated. Further, the  chart depicts and 
explains additional indicators for outcomes in policy choices. For use of force cases in 
German foreign policy, four variables were selected: 1) Multilateral Alliance Solidarity,
2) Historical Memory, 3) Domestic Influence, and 4) National/Economic Interests. 
Additional behavioral descriptors include: Engagement/Responsibility, Consent,
Rhetoric, Deployment Caveats and Humanitarian Arguments, and the International 
Environment. Each case is then categorized by an observed change as either an 
adjustment to policy, reconstruction of policy, learning of policy, or norms-consistent 
policy.
Table 2: Application of Variables: Case I
Kosovo Iraq 2003 Afghanistan Libya
Humanitarian
Argument
•  Use of force 
approved 
based on 
humanitarian 
crisis
•  consequence 
s of inaction
•  Ethnic 
cleansing
•  Main difference 
to Kosovo. Not 
based on 
humanitarian 
argument
•  Outside of 
Europe
•  Based on 
ideology
•  Reconstruction/
•  development 
support
•  Humanitarian 
support (main 
domestic 
understanding)
•  Humanitarian 
Argument 
made 
(not influential 
enough)
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Table 2: Continued
Kosovo Iraq 2003 Afghanistan Ubya
(VI)
Multilateral
Alliance
Solidarity/
NATO/EU
•  Showing 
commitment 
to partners 
and Int'l 
community 
(although 
arguably a 
little too late)
•  Break with  
alliance
(France, Russia)
•  External 
pressure to 
expand mission
•  Showed 
continued 
commitment
•  No actual 
com m itm ent/ 
grouped with  
China/Russia/ 
Brazil
•  Rhetorical 
com m itm ent 
to  fully 
support 
resolution
•  Com mitment 
of German 
soldiers 
manning 
AWACS 
missions in 
Afghanistan
Engagement/
Responsibility
•  Becoming a 
responsible, 
predictable 
actor (begins 
the Germany 
as a 'normal' 
actor debate)
• NO 
Consequences: 
break with U.S.; 
asking of 'the new  
German Question'
Yes, but caveats
•  External 
pressures to  
commit
• Based on civil 
reconstruction
• Need for 
alliance 
solidarity, 
responsibility
Consequences: 
voiced frustration 
by allies
• No. Break 
with alliance. 
"Inconsistent 
foreign 
policy"
Categorization 
of Change
•  Reconstructio 
n (of 'never 
again war'; 
use of force 
and Norms 
based
humanita rian 
intervention)
• First use of 
force since 
WW II
•  Pushing for 
independenc 
e o f Kosovo
•  Norms 
consistent 
(antimilitarism, 
pacifism, 
culture of 
restraint)
•  No change in 
actual policy 
but can be 
categorized as 
newly oriented / 
Shifted
•  Norms 
consistent as 
soldiers were 
deployed with 
caveats.
•  Change: 
elimination of 
draft
(professionalize
/com petence/
capability)
•  First German 
troop
deployment
outside
European
border
•  Norms 
consistent: 
Anti­
intervention 
norm  
trum ped  
humanitarian 
norm /No  
change
•  Adjustment 
(learning 
after Kunduz)
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Table 2: Continued
Kosovo Iraq 2003 Afghanistan Libya
(V2) Domestic 
Influence
•  Broadly 
supported 
after
massacres
were
reported
•  Strongly 
opposed
•  Election 
influence
•  Domestic 
discontent/ 
opposition
•  Different 
understanding 
of Germany's 
role in 
Afghanistan
•  M ajority  
strongly 
opposed 
German 
military 
intervention 
but fe lt that 
Gaddafi must 
go
•  Election 
influence
(V3) National 
Interests/ 
Economic 
Interests/cost
•  Cost of 
integrating 
East Germany 
played a role
•  Proximity to 
war, cost of 
refugee influx
•  "Nein" was 
viewed as new  
orientation for 
national 
interest based 
policy
•  Cost of 
integrating 
East/E U 
integration
•  Lack of 
capability
•  Cost of war
•  Cost of 
reconstruction
•  Cost o f war
•  Too 
expensive.
No plan for 
future
•  Economic 
interests in 
theBRIC  
countries
•  No interest in 
foreign policy 
or to take 
leadership 
role in 
Europe
•  Refugee cost
•  Cost of 
Bundeswehr 
Reform; 
troops in 
Afghanistan; 
cost of war
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Table 2: Continued
Kosovo Iraq 2003 Afghanistan Libya
(V4) Historical 
Memory/WWl 
1 Legacy
•  Prominent 
Presence. 
Historical 
memory 
enters 
discussion 
/rhetoric  
(discussion of 
"never again 
Auschwitz" 
"never again 
war")
•  Intersection 
of guilt/ 
responsibility
•  Emphasis on 
peaceful 
resolution and 
diplomatic 
efforts
•  Pacifism/ 
antimilitarism
•  Culture of 
restraint
•  Change after 
Kunduz
•  2010  
engagement 
on ground
•  Discussion of 
civilian 
casualties/ 
norms/values
•  Could not 
guarantee no 
civilian 
casualties
•  Emphasis on 
diplomatic 
efforts
•  Antimilitarism
•  Culture of 
restraint
•  Past 
history/memo  
ry of no-fly 
zone resulting 
in hostile, 
lengthy 
interventions
Consent
(dominant 
attitude of 
political 
leaders)
•  (internally 
not: Red- 
Green, CDU- 
yes)
•  externally 
eventually 
strong
consent-vote
•  Elite consensus, 
domestic 
consensus
•  Consensus 
until 2009
•  Majority  
consensus
•  Internal 
disagreement 
throughout 
debates
Rhetoric •  Strong 
(Fischer)
•  Rhetoric 
matched 
action
•  Strong (Fischer/ 
Schroder)
Von Gutenberg. 
Use of the word 
Krieg
•  Strong 
(M erkel, 
W esterw elle / 
Party 
members)
•  Rhetoric did 
not match 
action
Deployment
caveat
•  No troop 
deployment
N/A Bundestag 
limitations, no on 
ground 
engagement, 
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The evidence selected for this analysis shows that variable 1, M ultilateral 
Alliance Solidarity, was not present in the Libya case as Germany decided to  abstain and 
instead side with China and Russia. References to  historical memory and W W II legacy 
(variable 2) were also observed throughout several speeches, interviews, and 
statements given by policy makers. Domestic influence (variable 3), although strong 
throughout Germany in opposing a military intervention in Libya by the Bundeswher, 
can also be attributed to Germany's culture of restraint and norms-based behavior 
adopted after the W W II. The potential influence of the local elections on rhetoric and 
action adopted by Westerwelle and other policy makers may have contributed to  the  
abstention; however, the importance of domestic opinion and influence of elections 
only further reinforces the argument of the cyclical and continuous influence of 
historical memory. The ongoing financial crisis, Bundeswehr reform, and the continued  
mission in Afghanistan may also have had minor factors in influencing the decision to  
abstain, falling into the realm of national and economic interests.
Another variable, specific to  German foreign and security policy relating to out of 
area operations, is the concept of humanitarian-based interventions. W hile this concept 
was crucial in the reconstruction and reinterpretation of 'never again war' in the use of 
force debates during the Kosovo intervention, human rights-based offenses in Libya 
were considered but not influential enough to w arrant a vote for resolution 1973. W hile  
Germany officially condemned Gaddafi's human rights violations and publicly called for 
an end to the suffering of civilians, 'responsibility to protect' and 'humanitarian  
intervention' arguments did not measure against Germany's culture o f restraint, based
171
on historical memory and norms-based behavior. The concept of 'responsibility', which 
has been at the forefront of debates throughout Germany's post-W W II years, was once 
again highlighted in the Libya case. Although Germany has proven to  be a responsible 
actor and reliable partner in the past, the abstention prompted the international 
community to  question and doubt Germany's responsibility as a regional security 
exporter.
W hile majority consent was reached by the Bundestag for Germany's abstention
on the resolution, the internal differences among members of the parliam ent was no
surprise. The debates before, during, and after the vote w ere marked with controversial
opinions and argumentative statements. Despite this internal struggle to reach a
consensus, the majority of Germans opposed German troop deployment for an
intervention in Libya. Further, the three other cases considered for this analysis were
also marked by strong consensus, despite differing outcomes. The rhetoric employed by
policy makers for all cases under review is strong and often controversial. W hile political
rhetoric, in Germany, is often strong and influential, these four cases show the
importance of rhetoric in cases involving the use of force. Germany's pacifist convictions
post-WWII, continuously interfere with contemporary 'calls to  action' by the
international community, especially in cases involving human rights violations,
beginning with Kosovo. Fischer, in 1995 in front o f the Bundestag, most clearly
articulated the German struggle of leveling values and beliefs:
W e are in a real conflict between basic values. On the one hand, there is a 
renunciation of force as a vision of a world in which conflicts are resolved 
rationally, through resources to  laws and majority decisions, through the  
constitutional process and no longer through brute force; a world in which
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military means are rejected, and in which the aim is to  create structure to 
replace them  and make them  redundant. On the other hand, there is a bloody 
dilemma that human beings may be able to survive only with the use of military 
force. Between solidarity for survival and our commitment to non-violence - that 
is our dilem m a.1
This struggle to, on the one hand construct a foreign policy based on Germany's 
collective norms and values, yet on the other, Germany's responsibility to  act as a 
security exporter was certainly evident in the Libya case, where supporters o f the UNSC 
resolution urged for Germany's support on the basis of humanitarian intervention.
W hile Germany's population was largely in favor o f Kosovo, the data shows that 
domestic opinion in Germany in regards to potential military operations in Libya were  
different.
In both the Kosovo and Libya case, an argument can be made of the influence on 
domestic opinions on the vote and debates due to  ongoing and upcoming elections. The 
rhetoric in all cases involving use of force debates were strong, and filled w ith  
references to antimilitarism, historic memory, and past experiences. An argum ent can 
therefore be made that Libya is another instance of norm-consistent foreign policy 
involving military interventions, whereby the norm is informed by several variables. 
Selective use of historical memory has become instrumental to explain, inform, and 
justify foreign policy for out of area operations by the Bundeswer. This is evident by the  
continuous reference to past memory, and continued policy choices which were  
constructed and shaped immediately after W W II. German cases involving the use of
1 This quote was translated by Hanns Maull in Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ’Civilian 
Power’?," 63. The original, German speech, can be found at Archiv der Gegenwart: Deutschland 1949 bis 
1999, December 14, 1995, pp. 49.711-49.722.
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force are therefore sequential and no major changes have occurred. This is not to say 
that all cases are marked by the same continuity. Germany, and especially the red-green  
coalition, has emphasized a continued com m itm ent to European integration and 
alliance solidarity, especially toward the U.S. The September 11th attacks therefore also 
proved to be a 'defining m om ent' in Germany's political history as, then more than ever, 
Germany's commitment and responsibility as an alliance partner to the U.S. was crucial. 
While Germany's break with the U.S. for the invasion of Iraq can be explained and 
justified merely by the illegitimacy surrounding the case, shying away from  
responsibility for Afghanistan would have been nearly impossible. Joschka Fischer in his 
German memoir in 2007 explained that Germany's past continuous foreign policy would 
now, post-September 11, merely serve as "a difficult to detect guideline in the mist of 
the new world disorder".2 He correctly argued that Germany would have to  explore new  
and dangerous paths in order to  m eet the challenges of the new security environm ent 
through engagement and responsibility. The case of Afghanistan has, is, and continues 
to stand for Germany's continued com m itm ent to  its alliance. While specific 
deployment caveats were put in place before participating in out of area operations in 
Afghanistan, Germany's ISAF involvement has been used heavily, even during the  
aftermath of Libya, to highlight and present Germany's actions as a responsible actor.
Beyond W W II legacy, the Kunduz civilian afterm ath only further influenced and 
propelled Germany's policy of noninterventionism in the Libya case. The intersection of
2 Joschka Fischer, Die Rot-Grunen Jahre. Deutsche Aussenpolitik Vom Kosovo Bis Zum 11. September 
(Cologne, Germany: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2007), 433.
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guilt and responsibility, whereby guilt and memory appears to  be more influential, 
translate into Germany's continuous com m itm ent to  pacifism by keeping Germany's 
horrific past strongly engrained in today's consciousness. For example, beyond 
conceptualizations of the use of force, historic guilt is continuously processed and 
recognized by Germany.3 This processed gilt is also included in the analysis of some 
journalist and scholars, whereby some were quickly to point to Germany's shameful 
past and shameful present behavior in the Libya case. Some scholars make comparisons 
to the Iraq war, while others focus on the similarities to  the Kosovo case. The media and 
scholarly response for the Libya case was broad and approached through different 
theoretical frameworks, mainly focusing on the consequences of Germany's abstention 
for Germany as a civilian and 'normal' power.
Findings 
Power, Rhetoric, and Domestic Influence
The case of Libya in 2011 marked the first tim e that Germany 'voted' differently  
from its NATO and EU allies within the UN Security Council setting. This fact alone calls 
for greater analysis on the issues surrounding Germany's behavior in the Libya case. 
Surely aware of the impact the abstention may have, especially when considering the  
transatlantic crisis that occurred in 2003, the consensus tha t was reached in the
3 This is referred to in German as Vergangenheitsbewaltigung (a way of dealing with the past). This is 
evident by the numerous museums, monuments, and public events geared towards Germany's 
confrontation with its Nazi past. It is interesting to  note, that Germany is unique in processing this guilt 
intensively and continuously in comparison to other nations.
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Bundestag shows that cases involving the use of force remain highly controversial, 
complex, and difficult to understand. Germany with its dark political history comes to  
decisions about combat missions outside its borders and those of Europe by considering 
its past failures. Germany's risk-averse culture mixed with constructed, norms-based 
behavior can account for the foreign policy stance taken in the Libya case. W hile  
domestic factors certainly influence German political debates, the historical memory  
argument can be made for Germany's population as well: Germans, politicians and 
citizens alike, are continuously (perhaps subconsciously) influenced by Germany's W W II 
legacy and constructed culture of restraint, which shapes the German mindset on 
military intervention and the use of force. The intersection of responsibility, guilt, and 
memory is clearly reflected in the Libya case, whereby new er memory was also included 
in the justification for the abstention. The afterm ath and shock of the Kunduz incident in 
Afghanistan, combined with Germany's aversion to  "wars" and military force, place the  
Libyan case in a sequential line of cases of crises parallel to  Germany's evolving foreign 
and security policy.
The inclusion of historical pasts is evident in the international community's 
reaction to Germany's abstention. Historical memory shapes the sensitive issue of a 
somewhat fundamental fear towards that 'special path' Germany appears to  have taken  
once more, but this tim e not only against its transatlantic partner the U.S., but its 
closest European ally, France. The intersection o f responsibility and guilt is also evident 
by two opposing concepts in the debates over military interventions: on the one hand, 
the responsibility to protect and on the other the opposition to the prominence of
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forced intervention over diplomatic avenues to resolve international conflict. W hile the  
responsibility to protect points to  previous cases such as Srebrencia, Rwanda, and 
Kosovo, forced intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq have not necessarily led to initially 
desired goals which creates conflicting arguments.
Germany's behavior and adam ant opposition to an intervention in Libya falls in 
line with Germany's understanding of power. W hile power is theoretically understood in 
a multitude of ways, Germany has taken severe steps to move from its W W II fixation on 
power to a reconstructed forgetting and neglecting of power. This constructed 
understanding of power, based on historical memory and German identity, has become 
a basis for collective consensus by Germany, while specific aspects o f the use and 
exercise of said power are, at times, still conflicted. This view towards power, and, in 
this case, intervention by means of military force, became a dominantly accepted 
outlook of foreign policy since the Iraq invasion of 2002. The deployment caveats of 
Afghanistan, mixed with the horrific experience in Kunduz, further contributed to  the  
continued policy choices made by Germany, dominated by W W II legacy and strict 
opposition to military interventions. The Libya case therefore falls directly into an 
almost linear path of policy choices based on norms-consistent behavior, influenced by 
domestic attitudes, historical memory, and economic considerations, trum ping the  
framework of multilateral alliance solidarity and humanitarian-based arguments.
Germany's abstention on Resolution 1973 was reached by a majority consensus 
within the German Parliament. Germany's petition for a permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council was viewed by some analysts as a return to power politics and
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explained theoretically through structural realism. Dr. Rainer Stinner (FDP) explained 
that aligning with Brazil and India, and Germany's abstention from the vote on Libya, 
does not lessen Germany's chance of a perm anent seat.4 This position and conviction of 
rightful behavior for Germany shows a clear understanding o f Germany's use of power, 
its influence, execution, and consequences. Further, as W esterwelle explained, due to  
his conviction that the resolution had 'significant dangers and risks', it would not have 
been 'honest' for Germany to vote for the resolution but then to refuse to commit 
ground troops. While German policy makers often stress and highlight Germany's 
responsible behavior worldwide, the official position in the Libya case illustrates 
Germany's lack of interest in taking up a leadership role in Europe, especially in regards 
to  foreign security policy choices.
National interests-based choices, and the pursuit o f possession goals are 
certainly characteristics of a nation aware of its power. W hether the case of Libya falls 
into a calculated choice based on national and economic interests, or one that can be 
described as falling in line with historical pasts, all result in the same conclusion: 
Germany's understanding of its power is different from  its neighbors and allies. W hile  
today's security environment requires increased responsibility from Europe, Germany 
chose a rather luxurious path of self exemption. W hile not only abstaining from  the  
vote, Germany's inevitable 'siding' w ith Russia and China, showed that Germany was no 
longer a 'team player' by positioning its voice directly against its allies. Although 
Germany's behavior may have been irresponsible and continues to be difficult to
4 "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner."
178
understand, Germany can certainly afford to  make such decisions and has quickly 
recovered from the temporary outpour of outrage by the international community.
During Westerwelle's speech after Germany's abstention from the resolution, he 
explained the failure of surgical strikes to  prevent civilian casualties, adding that 
Germany has learned this through experience: "There is no so called 'surgical 
intervention'. Each military mission will also result in civilian casualties. W e know this 
from painful experience ...I must therefore ask and remind you, that we learned these 
lessons from recent history, from  recent military missions, and must consider this when 
we stand before a decision".5 This painful experience was most recently fe lt after the  
civilian casualties due to the controversial decisions surrounding the Kunduz affair in 
Afghanistan. The immensity of the political repercussions, mixed with domestic 
attitudes and international judgments, directly add to Germany's m em ory of and 
experience with use of force missions. Kunduz only further contributed to the German 
discourse and understanding of out of area operations and constructed a sequential 
attitude of antimilitarism and lack of support for military interventions (and "war") 
based on old and new memories.
The Libya case also highlights an unfortunate clash between rhetoric and action 
by Germany. Germany's rhetorical com m itm ent as a responsible global partner did not 
translate into actual policy to act in such a role. W esterwelle's continued mentioning of 
the importance to end the Gaddafi regime certainly clashed with the lack of solutions
5 "Regierungserklarung Bundesminister W esterwelle Vor Dem Deutschen Bundestag Zur Aktuellen 
Entwicklung in Libyen - Plenarprotokoll 17/97," (translated).
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offered by Germany, short of increased sanctions and refusal to participate in 
legitimized, multilateral approaches. W esterwelle's active support of the Arab Spring 
uprising further complicates the ability to understand and comprehend his and the  
German position. The internal differences among parliamentary politicians, ranging 
from calling the decision a 'disgrace' to supportive explanations of coherency in German 
policies, were also evident in the numerous interviews given to national and 
international newspapers and magazines.6 Journalists also pointed to  W esterwelle's  
comparison to the invasion in Iraq of 2003, arguing that such a comparison is a "sham" 
as the 2003 invasion was based on ideological beliefs and fabricated evidence w ithout a 
UNSC resolution.7 The rhetoric surrounding the abstention was complex and 
controversial and marked by references to the terms 'war', most prominently  
mentioned by the Leftist party, but also by German journalists for newspaper headlines 
hinting at a Germany's potential involvement in another war.
Also interesting to note is the odd position held by the German public. According 
to  an opinion poll by BildZeitung in 2011, while the majority supported a forceful 
military intervention against Gaddafi, 71 percent opposed the contribution of German 
troops to such an intervention.8 These somewhat competing opinions highlight the 
continuous and evident struggle by Germans to show responsible behavior when  
military interventions are necessary. W hile Germans w ere seemingly convinced that
6 "A 'Catastrophic Signal' to the Arab World: Berlin Divided over Security Council Abstention," accessed 
November 13, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/intem ational/germ any/a-catastrophic-signal-to-the-arab- 
world-berlin-divided-over-security-council-abstention-a-752259.html.
7 Lau, "Macht Mai - Ohne UnsL"
8 "Krieg Gegen Libyen: Uber 60 Prozent Der Deutschen Beftirworten Den Angriff."
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Gaddafi must go, and appalled by the human rights abuses occurring in Libya, the  
opinion polls, and arguably the official abstention, show that Germans do not w ant to  
take, quite literally, matters into their own hands. The old concept o f 'never again', 
which was momentarily reinterpreted by Joschka Fischer during the Kosovo crisis, 
certainly remains strong in the German psyche. W W II legacy, historical memory, and 
interpretations of the past, has led to a continued and active view of antimilitarism and 
opposition to the use of force in German foreign and security policy, despite cases that 
call for humanitarian intervention. The German public's opinion further highlights 
Germany's understanding of power, in a narrative on non-military capabilities, yet is 
marked by an obvious discomfort in the areas of military operations, the use of force, 
and war. Unlike in the United Kingdom or France, the German public has a long history 
of opposing German deployment of forces even for peacekeeping missions, and the loss 
of lives during such missions are extremely sensitive.9 W hile polling trends before the  
mission in Afghanistan showed that tw o thirds of all Germans desired a foreign policy 
closely resembling Switzerland's neutrality, the current state of domestic opinions 
varies.10 In 2013, an extensive report on transatlantic trends conducted by the German  
Marschall Fund of the U.S. found the majority of Germans polled w ere against any 
military involvement internationally. Specifically, 75 percent of Germans w ere adamant
9 Reimund Seidelmann, "Germany's Security Policy," in The New  Germany. History, Economy, Policies, ed. 
Reimund Seidelmann (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2011).
10 Paul Hockenos, Joschka Fischer and the M aking o f the Berlin Republic (New York, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 294.
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about Germany not getting involved in a military intervention in Syria, w ith 61 percent 
condemning the use of drones to kill enem ies.11
Germany's domestic attitude towards armed conflict and the  Bundeswehr's 
participation in out of area operations involving the use of force continuously influences 
policy makers. While Chancellor M erkel and the Bundestag collectively supported the  
mission in Afghanistan, it is important to mention that the chancellor's first visit to 
Afghanistan did not occur until 2009. Further, at this point in the mission, although 
there is little domestic support, w ithdrawal from  Afghanistan would result in an 
international backlash and attack Germany's credibility, especially in light of the Kunduz 
aftermath. Germany's questionable behavior during the Libyan crisis officially, 
internally, and through statements made by Chancellor M erkel, show an almost 
comprehensive response geared toward satisfying all requests and demands placed 
upon Germany. Namely, the German public opposed the mission in Libya while the  
international community looked to Germany to participate. While M erkel opposed the  
use of German aircrafts during the Libyan conflict, she favored German soldiers in Libya 
under the framework of humanitarian relief.12 On the other hand, Frank-W alter 
Steinmeier (SPD) argued that Germany made a mistake in focusing on elections, hoping 
that the allies somehow end up on Germany's side, instead of actively working to  
prevent the decision of the security council.13 The debates and voting for the security
11 "Transatlantic Trends," (German Marschall Fund of the United States, 2013), 19, accessed January 5, 
2014, http://trends.gmfus.org/files/13/09/TTrends-13-Key-Findings-Report.pdf.
12 Kurbjuweit, "A Germany of 82 Million Chancellors: W hy Angela Merke's Failures Continue to Multiply."
13 Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung March 27, 2011
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council resolution 1973 was immediately preceding local elections (M arch 27, 2011), 
and since over 61 percent of Germans opposed the  decision to militarily intervene in 
Libya, politicians may have been influenced by these domestic factors.14
The various commentary and debates in both Germany and in the  international 
media in regards to Germany's abstention also highlighted the differences o f EU goals 
both within Germany's leadership and in coalition with Germany's allies. Alexander Graf 
Lambsdorff, an FDP member of the European Parliament, argued that Germany's 
behavior and vote weakened the EU.15 The Libya case also highlights Germany's 
disinterest in certain areas of foreign policy or to take on leadership roles in the EU and 
globally. The observed disagreements among members of the EU, especially in regards 
to the Arab Spring movements, were highlighted once more in the afterm ath of 
Germany's abstention. While France dominated th e  Mediterranean policies, evident by 
the creation of the Union for the M editerranean in 2008 and headed by then President 
Sarkozy, who argued that Germany and other non-M editerranean states should not be 
able to fully participate in issues concerning M editerranean states, Germany's foreign 
policy did not focus on Tunisia and Egypt during th e  Arab Spring.16 The fact th a t the  
agendas of the Union for the M editerranean and the European Neighbourhood Policy 
are similar in nature, may also account for Germany's lack of concern for the region. 
Germany's defensive behavior showed in the afterm ath of the abstention. Several 
politicians, including W esterwelle and Merkel, continued to detail Germany's role as a
14 The CDU was defeated in an all time low and lost its support in Baden-Wurtenberg to  the Green Party.
15 "A 'Catastrophic Signal' to  the Arab World: Berlin Divided over Security Council Abstention.”
16 "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner."
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responsible, predictable partner to its allies by commenting on Germany's increased 
role in the mission in Afghanistan.
It is interesting to note that even German security scholars make historical 
references to Germany's shameful past in order to  underline and strengthen their 
argument. For example, esteemed scholar Harald Muller, in a German article published 
in 2011, heavily criticized Germany's abstention and decision, especially the position 
held by members of the Bundestag who belong to  the Left party (Die Linken). In 
response to the "no war" shouting by the party, M uller argues that not only was a civil 
war going on in Libya at the tim e of the debates, but this behavior of "silently observing 
the war yet morally condemning the rescuer" is reminiscent of a tim e "when Germans 
turned their heads left while the Gestapo17 picked up their neighbors on the right".18 
While the comparison sounds and looks intriguing, a direct link or parallel is hardly 
established, and the two instances are entirely different, historically and factually. 
Arguments and references to Germany's historical past certainly underline strong 
statements, provide controversial shock appeal, and are easily 'rem em bered' when  
Germany does not behave 'according to the  norm', or in this case, according to its allies. 
References to Germany's horrendous past behavior have been brought forth in light of 
the Libya case as well as during the economic bailouts for Greece by scholars, 
journalists, and politicians. The British press participated in "German-bashing" while
17 Geheime Staatspolizei-The Secret police of Nazi Germany and German occupied Europe, administered 
by selected officers of the SS (Schutzstaffel-the German defense paramilitary organization under Adolf 
Hitler)
18 Muller, "Ein Desaster. Deutschland Und Der Fall Libyen."
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French journalists continued to ask w hether Germany really shares the same community 
values.19
Germany's national and strategic interests must also be included for a 
comprehensive analysis on the Libya case. While milieu and tem porary goals may have 
been important to the decision making progress, Germany's economic interests in China 
and India, and ongoing relationship with Russia, may have also contributed to  
Germany's abstention. This variable, or argument, would theoretically fall into a realist 
prediction or explanation as this may show Germany's pursuit of possession goals, 
acting based on national interests rather than community based values. In the past, 
realists have argued that Germany's petition for a perm anent seat in the UNSC can be 
seen as the pursuit of possession goals. Ironically, Germany's abstention and behavior in 
the Libya case may have serious consequences both in terms of Germany's fight for a 
permanent seat as well as for the relationship with the U.S. The case of Libya highlighted 
Germany's insecure view towards its role in the international community. W hile being a 
powerful nation by most definitions, Germany's behavior once more highlighted how  
uncomfortable Germans truly are in projecting and exerting power. W hile this notion 
stems from yesteryear's 'German question', which should be resolved through  
Germany's responsible behavior since W W II, the most recent puzzling observations in 
German foreign policy, termed "deviations" and "inconsistencies", may also be 
attributed to a potential disinterest by Germany to be a foreign policy leader. Either 
way, the case of Libya, along with the ongoing European economic crisis and exchanges
19 Ibid.
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with Greece, on top of Germany's rethinking of nuclear power, severely contributes to  a 
loss in predictability and credibility. W hile analysts and scholars criticize Germany's 
problematic relationship to  the concept of power, the fact that Germany perhaps 
calculatedly decides not to  take on a leadership role is left out of the discussion. Based 
on Germany's foreign and security policy choices in the past, which w ere still part of 
shaping and constructing a normative fram ework based on historical memory, today's 
foreign policy choices are also influenced by national interests.
The Use of Force Debates: A Sequential Case
Taking into consideration security arrangements, such as collective defense 
organizations (i.e. NATO), states form coalitions in order to balance against threats  
collectively. The definitions of threats hereby vary greatly and although multilateral 
action with deployed NATO troops occurred before Kosovo, the intervention in Kosovo 
marked the first time that this collective defense organization used force in order to  
intervene in a sovereign country's internal affairs. The intervention itself sparked 
discussion in the field of international relations surrounding the question of legitimacy, 
international law, and security norms. A liberalist explanation of the intervention of 
Kosovo emphasizes the concept of cooperation by way of military coalition in order to  
preserve and enforce peace and order while emphasizing the importance of 
international law and norms. NATO members agreed, in part, to commit and respond 
collectively to threats to the system in place, and while Kosovo did not have full support, 
the idea of responsibility to  the system was evident through support by several
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member-states. Unfortunately 'the hour of Europe' did not translate as such, and 
Kosovo proved that the EU could not address the problem w ithout the support of the  
U.S. This was much later recalled by Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, in his memoirs, when  
he wrote that Europe learned it could not solve conflicts on this scale alone.
The case of Kosovo certainly brought forth a new form  of interventionism, 
sometimes referred to as liberal interventionism as articulated publicly by Tony Blair. 
Here, the main justification for this collective intervention was based on humanitarian  
reasons and the ethnic cleansing carried out by Milosevic. In terms of collective security, 
Kosovo also showed that two powers, Russia and China, disagreed with the justification 
that the war was necessary in order to enforce peace and human rights. Kosovo also 
showed that state-practiced military action, though multilaterally executed, can be 
presented as supporting community interest and security, to  include human rights. After 
the international community's failure to  respond and protect in the gross atrocities and 
genocide in Rwanda, an intervention in Kosovo was crucial and necessary. Both in 
theory and practice, the intervention and the use of force was justified collectively 
through coalitions of security arrangements, under the concept of "collective will". The 
aftermath of Kosovo for collective security shows that the intervention was largely 
dominated by western actors, with China and Russia opposing intervention. NATO's use 
of force has been viewed as a landmark decision to  intervene in humanitarian issues, 
although other arguments have been made that outlined NATO's decisions based upon 
enforcing international security in the Balkans region.
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The heavy influence of public opinion, combined with the traditional 'culture of 
restraint' employed by German policy makers, clearly shows that in the case of 
Afghanistan, Germany did not actively pursue policy input, instead acting only upon 
requests by its allies. Further, in order to separate from the combat heavy, terrorist 
seeking missions of the U.S. under OEF, Germany focused on the reconstruction efforts  
within ISAF. This alignment of, and behavior of policy choice and focus, shows 
Germany's understanding of their use of power and security. Emphasizing the  
importance of contributing to the development mission in Afghanistan and explaining 
Germany's troop contribution as such to the German public shows how domestic 
opinion drives and influences German foreign and security policy. The rhetoric and 
statements employed by policy makers, the focus on humanitarian efforts and 
reconstruction, and the continued focus prominence of the rejection of direct use of 
force, highlights Germany's interests and approaches, in line with soft power theoretical 
explanations. The aftermath of the Kunduz affair is still relevant to contemporary 
German political discussions and continues to inform and influence the use of force 
debate.
The extensive study in Der Spiegel (Ein deutsches Verbrechen), combined with a 
movie and several television segments and talk shows surrounding the air strike that 
resulted in over one hundred civilian casualties in Afghanistan, contributes to  the  
construction of new memories and experiences which are used to make foreign policy 
decisions. The bombing of Kunduz remains the "bloodiest German military operation  
since W W II", and the controversial political repercussions which still dominate the
media are certain to contribute to  the dialogue o f Bundeswehr deployment 
indefinitely.20 After German federal attorneys did not charge Colonel Klein in 2009 with  
the murder of civilians, the district court in the city of Bonn in December 2013 rejected a 
lawsuit brought forth by the victims of the attack. The attorneys of the victims sued the  
Federal Republic of Germany for 90,000 euro in compensation per victim of the attack.21 
Thus far, Germany has paid over half million Euros in reparations due to  the Kunduz 
attack. While the excusal o f Colonel Klein's call was m et w ith different reactions 
nationally and internationally, it is im portant to note th a t the  reason given was due to  
the rules of engagement which "allowed an attack in this case".22 This ruling directly 
contributes to the use of force dialogue in furthering the German understanding of out 
of area operations, armed conflict, and the legality of military action. The ruling and the 
dismissal for additional compensation to  the victims of the Kunduz affair, combined with  
the ongoing debates in Germany surrounding the attack, emphasizes the important 
repercussions and effect o f the event on German foreign and security policy.
Germany's behavior and shift from its allies' position seemed all too familiar, and 
comparisons between the Iraq invasion in 2002-2003 and the Libya vote were  
inevitable. The striking and important difference though is the legitimacy and 
multilateral support of the latter. W hile rhetorically, and in print, referring to  the 'Nein' 
of Iraq during the headlines of the Libya case, journalists attem pted to find parallels of 
the two in order to strengthen the position that Germany, yet again, has abandoned its
20 Von Demmer et al., "Ein Deutsches Verbrechen."
21 "Prozess in Bonn: Gericht Weist Klage Von Kunduz-Opfern Ab," SpiegelOnline, December 11, 2013.
22 Ibid.
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allies under the pretense of enduring pacifism. W hile the internal and external debates 
surrounding the use of force in both cases may have similar aspects, the factual data 
and variables involved in the decision making process is quite different. This 
differentiation and prerequisite of influential variables in the  Libya case precisely 
confuses scholars who struggle with explaining Germany's behavior both theoretically  
and practically. The Iraq case showed Germany's com m itm ent to its role concept as a 
civilian power most distinctively, by voting "No" on the basis of multilateral approaches 
and legitimacy and using soft power approaches to  influence international relations and 
foreign policy diplomatically.
Discussion
Historical memory is deeply imbedded in German culture and identity, thus 
difficult to change or adjust and rhetoric and political behavior is therefore ritualized 
and perpetuated in German foreign and security policy. How then exactly can the  
changes be explained? The change and continuity debate has been ongoing for decades; 
the recent developments o f Libya and Germany's Iran policy has resulted in German 
security scholars calling Germany's policy "inconsistent", pointing to  drastic changes. 
While these recent developments appear to  be inconsistent on the surface, this study 
argues that there is no new status quo. Perhaps Germany hovers between old and new  
ideas depending on the issue area; sometimes acting "more realist", but always 
considering the importance of the past. Germany's decision to abstain from  the vote can 
be explained under the umbrella of memory comprised of W W II legacy and recent
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memory surrounding military operations. The uncertainty o f how an established no-fly 
zone would affect and influence the Libyan crisis was monumental in the German 
decision. Historically, the same scenario has resulted in military interventions using 
force and ground troops. Germany simply did not feel comfortable w ith this potential 
scenario which could easily result in more civilian casualties, prolonged com m itm ent to  
reconstruction efforts, and bloodshed of German soldiers involved in Libya's civil war. 
German domestic opposition to  the ongoing war in Afghanistan, and the horrendous 
aftermath of the  Kunduz affair, further contributed to the government's resistance to  
actively engage in a potential out of area military mission in Libya. The ruling coalition 
therefore had a motivation to abstain (or oppose) as an affirmative vote may have 
resulted in an electoral defeat.
While UNSC resolution 1973 was created as a measure to protect civilians in 
Libya, the actual formulation extends beyond the no-fly zone to several military 
measures allowed under Article 4. This precise formulation, despite the fact that the  
operation was not rhetorically referred to  as 'w ar', significantly contributed to  
Germany's decision. The inclusion of possible militarily and forceful interventions 
translated into a fear by German politicians of aerial bombing missions w ith potential 
collateral damage.23 Rainer Stinner (FDP), in defending Germany's position and 
behavior, argued that the use of force in the  Libya mission would mean a forceful 
intervention of a civil war, and while Germany collectively agrees that Gaddafi must go, 
not "everyone who fights against Gaddafi on the streets" can be seen as protector of
23 "Interview with Dr. Rainer Stinner."
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democracy and human rights.24 Addressing the criticism that Germany, through 
Westerwelle, rhetorically supported the freedom  movements observed in the Arab 
world, including in Libya, yet refused to  vote on contribution of troops to  the area, 
Stinner argues that Germany never promised to intervene in a civil war. The Libyan case 
showed that not only W W II legacy influences decision making for out of area 
operations, but also more recent m emory and experience. The drawn out war in 
Afghanistan (and Iraq), with diverging missions of humanitarian efforts and 
reconstruction and development, paved the way for arguments against military 
intervention mission in Libya. German policy makers feared that the lack of plans for 
Libya's future would result in costly and lengthy missions similar to those in 
Afghanistan.25
The question of where German foreign policy is headed in light o f the Libya case 
arises when taking into consideration the other tw o  im portant pillars of German foreign 
policy: Germany's economic position against bailouts, and the  rethinking of nuclear 
power. While leaving the Euro or the EU is unthinkable, Germany's abstention from  the  
vote calls into question Germany's responsibility and predictability as a security exporter 
and reliable partner for the transatlantic security relationship. Considering the evidence 
in the Libya case, and examining the statements, justification, and factual data, history is 
too compelling for Germany to have a new status quo on its foreign and security policy. 
Motives of self-interest are evident, which complicates previously held views of
24 Ibid.
25 The German minister for economic cooperation argued that the coalition of the willing does not have a 
concept of the future for Libya.
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Germany as a civilian power. The willingness to use force unilaterally, w ithout 
international legitimization, as arguably observed during the Kosovo case, was an 
isolated decision which followed a number of mismanaged inactions leading up to  
Germany's use of force. While im portant concepts in Germany's strategic culture w ere  
critically reinterpreted rhetorically during that tim e, the more recent cases, and 
especially the case of Libya, shows a reversal and emphasis on previously held norms. 
The reinforcing of the role of historic memory-norm culture in the rhetorical analysis 
shows a continuity of previously held policy norms. Germany's behavior in the Libya 
case is certainly less multilaterally oriented than previous instances involving the use of 
force; however, this does not constitute a role change. The Libya case simply highlighted 
which norms are most influential for German foreign policy in this given policy area. 
Germany's willingness to act (Gestaltungswille), in the policy area surrounding out of 
area operations was most evident during the Kosovo case.
Despite the shift observed in the abstention, most evident w ith Germany's siding 
along the BRIC countries, the Libya case is not an instance o f change in German foreign  
policy. Rather, it shows continued and sequential action, marked by few  adjustments 
and learning processes. Namely, Germany's reaction to  its external environm ent can 
account for slight shifts in policy orientations. The importance of domestic issues over 
foreign policy issues is also evident when analyzing instances of use of force debates. In 
several cases, and arguably in most foreign policy issue areas, domestic opinion plays a 
vital role in influencing and shaping policy makers. This analysis of causal elem ents of 
historical memory on German foreign policy behavior highlights the influential
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importance of Germany's W W II legacy on contemporary domestic politics, international 
structures, and institutions, by informing choices, positions, and rhetoric in instances 
where the use of force is debated politically. The media analysis shows an overall 
struggle and difficulty to adequately explain and understand Germany's behavior.
A common framework in which Germany's abstention can be discussed and 
debated theoretically does not exist. This confusion and complexity led to the argument 
that German foreign policy is, at worst, undergoing an "identity crisis" and marked by 
"inconsistency", and at best, has simply "changed". W hile Germany can certainly afford  
to act based on national interests, the Libya case may simply highlight Germany's 
disinterest to take a leadership role in regional and global security policies. This 
disinterest or assumption that Germany can somehow escape its responsibilities can 
further be attributed to  the changing international security environment. W hile  
Germany eagerly focused on showing responsibility and predictability during and 
immediately after the Cold War, today's environm ent does not forcefully 'ask' of 
Germany to act. This case was certainly not marked by shockingly different and changing 
positions, but simply highlighted the enduring importance of historical memory on 
contemporary policy. The only true change observed in Germany's security policy in 
recent years is the change in conscription, which can be categorized and explained as 
assimilation to the policies of other EU members.
Consensus was reached not to intervene militarily in another state's internal 
conflict. In the past, Germany decided exactly tha t, and Kosovo was seen as a new  
orientation of German foreign and security policy. Kosovo led to the scholarly debate of
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'Germany as a normal actor', in which Germany's power and responsibility to  act was 
highlighted and analyzed. In the case of Kosovo, the variable of committing to partners 
and the international community may have been crucial, but Germany's allowing of the  
use of force in the Kosovo case remains an anomaly. To show responsibility, in the  
Kosovo case, was the determining factor, whereby historical memory informed this 
decision by reinterpreting the concept of 'never again' in terms to never again  allow  
genocide. The similarities between the Kosovo case, on the grounds of humanitarian  
intervention, and Libya, has led to a multitude of discussions, drawing comparisons and 
concluding that Germany's abstention for Libya is not only unforgivable but also 
unexplainable. The findings above show that historical memory significantly influenced 
the Libya decision, whereby the concept of 'never again' was interpreted in its 
traditional meaning; to not commit German troops to  military interventions. The other 
determining factor, the influence of Germany's domestic opinion, has been constructed, 
shaped, and formed through the prominence of Germany's W W II legacy in the  
contemporary German mindset. The norms and beliefs that dominated in Kosovo and 
Libya are therefore not conflicting, but w ere ranked differently, in order o f importance 
for each case at the time. Further, Kosovo was viewed as part of Europe, therefore  
allowing a NATO operation, while the remaining cases under review are outside of the  
borders of Europe.26 Another plausible explanation for the variation between Kosovo
26 While Afghanistan is also outside o f European borders, Germany's troop deployment to the area was 
marked by specific and strict deployment caveats.
195
and Libya is that Germany may simply trea t foreign policy issues on a case by case basis, 
whereby the Libya case occurred during a time of Bundeswehr reform.
While there are obvious deviations from the rhetoric used in each case under 
review, the strongest articulation of Germany's choices, position, and behavior can be 
found in the Kosovo and Iraq cases. Also stemming from historical memory, the rhetoric 
employed by Joschka Fischer during Kosovo was detrim ental in justifying and explaining 
the obvious shift in German foreign policy. Here, Germany's strong rhetoric of 
commitment, responsibility, and predictability matched Germany's action and policies. 
Similarly, Chancellor Schroder's and Joschka Fischer's strong rhetoric against an invasion 
of Iraq matched Germany's policy choices. W hile the rhetoric in all cases was relatively 
strong, Germany's rhetorical com m itm ent to  alliance solidarity in the Libya case was not 
matched with actual support. The National/Economic Interests variable, especially in the 
Libya case, highlighted Germany's cost analysis during a tim e of Bundeswehr reform , 
when Germany's military professionalized. True to  checkbook diplomacy of the past, 
German policy makers highlighted the 5,000 Syrian refugees taken in by Germany, more 
than any other country in the EU, and over 12,000 more political asylum seekers from  
Syria and Libya.
The shift in policy through Kosovo, represented a reinterpretation of Germany's 
use of power, understanding of power, and role in the international community. 
Scholars, while debating Germany's status as a 'civilian power' argued that Germany's 
norms, traditionally defined Germany's interests. Despite this shift, some scholars, 
shortly after Kosovo, predicted Germany's continuity and adherence to post-W W II
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norms and values: “Germany will continue to  be guided by its old principles, and it will 
continue to try to reconcile them as much as possible with the  new exigencies of 
radically different security environment. Policies on the use o f force will continue to  be 
cautious and restrained..."27 This struggle to reconcile old principles with new demands 
has continued to be problematic in contemporary German foreign policy debates, and 
points to  Germany's unique position and need to  fully analyze, discuss, and act upon 
today's security environment. Cases involving out of area operations and the use of 
force also highlight how Germany views its responsibility to  its alliance partners. W hile  
showing solidarity and commitment is an im portant pillar of Germany's post-war 
identity, the Iraq case highlights in which areas Germany is willing to oppose its (major) 
allies. While peaceful disarmament procedures and the overall fighting of terrorism are 
reconcilable with German interests, the national interest term s under which the U.S. 
policy makers framed their arguments for the invasion of Iraq, proved to be problematic 
and conflicting with Germany's com m itm ent to ideationally based policy choices.
Scholarly Findings and Opinion
Germany's use and understanding of power is an important aspect of an overall 
analysis to German foreign and security policy. The cases selected to highlight one policy 
area, the use of force debates in German politics, account for a variation in results, 
behavior, and environment. The Kosovo case, during a Red-Green coalition, dramatically  
changed how out of area operations were viewed, discussed, and subsequently
27 Mauil, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?," 77.
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analyzed, providing an example of restructure, reinterpretation, and increased 
responsibility. The Iraq case emphasized Germany's com m itm ent to  legitimized, 
sanctioned approaches backed by the UN, while Afghanistan solidified Germany's 
assurance to multilateral approaches. Libya initially throws o ff the trajectory of 
Germany's foreign policy evolution, but after closer examination, several variables and 
calculations can account for Germany's behavior. Security scholars have debated the  
puzzle of Germany's changing, yet stagnant, foreign policy over the past tw o decades, 
beginning with the Kosovo case. Since then, tw o argumentative themes of analyses have 
emerged: explanations focused on domestic influence and policy driven by electoral 
concerns, or behavior bound and dictated by Germany's continued 'culture of restraint'.
According to German security scholars, Germany's policy choices during the Iraq 
case showed an increased "self-centeredness", not adequately explained by the two  
themes.28 According to Harnisch, Germany's policies during the out of area operations 
debates for Iraq reflect that of a status quo power; a reaction to a drastic change in the  
international security environment, but not dramatically different to the Kosovo and 
Afghanistan cases, during which the Schroder government took steps to  direct domestic 
consensus in order to fulfill international expectations of Germany to  include 
responsibility and alliance solidarity.29 Iraq here differed in that the coalition 
government at the tim e was unable to combine the influence of domestic opinion and 
alliance expectations, while Germany's other military commitments abroad contributed
28 Sebastian Harnisch, "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," German Politics 13, no. 1 
(2004): 23.
29 "German Non-Proliferation Policy and the Iraq Conflict," German Politics 13, no. 1 (2004): 24.
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to the "No" vote as did the lack of consensus among EU members in the case. Iraq, 
according to some authors, should therefore be seen as a case that reflects Germany's 
struggle to bridge its external and internal pressures, not one that presented and 
unprecedented vote. Similarly, scholars argue for nearly tw enty years th at Germany's 
foreign policy choices involving the use of force have, and will continue to be, influenced 
by a mixture of both Germany's political tradition, the culture of restraint, and budget 
constraints.30
On the other hand, Germany's abstention from Libya appears to throw  off 
analytical examination of Germany's foreign policy trajectory. Representing a 'puzzling' 
phenomena, Germany's abstention was certainly not presented, viewed, and treated as 
just an abstention; Germany's behavior, while initially questionable and shocking, can 
be explained. Germany did not decide to  block UNSC Resolution 1973, but instead chose 
to abstain, based on strategic and political incentives.31 Initial scholarly reaction from  
Germany detailed the path to the establishment o f the no-fly zone by emphasizing the  
initial opposition by the U.S.; especially by defense minister Robert Gates. W hile the  
reactions from Berlin focused on the lack of solidarity and resulting international 
isolation rather than Germany's refusal to militarily participate in "protecting Libyan 
civilians", this case certainly highlighted Germany's need to fully debate and rethink its 
foreign policy choices involving the use of force.32 The startling facts surrounding an
30 Carl Hodge, "Germany and the Limits of Soft Security," European Security 7, no. 3 (1998).
31 Patrick Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," Survival 54, no. 3 (2012): 106.
32 Svenja Sinjen, "Der Preis Der Freiheit. Fall Libyen: Was W ir Neu Denken Mussen," Internationale Politik 
3(2011): 82. Own translation.
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intervention in Libya, which, on the surface, appear to present the ideal case to warrant 
German Bundeswehr participation: sanctioned by the UNSC, international and regional 
support, alliance solidarity and multilateral approaches, and most importantly, human  
rights abuses, were simply not enough to convince the majority that the possibility o f 
civilian casualties and consequences of a military intervention in Libya outweigh the  
benefit of the "chance of a democratic process".33 While the choice not to participate in 
Operation Unified Protector resulted in isolation from Germany's closest allies, overall 
only fifteen NATO states supported UNSC Resolution 1973.34 While disagreeing on the  
variety of reasons behind Germany's abstention, most scholars agree that the decision 
reflects Germany's lack of "strategic orientation" and lack of interests in foreign policy, 
calling for a critical need to  "rethink, discuss, and revive" Germany's foreign policy role 
concept.35
Scholarly examination on contemporary German foreign and security policy 
usually focuses on strategic security, political behavior, and policy action in light of the  
changing security environment. Theoretical focus here emphasizes th e  use of power, 
specifically Germany's use of institutional power to  shape and influence its external 
environment. In the field of international relations, analyses pointing to constructivist 
notions of collective memory, cultural identity, and norms-based behavior in German 
foreign policy are grouped in an outlier of sorts, with publications appearing in
33 August Pradetto, "Der Andere Preis Der Freiheit," ibid.4: 59. Own translation.
34 Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," 106.
35 Hanns Maull, "Deutsche Aussenpolitik: Orientierungslos," Zeitschrift fu r  Politikwissenschaft 21, no. 1 
(2011): 117. own translation.
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Germany-specific journals, or weaved amongst themes of historic and identity studies. 
While the aforementioned research is im portant, W W II history undoubtedly affects 
German foreign policy approaches, especially areas involving the use of force. As such, 
inquiries into history should yield results and arguments detailing how  and when history 
informs German foreign policy, not that it does. Reviewing Germany's behavior over the 
four selected cases, Kosovo directly conflicted with Germany's traditional role concept, 
while Iraq sparked debates of a renewed 'German Question' and Germany's Sonderweg. 
Some German scholars have therefore argued that collective memory of W W II has 
changed into tw o strands used to  explain and justify Germany's behavior: on the one 
hand providing a reason for restraint (Iraq and Libya) and on the other hand a 
justification for Germany's increased role as a responsible partner (Kosovo and 
Afghanistan).36 Policy makers have used W W II references in a non-linear way since 
Kosovo, depending on the context, to justify, instrumentalize, and "as a convenient tool 
to lend argumentative force to a variety of positions".37 Furthermore, Germany's 
commitment to diplomatic approaches will continue to dominate Germany's behavior in 
cases involving the use of force. Germany's allies need to understand that military 
action will remain a last resort, "by choice, not by default".38
Power, and Germany's rejection of national power, is detailed in scholarly 
analyses interpreting how security and threat is perceived by Germany. Germany's
36 Ruth W ittlinger and Martin Larose, "No Future for Germany's Past? Collective M em ory and German 
Foreign Policy," German Politics 16, no. 4 (2007).
37 "No Future for Germany's Past? Collective M em ory and German Foreign Policy," German Politics 16, no. 
4 (2007): 492.
38 Regina Karp, "The New German Foreign Policy Consensus," The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2005): 
79.
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security interests have been pursued within an institutional fram ework in order to  
shape and direct EU security identity while remaining 'true' to  the culture of restraint in 
terms of the projection of power.39 From Germany's 'policy of responsibility', 'tamed  
power7, and 'Germany as a civilian power', scholars have focused on how Germany's use 
and understanding of power has changed and transformed over the past four decades. 
Others focus on 'the German way' and the 'German question', detailing the 
consequences of how the 'NO' during Iraq has shaped, influenced, and prevented 
Germany's exercise of power; however, the observed 'changes' in Germany's foreign 
policy in regards to out of area operations point to sequential cases within Germany's 
traditional foreign policy pattern. According to some authors, controversial and much 
discussed cases such as Iraq may simply be at odds with one or more core concepts of 
German foreign policy: multilateral frameworks, civilized international order, and no use 
of force.40
Summary
The operationalization of this case study included explanatory variables to  
account for variance among the selected cases, w ith a focus on Libya. This study 
examined the deviation from rhetoric and policy and found that rhetoric, for the most 
part, remained continuous across tim e while policies changed gradually but remained 
sequential. The variable of historical m emory can account for matching and continuous
39 Hampton, "Living in a World of Dangers and Strangers," 86.
40 Peter Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations," 
Survival 47, no. 1 (2005): 145.
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rhetoric and policy, while domestic opinion and alliance solidarity further influenced 
foreign policy choices involving out of area operations. The variables selected further  
highlight the importance of rhetoric in German foreign and security policy by providing a 
comprehensive framework to analyze, understand, and predict Germany's behavior. 
Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya are not cases of tem porary impacts; they are 
consistent within a pattern of German foreign and security policy and clearly show  
Germany's understanding and use of power (soft power, through institutions) which, at 
times, is heavily influence by historical memory and guided by norms-based approaches. 
This is especially accurate in instances of the use of military force. Instead, Germany has 
continuously advocated out of area operations guided by legitimacy, cooperation, and 
multilateralism; however, policy is also influenced and shaped by aspects of national 
interests as may be the case for Iran. In analyzing how or whether Germany's foreign 
policy is changing and examining this process of change from the old status quo to  a 
potentially new one, the possibility that Germany's behavior is a mere reaction to  its 
external environment must be considered. The current economic problems observed in 
Europe, and elsewhere in the world, directly strengthen Germany's relationship with  
Russia and China, thus also influencing Germany's security-related policy in issue areas 
involving both countries. Germany's strong economic ties to Libya in the past (as well as 
Iran) may account for what has been called Germany's "inconsistent" foreign policy 
behavior. As Duffield notes, German foreign policy behavior greatly depends on the  
international environment and the German response to it.41 Progress and change in
41 John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken : Political Culture, International Institutions, and German
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German foreign and security policy has, is, and will continue to  be tied to past 
experience and emphasize the enduring power o f historical memory.
Beyond the intricate details that influenced Germany's abstention, and beyond 
justification and explanation, this case highlights the lack of agreement among the EU's 
regional powers, especially in the realm of foreign and security policy. This shifting and 
disagreement of major political issues, including economic measures pertaining to the  
EU financial crisis, demonstrate Germany's focus on domestic and national goals. While 
this may be viewed as a change in Germany's foreign policy approach, it is neither 
sudden nor drastic and can be explained and understood through several variables. 
Historical memory, domestic factors, and national interests have always contributed to  
Germany's foreign and security policies. The Libya case, as a sequential case of use of 
force debates, simply categorized some variables over others, while demonstrating  
Germany's strategic reaction to the international environment. Undoubtedly, norms 
continue to  guide and direct German foreign policy. This case study showed which 
norms and interests dominated the use of force debate and are ranked higher by policy 
makers in decisions that call for German troop deploym ent. Historical m emory enters 
use of force discussions before, during, and after major policy decisions, and influences, 
confirms, and informs the status quo. Further, an action from  Germany in regards to  
military interventions and the use of force, will continue to  be present in political 
debates, requiring time, analysis, and fully cooperated diplomatic discussions with
Security Policy after Unification (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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Germany's allies. It is unlikely that Germany will drastically change its view toward use 
of force cases, especially when pressured to  act quickly. Germany's historic past is 
simply too relevant not to shape the future of German foreign policy. Future constraints 
on Germany's ability to project and exercise power are on the  horizon as the  
international security environment continues to  change.
CASE II: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, SANCTIONS, AND DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF IRAN 
The question that directed the analysis of this case study was also guided by the  
hypotheses that German foreign policy either is or is not determined by historical 
memory. Applying the same variables to examine Germany's behavior during the  
negotiations towards Iran's nuclear program will not only highlight a different area of 
Germany's foreign policy but also detail and account for variance in rhetoric and action. 
While the case of Iran presents a single observation, the period of negotiations spanned 
over several years accounting for a variance of relationships, alliances, and an ever- 
changing security environment. Germany's rhetorical com m itm ent to  its allies 
condemning a nuclear armed Iran was not m et with policy action. Specifically, Germany 
refused and opposed stronger sanctions, siding with Russia and China. Which variables 
can explain Germany's foreign policy behavior in this case and account for the obvious 
conflict of rhetoric and action?
After the EU3+3 negotiations and the UN resolution in 2008, the election of 
President Obama initially lessened the  focus on sanctions and opened the doors for new  
diplomatic efforts by Germany. In 2009, Gerhard Schroder visited Tehran and renewed
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German-lranian relations, especially in the economic realm .42 By June of 2009, Basell 
Polyolefine, a German firm, signed a €825 million contract, supported by Schroder who  
believed in "seizing and not missing" business opportunities with Iran.43 W hile the  
numbers appear high and Germany certainly has economic interests in Iran, arguing that 
Germany's refusal for stronger sanctions is only based on the  German-lranian business 
relationship would be an overstatem ent. The highest German exports to Iran w ere in 
2005 and 2010 and have since been steadily declining. Energy security and Germany's 
gas relationship with Iran and Russia also influences Germany's behavior, which would 
fall into the variable o f national/economic interests.
It is also important to review Germany's stance towards nuclear weapons in 
general. While Germany is legally forbidden to acquire nuclear weapons, Germany has a 
long history of using nuclear energy. Beyond this, several tactical nuclear weapons 
(TNWs) are positioned in Germany, which has resulted in controversial calls for their 
removal in recent years. Interestingly, a 2006 survey showed that only 12 percent of the  
German population was aware o f the U.S. nuclear weapons positioned in Germany.44 
Further, a 2005 poll by the German newspaper Der Spiegel showed that 76 percent of 
the German population would support the removal of tactical nuclear weapons
42 "Iran-Germany Ties Entering New Chapter, Especially in Gas Sector," Tehran Times, February 22, 2009, 
accessed December 10, 2013, http://w ww .im ra.org.il/story.php3?id=42919.
43 Reiner Hermann, "Deutsch-Emiratische Dynamic," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 10, 2009, 
accessed December 10, 2013,
http://fazarchiv.faz.net/document/showSingleDoc/FAZ FD1200906102302074?
44 "Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Survey Results in Five European Countries," Greenpeace International, 
May 26, 2006.
stationed in Germany.45 Several German non-governmental organizations have 
continuously campaigned for a Germany w ithout nuclear weapons, w ith some civil 
society groups pressuring the German government to call fo r the removal of American  
tactical nuclear weapons.46 This pressure was first evident within the governm ent in 
1998, when Joschka Fischer proposed a 'no first use doctrine' as a pathway to  remove 
tactical nuclear weapons from  Germany; a proposal not well received w ith the U.S. and 
the United Kingdom. In 2005, a petition was issued to the German Bundestag which 
called for the withdrawal once more in order to strengthen the  nonproliferation  
regime.47 Beyond the tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Germany, the German 
government is currently rethinking its own nuclear power program. The Fukushima 
catastrophe has affected Germany's views towards nuclear energy. Chancellor M erkel 
has closed 41 percent of Germany's nuclear energy reactors and proposes a com plete  
closure within a decade. This move is supported by the vast majority of Germans and all 
political parties.
This case study of Germany's foreign policy behavior in the case of the Iranian 
nuclear program sheds light on how historical memory enters German political debates 
in a global policy issue area, nonproliferation. W hile historical memory is revisited by 
politicians in this case rhetorically, it is not the strongest influential variable that 
determines Germany's policy behavior. Historical memory and W W II legacy was only
45 "Atomwaffen: Ausstieg Ankiindigen," Der Spiegel, May 2, 2005.
46 www.atom waffenfrei.de, "Unsere Zukuft - Atomwaffenfrei."
47 "Glaubwurdigkeit Des Nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsregimes Starken - Us-Nuklearwaffen Aus 
Deutschland Abziehen-15/5257," ed. Deutscher Bundestag.
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introduced in context of potential military action in the case of Iran. Specifically, the  
concepts of 'never again war' and 'w ith peaceful means only' have been used to  justify, 
explain, and advocate for sanctions instead of military actions, therefore strengthening 
the diplomatic process proposed by Germany. Alliance solidarity, another variable 
selected for analysis, was present in tha t Germany initially aligned itself along with the  
EU voice and its coalition partners. Despite this, Germany continuously advocated a 
softer approach, eventually opposing the stronger sanctions which were suggested by 
Germany's allies. This prompted international partners to call on Germany to show 
more responsible behavior. Furthermore, Germany's refusal for stronger sanctions also 
placed Germany on the side with Russia and China. W hile domestic opinion strongly 
affects German foreign and security policy, the case of Iran's nuclear program did not 
result in the outpour of significant domestic opinion. An overwhelming m ajority of 
Germans opposed a nuclear-armed Iran, yet only half would support possible military 
action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. Even in this case, it is doubtful that the German  
public would support said military actions by committing German soldiers and 
resources. This can partly be explained by Germany's long standing history and 
relationship with Iran. The below table shows the variables selected for analysis in this 
case and details the strength, presence, and ability to influence and shape German 
foreign and security policy towards Iran's nuclear program of each.
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Table 3: Application of Variables; Case II
German Foreign Policy towards Iran's Nuclear Program. 2003-2013
Historical Memory/WWII 
Legacy
Slightly Present.
Rhetorical mention of 'never again war" and 'w ith peaceful means 
only' which can account for Germany's emphasis on diplomatic 
measures.
Alliance
SoIidarity/NATO/EU/EU3+3
Slightly Present.
Solidarity in terms of aligning along with EU voice 
initially/Rhetorical commitment.
Eventually: advocacy of softer approach and opposition to severe 
sanctions.
"New Constellation" o f Russia-China-Germany
Domestic Influence Slightly Present.
Cultural history and tourism with Iran and domestic opposition 
against any form of military option for Iran (yet 96 % of Germans 
oppose a nuclear-armed Iran).
National/Economic Interests Present.
Economic ties and interest through trade and export (although 
steadily declining). Germany argued that imposed sanctions did not 
harm the mullahs, instead only German business suffered as the 
gaps left by sanctions were filled by China and Russia. National and 
economic interests through a strengthened relationship with Russia 
(and China), especially in regards to  energy security.
Rhetoric Present but varied.
German leaders advocated severe sanctions rhetorically while 
emphasizing no military actions. Rhetoric was m et with inaction.
"W andel durch Handel" and "Keeping business and politics 
separate" was used rhetorically against stronger sanctions.
Overall, rhetorical com m itm ent to alliance solidarity, condemning 
nuclear-armed Iran.
The strongest variable for influencing German foreign policy towards Iran's 
nuclear program appears to  be the importance of the German-lranian trade relationship 
in the realm of national interests. This importance further increases due to the Russia-
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Germany-lran energy security nexus. Germany continuously advocated for a softer 
approach to sanctions, pointing to  the fact that sanctions did not harm Iran directly as 
market gaps were filled by China, Russia, and other countries. Instead, the sanctions 
hurt the German business industry, although not severely, resulting in some domestic 
responses towards the economic sanctions. M ore specifically, slogans such as "Change 
through Trade" and "Keep business and politics separate" w ere used to show opposition 
to the sanctions imposed on Iran. Although national and economic interests are not the  
sole explanatory variable for Germany's foreign policy behavior towards the Iranian 
nuclear program, differences between the Iranian and Libyan case show Germany's 
discontent with economic sanctions for Iran. While refusing strong sanctions and 
working through legal loopholes in the Iran case, Germany publicly called for stronger 
sanctions for Libya, perhaps because Germany does not have the same economic 
interests in Libya.
Findings
Rhetorically, German politicians articulated a varied position towards a nuclear 
Iran. While the IAEA report in 2011 prompted Guido W esterwelle to  argue that severe 
sanctions were inevitable unless cooperation occurs, he simultaneously emphasized 
that Germany would not support any military action. Chancellor Merkel similarly 
commented that a nuclear bomb in Iran would be unacceptable and m et with tough 
economic sanctions. Over the past ten years, German policy makers showed alliance 
solidarity and consensus by rhetorically condemning Iran's nuclear program; however,
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Germany's rhetorical commitment did not match Germany's policy /nactions. When  
possible sanctions were discussed in coalition settings such as the UNSC, Germany 
publicly refused and opposed stronger sanctions. This inaction has resulted in several 
scholarly and media critiques, mainly pointing to Germany's inconsistent foreign policy. 
The international community points to Germany's failure to  show alliance solidarity 
through responsible behavior and questions Germany's role as a global power. This has 
contributed to the overall debate within international relations on how to  explain 
Germany's continued and changed foreign policy behavior theoretically while  
establishing a predictable pattern for future German policy choices.
Germany's behavior in the case of Iran's nuclear program did not show a 
significant change in policy or shift towards a new status quo. Germany's inaction and 
disinterest with foreign policy-related issue areas has been constant, while the  
multilateral and diplomatic approach taken at the beginning aligns with Germany's 
norm-consistent behavior. Scholarly and media analyses group Germany's behavior, 
specifically opposing stronger sanctions and voting along Russia and China, as 
irresponsible and problematic. In recent years, and examining Germany's foreign policy 
behavior comprehensively, scholars question Germany's role as a civilian power, 
particularly due to  policies based on national interest. Taking into consideration 
Germany's business interest in Iran and Germany's role during the economic crisis in 
Europe, analysts have pointed to Germany's policies based on national interests and 
overall changing towards a geo-economic power. Some analysts have even argued that
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Germany's national interests-based behavior in recent years shows a gradual change in 
policy and is in line with realist explanations for foreign policy choices.
Taking into consideration the variables chosen for this case study, motives of 
self-interests, specifically national and economic interests, can account for Germany's 
behavior, inaction, and advocacy for softer approaches towards Iran's nuclear program. 
While the majority of scholars and media experts grouped German inaction as 
'surprising' and 'shocking', this case is certainly not an instance of direct change in policy 
behavior. Germany's policy behavior in the Iran case has been continuous and partially 
adjusted, based on national interests and the external security environment, while the  
rhetoric towards alliance solidarity, antimilitarism, and diplomatic approaches has 
remained unchanged. Domestic opinion, while strong, was not as evident in this case as 
within the policy area involving the use of force. However, in relation to  the use of force, 
a 2013 domestic opinion poll showed that Germany and Slovakia had the lowest 
approval rate for the use of force for Iran in all of Europe at 32 percent, while an option 
of accepting a nuclear Iran if military force was the only alternative action was favored  
the most by Germany with 51 percent.48
While historical memory was used rhetorically to  push diplomacy over potential 
military intervention, historical memory did not directly shape German foreign policy 
choices in the case of Iran. Further, while Germany's emphasis on economic interests, 
especially during the Greece bailouts, was analyzed as a return to realist policy behavior 
by some analysts, historical memory may have constrained Germany's ability to  project
48 "Transatlantic Trends," 33.
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and exercise power only in regards to potential military interventions. This rhetorical 
and policy commitment to W W II legacies and culture of restraint does not limit German 
power; it serves German policy makers in justifying and explaining policy choices in all 
realms of foreign policy where Germany m ayor may not have interest. Historical 
memory enters the discussion once potential military action is debated. Historical 
memory then assumes the role of restraining policy action, therefore confirming the  
status quo. Historical memory has the most impact on German foreign and security 
policy when dealing with use of force situations, which is not the case for Iran. Despite 
the somewhat restraining side-effect, Germany's refusal for stronger economic 
sanctions and constant advocacy of softer and constructive diplomatic approaches is in 
line with Germany's idea of power.
Economic and National Interest
It is important to consider the German-lranian economic relationship in greater 
detail. During the first half of 2013, German exports to Iran fell by 33 percent in 
comparison to previous years while imports from Iran to Germany decreased by 26 
percent.49 The bilateral trade volume for 2012 considered of €2.528 billion in exports to  
Iran and €710 million in imports from Iran.50 According to  the German Departm ent o f 
State, German banks operating in Iran have not taken on new business since 2007. The 
below table details the bilateral trade between Germany and Iran from  2007-2013.
49 "Beziehungen Zu Deutschland," own translation.
50 Ibid.
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Table 4: German Exports to Iran
Exports to Iran Imports from Iran
2007 €3.604 Billion €583 Million
2008 €3.924 Billion €593 Million
2009 €3.714 Billion €537 Million
2010 €3.804 Billion €916 Million
2011 €3.087 Billion €712 Million
2012 €2.528 Billion €313 Million
2013 (1*J4) €1.040 Billion €157 Million
...:..........1 ..... .5i(Source: Data taken from the German Department of State website) 1
This table reflects a strong decrease in German exports to Iran since the sanctions in 
December 2006, and a second round of UN and EU sanctions in June and July of 2010. 
The EU sanctions were then further increased in 2011. W hile the historical high in 
German exports to Iran, before sanctions, in 2005 reached €4.4  Billion, this number only 
accounts for 0.6 percent of the total value o f German foreign exports that year (€720  
Billion). The more recent years of the German-lranian trade relationship paints a similar 
picture in comparison to Germany's total exports and imports, depicted in the table  
below.
51 Ibid.
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Table 5: German Exports and Imports
Total
German
Exports
(Billion)
German 
Exports 
to Iran 
(Billion)
Total
German
Imports
(Billion)
German 
Imports 
from Iran 
(Million)
Value of 
exports to 
Iran to total 
German 
exports
Value of 
imports from 
Iran to overall 
German 
imports
2009 €803 €3.71 €664 €537 0.462% 0.081%
2010 €952 €3.8 €797 €916 0.399% 0.115%
2011 €1,061 €3.0 €902 €712 0.283% 0.079%
— ..............(Source: German Department of State and German Federal Statistic Office, Ministry of Finance)
While the overall exports to Iran in comparison to Germany's total foreign trade  
only accounted for a relatively small percentage, Germany has been Iran's main trading 
partner for over a decade, closely followed by China. After the  initial rounds of 
sanctions, German businesses widely critiqued the German government for supporting 
UN sanctions, arguing for a separation of politics and business. During this tim e, the  
Director of the Federation of German Wholesale and Trade, publicly spoke out against 
unilateral sanctions against Iran, adding his concern that German companies were  
increasingly losing business to Asia.53 Other officials, to  include Jurgen Thumann, head 
of the Federation of German Industries, cautioned against the  sanctions, arguing that 
German companies lost lucrative Iranian contracts established over long-standing 
business relationships due to  the political pressure of the EU. Specifically, medium sized 
German companies were most affected by the sanctions against Iran. As echoed by 
other political officials, the majority of the business industry argued that conflicts over
52 "Beziehungen Zu Deutschland; "Economic Overview Germany: Market, Productivity, Innovation," ed. 
Germany Trade and Invest (2013).
53 "German-lranian Trade up 7.8 Perecnt," Payvand Iran News, December 2,2008.
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Iran's nuclear program should be solved through diplomatic and political means, not 
economic sanctions. China's exports to  Iran have steadily risen with the sanctions, while 
Germany decreased exports since 2006. Further, the United Arab Emirates has 
increased its exports to  Iran, surpassing Germany in 2008/2009. In 2007, Germany 
announced the desire to offer carrots to  Iran, a proposal which was shut down.
Internally within the EU, soft approaches took a m ajority hold, but were dismissed when  
the U.S. intervened.54 The EU's decision in July 2010 to make sanctions m andatory 
across entire sectors further complicated internal EU division. This, combined w ith the  
EU's gradual change from negotiator to  the right-hand 'body' of the U.S. eventually  
stalled negotiations.
Discussion
As previously mentioned, the economic interest variable for Germany's behavior 
in regards to the German-lranian trade relationship is not significant enough to  argue 
that Germany's policies have been influenced greatly. German exports to  Iran w ere at a 
high in 2005 with € 720 billion, just 0.6 percent of Germany's total export.55 Therefore, 
to make an argument solely on this trade relationship would be flawed. Some analysts 
argue that Germany's adherence to policies that are opposed by the U.S. falls into the  
category of soft balancing; an attem pt to  level or balance American power. Others take  
a more cynical position and explain that by aligning with Iran, Germany secures a
54 Sauer, "Struggling on the World Scene: An over-Ambitious Eu Versus a Committed Iran."
55 Kuntzel, "Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb."
potentially important position in the future of a nuclear hegemonic Iran. Despite these 
possible explanations for Germany's behavior, the most plausible explanation is a 
combination of norms-based behavior and national interests-based behavior. On the  
one hand, Germany has an established foreign policy, continued and constructed over 
the past sixty years and marked by non-confrontational approaches. These approaches, 
to-date, are "fool proof" policy approaches, used in the past w ithout significant 
repercussions or push backs. On the other hand, Germany, as an economic super power 
in Europe, has a high interest in remaining economically strong. Thus, securing future  
alliances and relationships with countries such as China and Russia, enables Germany to  
'play the field' while remaining somewhat neutral in controversial situations. Economic 
and national interests in this case, and arguably possession goals, have an overwhelming  
effect on Germany's foreign and security policy.
While Germany's initial involvement in the negotiations with Iran in 2003 were  
certainly a sign of assuming a leadership role, even showing willingness to  act 
(Gestaltungswille), the progression of the negotiations over the years resulted in 'old 
policies' and consistent behavior. The change observed was merely a shift of 
orientation, or the new constellation of China-Russia-Germany, which can be explained 
as a reaction to the external environment. The changing security environm ent and 
international structure, with the U.S.'s pivot to Asia and slow withdrawal from  the  
European continent, resulted in Germany also refocusing its interest and goals. Beyond 
this, Germany, as most other countries, may simply treat foreign policy issues on a case 
by case basis. The questions asked of Germany's behavior by the international
217
community, to include Germany's ability to project and use power and Germany's ability 
to act responsibly, are not asked of other regional powers. Germany's need to  show 
responsible behavior and W W II guilt are brought into contemporary foreign policy 
discussions continuously due to  a desire to categorize Germany, hopefully as a normal, 
responsible actor. Germany's unwillingness to support U.S. polices, refusal to  consider 
military action, and focus on economic interests while adhering to W W II legacy 
approaches, may also point to Germany's disinterest in foreign and security policy- 
related issues beyond 'checkbook diplomacy'. Germany simply does not have the desire 
to assume an international leadership role.
The economic data which shows the trade relationship and Germany's total 
exports to Iran cannot fully account for Germany's strong opposition for sanctions 
against Iran. While German businesses and economic experts warned against increased 
sanctions, Germany has traditionally adopted a different political approach not focused 
on sanctions, while the U.S. uses sanctions as a default policy tool. Deviation from policy 
occurred when Germany opposed stronger sanctions while rhetorically continuing to  
condemn a nuclear-armed Iran and vowing to support and defend Israel. In the case of 
Iran, Germany's continuous rhetoric did not necessarily match policy approaches, yet 
sanctions do not fit into Germany's role concept. Beyond this, Germany's historical 
legacies in the Gulf regions have resulted in a leadership role for over thirty decades. 
Specifically, Germany negotiated several bilateral agreements with Russia in the 1970 's, 
focused around the concept o f 'wandel durch handel'. As such, Germany has become a 
global actor in economic terms, having interests in political stability in the M iddle East.
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Beyond this, due to Germany's own prescribed nonproliferation stance on a global scale, 
Germany has condemned Iran's nuclear weapons acquisition. Consolidating long-term  
strategic cooperation in the region with Iran, and with Russia and China, is at the  
forefront of Germany's foreign policy interests, thus making stability in Iran a crucial 
factor. Germany's behavior during the negotiations with Iran, exemplify Germany's 
value based and interests driven foreign policy choices.
Summary
The recent relationship between the EU and Iran can be summarized as an 
evolving dialogue that includes a constructive dialogue of securitization of the  issue 
while employing a policy of diplomacy and sanctions, whereby the option of military 
action was discussed. The possibility of w ar does not fall into Europe's normative power 
approach, and EU policy makers therefore tried to  avoid this escalation at all cost, 
instead implementing strong sanctions under the coercive diplomacy fram ework. 
Throughout the process, the E3,EU-3, and EU3+3 have shown a collective voice by 
condemning a nuclear armed Iran, outlining strategic decision approaches on the basis 
of justifications through Iran's actions. The EU's identity as a foreign policy actor and 
global power has been elevated through the negotiations with Iran while staying true to 
its principles of transparency, normative rules and goals, and mostly non-proliferation  
rhetoric. According scholars, the EU's actions within framing the coercive approach as 
part of a normative path, has made the EU exclusivist while failing to address the
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security concerns of regional actors and portraying a asymmetric picture of threat 
analysis.
By examining how alliance solidarity, historical memory, national interests, and 
domestic influence shape German foreign policy in the case of Iran, this case sheds light 
on an area of German foreign policy involving global issues. In hopes of a global zero, 
Germany's constructed nonproliferation identity contributes to Germany's norms-based 
approach in both advocating diplomatic measures as well as opposing a nuclear 
weapons program by Iran. Despite Germany's rhetorical commitment, Germany has 
openly opposed stronger sanctions, siding with Russia. W hile Germany's trade  
relationship with Iran presents the potential to  influence Germany's decision in this 
case, Germany's export to Iran in relation to Germany's total foreign trade is not 
significant enough to make a strong argument for economic based reasons. However, 
Germany's economic relationship with Russia and China may account for Germany's 
overall behavior in both the case of Libya and Iran. National interests, including energy 
security and similar possession goals, contribute to  Germany's overall foreign policy 
strategy while rhetorically committing to continuous and previous patterns of norms- 
based approaches. This case added to  an understanding of Germany's foreign policy 
choices and rhetoric used in regards to Germany's own prescribed nonproliferation  
commitments and norms. Further, this analysis highlighted which factors determ ine  
rhetorical action and practices in regards to nuclear proliferation issues by Germany  
while emphasizing the importance of economic and national interests, especially when  
such interests conflict with components of German foreign policy norms, such as
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alliance solidarity. Unlike in foreign policy issue areas involving the use o f force, this case 
illustrates that historical memory alone does not have the strongest affect o f policy 
decisions.
COMPARISON OF CASES OF GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
The two policy areas under review, out of area operations and nuclear 
nonproliferation, present tw o different cases that are shaped and influenced by several 
variables. W hile obvious variations exist, both policy areas highlighted the international 
community's expectation of Germany in critical situations. In the more recent cases of 
Libya and during the past few  years of the Iranian nuclear program, Germany's 
abstention from the vote and opposition for stronger sanctions resulted in a m ultitude  
of media arguments and analyses referring to  Germany's foreign policy as irresponsible, 
unpredictable, and inconsistent. W hile the Kosovo case was significant in reinterpreting  
Germany's approach to the cases involving the use of force, Iraq, Libya, and Iran all 
stand for instances in which Germany ultim ately chose a path different from  Germany's 
traditional alliance members. W hile Germany's contribution in the Afghanistan w ar has 
been used to emphasize alliance solidarity, deployment caveats, domestic opposition, 
and controversial political debates within Germany hardly make Afghanistan an example 
of Germany's full commitment to the alliance. Rhetorically, German policy makers 
showed commitment in all cases, except Iraq. Unfortunately, the Iraq case resulted in a 
distanced relationship between Germany and the U.S., also 'paralyzing' European 
security strategy and policy. The Libya case highlighted this aftermath clearly as did the
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latter half of the negotiations with Iran among the EU3+3. Further, Germany's position 
aligned with Russia's position in the cases of Iraq, Libya, and Iran, prompting the  
description: 'the new constellation of Russia-China-Germany'. While Germany's 
employed rhetoric was strong across all cases, rhetoric was more controversial and 
more prominently debated in cases involving the use of force. In all cases, rhetorical 
references to W W II legacy was used to explain and justify policy action. Similarly, in the  
cases involving out of area operations and direct implications for Germany's 
Bundeswehr, domestic opinion and opposition was strong and certainly contributed to  
Germany's behavior. Although the cases involving the use of force were rhetorically 
placed under the umbrella of historical memory, economic factors including the cost of 
war and benefit analyses of military intervention were present across all cases.
The major variation in the analysis o f these tw o policy areas lies in the central 
focus of Germany's interests. Or, perhaps, the presented central focus of interests.
W hile Germany's behavior in all cases was explained through norms-based approaches 
that directly fall within Germany's prescribed pattern of foreign policy, a national and 
economic interest argument is certainly valid in cases where Germany showed breaks 
with alliances, instead aligning with Russia. Although Germany has always interpreted its 
powerful position in economic terms, Germany's national interest and economically 
focused behavior during the abstention in Libya and opposition to stronger sanctions in 
Iran has confused some scholars and analysts. According to some scholars, this recent 
behavior shows Germany's lack of responsibility. W hile this may be accurate in terms of 
Germany's position as a security exporter, Germany's behavior can be seen as a reaction
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to the ever-changing international security environment. W ith  Germany's long-standing 
relationship with Russia present throughout the majority o f these cases, and in light o f 
Germany's energy dependency on Russia in the future, it is important to analyze this 
factor in more detail.
Germany's siding with Russia and China in both cases, during the abstention 
from the Libya vote and by opposing tougher sanction on Iran, has resulted in much 
criticism and debate. On the forefront of critique is Germany's acceptance of Russia's 
authoritarian tactics and China's human rights abuses. Often referred to in scholarly 
analyses as either 'bear-huggers' or 'bear-hunters', Germany views and accepts Russia's 
and China's unfortunate regime traits as "a tem porary price for stability" by focusing on 
change through trade towards a liberal free market democracy.55 W hile the Libya case 
highlighted Germany's relationship with Russia, prompting analysts, journalists, and 
scholars to focus on Germany's betrayal of its past allies, the German-Russian 
relationship has been critical for Germany's foreign policy choices fo r several decades. 
During the Schroder government, Germany supported a much critiqued treaty on the  
North Stream gas pipeline, while also building the German-French-Russian opposition to 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq.57 W hile supporting a more reserved approach towards Russia, 
Chancellor Merkel has a known "special relationship" with Russia. Beyond Germany's 
dependence on Russia as an energy exporter, Germany is also Russia's largest trading
56 Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," 104. Also discussed in: Constanze Stelzenmuller, 
"Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe," Foreign Affairs 88, no. 2 (2009).
57 Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," 104.
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partner.58 This puts Germany in a difficult position in navigating political issues with  
Russia, acting as a m ediator between Russian and NATO interests further complicated 
by military "threats" as observed in the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. Germany 
has adopted an approach of ‘Annaherung durch Verflechtung', or "Rapprochement 
through economic interlocking" in order to engage, shape, and influence Russia-EU- 
NATO relations.59 At the forefront of Germany's policy makers, the M inister of Foreign 
Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier emphasized the significance of a 'strategic partnership' 
with Russia, advocating continued engagement w ith Russia and emphasizing the  
importance of cooperation with Russia. This approach has resulted in policies geared 
towards "democracy transfer, energy cooperation, and conflict resolution for Central 
Asia and the Caucasus".60 Similarly, Germany's trade relationship w ith China has steadily 
increased over the past five years. While the majority of German foreign exports, 60 
percent remain in the Eurozone, German exports to  China increased by over 70 percent 
between 2009-2010.61 Experts predict that exports will continue to  rise, especially as EU 
enlargement policy has posed problems in coordinating and implementing trade  
agreements with France. These hurdles to international trade in turn motivate Germany 
to pursue "special relationships" with China and Russia.62
Beyond Germany and Russia's combined energy and trade interests, Russian- 
German cultural history further contributes to this special relationship in which
58 Stelzenmuller, "Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe," 90.
59 "Germany's Russia Question: A New Ostpolitik for Europe," 94.
60 Alexander Rahr, "Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship," The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 2 
(2007): 141.
61 Hans Kundnani, "Germany as a Geo-Economic Power," ibid.34, no. 3 (2011): 36.
62 "Germany as a Geo-Economic Power," The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2011).
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Germany continuously accepts and considers Russia's interests in several foreign policy 
areas over the past decade. This consideration is evident through several policy issue 
areas to include nuclear strategy and missile defense.63 Historically, W illy Brandt's 
Ostpolitik aided in progressing and developing the relationship of the W est to  East 
Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union during the 1970's while Helmut Kohl, during the  
1990's similarly looked to Russia's role in Europe.64 The relationship between Russia and 
the EU took a turn in 2006 when Russia did not ratify the Energy Charter, raising gas 
prices, and using Europe's reliance of Russia's energy to influence political outcomes. 
Russia has therefore presented a much debated factor in EU politics, resulting in 
diverging positions from traditional policies of containment to  constructive 
engagement.65 Despite this, political analysts are convinced that "there is no realistic 
scenario available in which Russian natural gas is not a dominant feature of European 
energy supply", especially for Germany due to  Nord Stream, the pipeline running from  
Russia to  Germany through the Baltic Sea.66 Critics within the EU have pointed to  the  
problems surrounding the launch of Nord Stream in 2011, specifically the fear that the  
EU may become too dependent on Russian energy imports, in turn giving Russia political 
leverage over important disputes. Former Chancellor Schroder, in an interview with the  
German newspaper Handelsblatt addressed these critiques arguing that while 25 
percent of EU gas imports come from Russia, 60 percent of Russia's total gas exports are
63 Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally."
64 Rahr, "Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship."
65 Ibid.
66 Tim Boersma, "European Energy Security and the Role o f Russia," The German Marshall Fund o f the 
United States, July 2013, 2.
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received by the EU, making Russia dependent on the EU.67 In January 2014, the EU and 
Russia agreed on another gas pipeline, South Stream, set to fulfill 15 percent of Europe's 
natural gas requirement by 2018.68 As previously argued, Germany's focus on costly 
renewable energy sources combined with recent approaches of rethinking and reducing 
Germany's nuclear energy, further contributes to Germany's interests in energy security 
and continued partnership with Russia. Despite this, Germany is far from depending on 
Russia for energy. At this point, the Russian-German energy relationship can be 
understood as almost symmetrically interdependent and mutually beneficial, especially 
with new and emerging energy markets globally.
As most countries, Germany considers cost-benefit analyses and risks associated 
with military action. This was especially true for the Libya case, during which German  
politicians expressed fear of prolonged engagement and com m itm ent similar to  
Afghanistan. Unfortunately, most of these cases also contribute to Germany's partners 
expecting the 'Nein' from the onset of new foreign policy issue areas, especially 
surrounding the use of force. This stance is then interpreted by German critics as well as 
the international community as a continuous refusal to support out o f area operations 
militarily, regardless of the case; also recently evident in the cases of Syria and M ali.69
67 "In Der Energiepolitik Sind GroBe Fehler Gemacht W orden"-lnterview with Gerhard Schroder," 
Handelsblatt, August 1, 2011, own translation. Accessed January 21, 2014, 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/altkanzler-schroeder-im -interview-in-der- 
energiepolitik-sind-grosse-fehler-gemacht-worden/4452406.html.
68 "Eu Gives Gazprom Preliminary 'Ok' for South Stream Gas Pipeline," RT News, January 20, 2014, 
accessed January 22, 2014, http://rt.com /business/eu-gazprom -south-stream -881/.
69 Germany opposed military intervention in Syria and only agreed to  engagement with Mali once ensured 
that no military commitment from Germany was necessary. Bittner et al., "Wir Tun Doch Nix..." own 
translation.
Germany's abstention from the vote for Libya can be seen as a sequential case of a 
commitment to non-intervention. Germany's position aligned with Russia's; Russian 
President Vladimir Putin condemned any military intervention of Libya and threatened  
to veto UNSC sanctions against Syria.70 Beyond this constellation, some scholars have 
attributed Germany's recent behavior in these cases to a lack of strategic consideration. 
In the past, Germany acted as a negotiator within NATO and the EU, striving for 
consensus and agreement, whereas the Germany of the past decade turned into a "nay- 
sayer", choosing the status quo "strategy by default" within NATO.71 The more 
controversial cases of Iraq, Libya, and Iran also highlight the internal struggle in 
Germany to consolidate and clarify Germany's strategy within the international world 
order. This further reflects on and transcends to disagreements within the EU over 
either supporting a more "pluralist world of multiple and sometimes competing sets of 
values or a liberal world of democracy".72
Overall, while domestic issues in Germany have trum ped foreign policy issues in 
the 2000s, including the pension system, federalism, and the labor market, domestic 
influence on controversial foreign policy areas involving the use of force directs 
Germany policy makers' position. Germany's policies reflect the lack of domestic, 
financial, and political support combined with an ever increasing unwillingness to  take
70 "Putin: Libya Intervention Is Like 'Crusades’," Huffington Post, March 21, 2011. It is im portant to note 
that Russia and Syria have an important trade relationship; over the span o ften  years, Russia exported 
$1.5 billion in arms to Syria. For more on this, please see "Why Russia Supports Assad," The New  York 
Times, February 9, 2012.
71 Keller, "Germany in Nato: The Status Quo Ally," 106.
72 Sten Rynning, "Peripheral or Powerful? The European Union's Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons," European Security 16, no. 3-4 (2007): 284.
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financial and military risks. Especially in the case of Libya, Germany's contribution to  an 
intervention would have resulted in a potentially heavy burden for the  purpose of 
fulfilling a foreign policy objective, regardless how imperative this objective may be to  
alliance solidarity and international peace. This consideration is a combination of 
factors, beliefs, and norms, which have survived the  structural changes of the past tw o  
to three decades. John Duffield's argument, made over ten years ago, still holds true in 
spite of Germany's recent political behavior: "German society as a whole and German 
political elites in particular, can be characterized as possessing a distinctive, widely  
shared, and rather elaborate set of beliefs and values of potentially great relevance to  
national security policy, which w ere little altered by unification. The existence of this 
political culture has contributed to a high degree of consensus on security issues since
1990" 7 3
On a side note, and within the overall them e of historical m emory on which this 
dissertation is based upon, it is im portant to  mention that Germany's historical memory 
is not only used by Germany to justify and explain foreign policy behavior, but has also 
been used by the international community to  point to and remind Germany of its 
horrendous past. This was most recently evident during the Greek debt crisis and Angela 
Merkel's behavior during the bailout. According to  some scholars, historical m em ory- 
based rhetoric has been employed to direct and influence German policy while also
73 Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy 
after Unification, 61. This consensus is certainly not evident internally, especially the Bundestag debates 
during and after the Libya abstention. Despite this, a majority vote was reached in all cases, therefore  
arguable reflecting an overall consensus for Germany towards these security issues.
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presenting Germany as an unreliable partner. W hile 'the German question', at one 
point, was resolved with the help o f the U.S., the case of Libya and the opposition to  
stronger sanctions for Iran resulted in a renewed asking, inquiry, and analysis of 
whether Germany can be trusted to  be a responsible ally. Thematically throughout 
these analyses, the domestic influence variable is present, especially in relation to 
German elections. Scholars wonder w hether Germany's behavior in some cases is a 
direct result of the Merkel government pressure to  conform to electorate demands. 
Parallels of foreign policy behavior to  German elections are certainly evident. M ore  
specifically, during the height of the Greek sovereign debt crisis of 2010, Chancellor 
Merkel focused on the election in the state o f North Rhine-Westphalia, while the  
elections of Baden-Wurtenberg in March 2011 coincided w ith  the case of Libya.74 
Despite this potential factor, Germany's behavior involving the use of force, and even 
the potential for military action in the Iran case, is rhetorically explained through  
Germany's adherence to post-W W II legacy of restraint, antimilitarism, constructive 
engagement, and the diplomatic dialogue. Economic and national interests reasons are 
not given to justify policy choices.
APPLICATION OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
Despite the structural changes of the end of the Cold War, German foreign policy 
has been marked by a large degree of continuity. This has puzzled scholars and resulted 
in an ongoing debate about Germany's use of power, Germany as a civilian power, and
74 Cohen, "Merkel in Miniature."
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Germany as a normal power, while attem pting to  group Germany's foreign policy 
approaches into theoretical frameworks. As discussed in chapter three o f this 
dissertation, scholars within the field of international relations continue to struggle to  
analytically explain, account, and predict Germany's behavior. I argue that this is mainly 
due to Germany's history, which continues to guide foreign policy choices despite 
structural changes. German identity and culture directly shape and influence the  
perception and interests of policy makers and the domestic population, and in turn, the  
external environment. As Germany has entirely reconstructed its identity and policy 
approach after W W II, a distinct set of values and beliefs within political culture 
emerged. More specifically, and mostly relevant to  this analysis is Germany's culture of 
restraint which poses an important aspect and obstacle to  Germany's national security 
policy. This culture of restraint has, is, and continues to lim it and influence Germany's 
ability to project and use power internationally. As such, instead of focusing on 
traditional projection of power through military capabilities, Germany placed great 
value on continuity, transparency, and restraint while advocating m ultilateral 
approaches.75 How then can Germany's recent behavior, breaking the alliance solidarity 
of previous years, be explained theoretically? Is Germany pursuing possession goals and 
national interests as explained by realism? This section will address the scholarly input 
of theoretical analyses described in the third chapter and apply the concepts for the 
selected theories, structural realism, liberalism, and constructivism, to  the cases
75 Of course, some of these restraints are due to the afterm ath of W W II and limits placed on Germany by 
the alliance.
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selected for this dissertation in order to  further an understanding of Germany's foreign 
policy role concept.
The interaction of structure and agency is evident when analyzing Germany's 
behavior in a variety of foreign and security policy areas. Germany as a 'civilian power', 
has worked within these structures and through institutional approaches to shape its 
external environment. While the historical institutional approach points to  Germany's 
path-dependency, sociological institutionalism outlines Germany's 'logic of 
appropriateness' within a civilian power fram ew ork.76 The first decade after unification, 
scholars focused on conceptions of Germany's use of power, explaining and 
understanding the use thereof within a civilian power and institutional fram ework. 
Kosovo called for a reinterpretation on the use of force, while Iraq resulted in debates of 
soft-balancing and changed national interests. Constructivism can highlight for the  
importance of historical memory, identity, culture, and norms in shaping German  
foreign policy behavior, but does not fully account for variations in cases, such as Libya. 
Scholars have therefore struggled to apply theoretical frameworks to the political 
culture of Germany, resulting in the continuous emergence of 'the German question'. 
While structure has appeared to  dictate and direct German behavior in military policy 
areas, agency, especially in the realm of shaping the development of the EU, is also 
evident. Germany's Ostpolitik is an example an example o f agency in that, while 
Ostpolitik also aligned with Europapolitik o f the tim e, specific Eastern Treaties
76 Tom Dyson, "Civilian Power and 'History-Making1 Decisions: German Agenda-Setting on Europe," 
European Security 11, no. 1 (2002).
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eliminated Germany's reliance on interlocutors when engaging Eastern European 
countries, while simultaneously giving W est Germany a decision-granting leadership 
role.77 Beyond structure and agency, the crucial importance of the external 
environment, inclusive of constraints, has a causal effect on how Germany operates, 
behaves, and votes internationally.
Scholars theoretically explain and understand the majority of German behavior 
through the evolution of Germany's role concept as the 'good citizen' based on the 'rule 
of appropriateness'.78 Also focusing on the influence of the external environm ent and 
structure on German foreign policy, some scholars theoretically examine Germany's 
policy in relation to those of the U.S., explaining Germany's 'bandwagoning' and 'soft- 
balancing' adjustments in the past while pointing to  the inherently conflicting identity 
and role concepts in the direction of U.S. and German leadership approaches. Most 
scholars agree that a shift in course to return to traditional power politics by Germany is 
highly unlikely. Moreover, within a theoretical fram ework, a review of the cases 
selected for this dissertation further emphasizes the inability of international relations 
theories to fully explain and account for the observed variance in German foreign and 
security policy. Understanding and exclaiming Germany's behavior in Iraq, Libya, and 
during the economic crisis as a 'sudden change' in Germany's foreign policy would be 
highly overstated. Theoretically, Germany's behavior can be understood through an 
examination of how closely Germany matches its prescribed role concepts.
77 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 43.
78 Harald Muller, "Germany and Wmd Proliferation," The Nonproliferation Review (2003): 18.
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Constructivism, by emphasizing the importance of identity, norm, and constructed 
patterns of foreign policy, can account for several cases. First and foremost, the Iraq 
case did not show a return to traditional power politics and (soft) balancing measures, 
but serves as a prime example of Germany acting based on historically established 
norms, marked by a more independent foreign policy approach. M ore specifically, the  
concept of 'never alone' and to  operate within a multilateral fram ework of allies 
combined with the role of the UN in legitimizing the use of force, emphasizes Germany's 
traditional pattern of foreign policy application and importance thereof for policy areas 
involving military operation.79
The EU's approach to Iran's nuclear program, theoretically explained through the  
concept of coercive diplomacy, along with nonproliferation theory and the  idea of 
'normative power Europe' further contribute to the explanation of the EU's and 
Germany's action toward Iran, with an underlying urgency to  avoid cost at all times  
while also staunchly opposing nuclear proliferation by Iran. Several scholars analyzing 
the EU's policies, point to issues of legitimacy, especially in regards to  NPT agreements 
and the double-standards applied to certain countries. Tom Sauer's analysis o f coercive 
diplomacy practices by the EU toward Iran's nuclear program provide a theoretical 
fram ework for understanding and explaining the EU's foreign policy choices over the  
past ten years in regards to Iran. Germany's relationship with Russia, and aligning of 
position with Russia in the cases of Iraq, Iran, and Libya, can be understood through 
economic and liberal instutionalist terms. Namely, Keohane and Nye's articulation of
79 Dettke, Germany Says "No". The Iraq W ar and the Future o f German Foreign and Security Policy.
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interdependence, the "relationship among economics, politics, and patterns of 
institutionalized cooperation" in combination with power and interests, can shed light 
on Germany's and Russia's mutual dependency on each other.80 The cost of hurting and 
severing this relationship would result in major economic and political losses for both 
countries, while continued cooperation and engagement can prolong the shadow of the 
future, as outlined by institutionalism. W hile Germany certainly has several such 
relationships, Libya, Iraq, and Iran showed Germany's will to  break with long-term  
alliance members. Germany's use of constructive diplomacy and emphasis on trade can 
be seen as tools to shape politics by having leverage in specific policy areas. As such, 
Germany has been able to assume the role of negotiator and mediator while shaping its 
external environment, specifically the EU, through strategic diplomacy and economic 
influence in line with Joseph's Nye theoretical articulation of 'soft power' approaches.81
Most scholars who theoretically examine Germany's foreign policy agree that 
Germany confounds neorealism.82 As discussed previously, scholars attem pt to combine 
approaches or formulate news schools of thought geared at accounting for the variance 
between the changing international environment and Germany's prescribed continuity, 
in both rhetoric and action. In recent years, Germany has altered its policy approach 
gradually while political rhetoric remained unchanged. Frank Schimmelfennig discusses 
and explains this phenomenon, for the enlargem ent of the EU, through the concept of
80 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 3rd ed. 
(New York: Longman, 2001).
81 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004).
82 John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: W hy Germany Confounds Neorealism," 
International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999).
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the 'community trap' of liberal norms and rhetorical action'.83 Once political elites have 
committed to community through rhetoric, outlined identity, ideas, and norms have to  
remain constant. As such, policy makers vote and behave within this community in 
order to ensure legitimacy and protect reputation. W hether or not German policy 
makers at this point internalize the components that constitute German identity, 
strategic culture, and W W II legacy is almost irrelevant to  the theoretical explanation of 
these cases, as causality extends to collective community values for all German citizens. 
Indeed, German identity has been constructed for several years and a denial of the  
influence of such identity and linking to  the culture of restraint would critically 
undermine any plausible explanation for Germany's foreign policy behavior. The 
importance of the cultural approach in international relations theories is exemplified by 
the case of Germany.
The continuity in rhetoric, as a critical discourse, is employed by German policy 
makers to justify and explain behavior based on the normative principles adopted after 
W W II. In previous years, and in the cases under review for this dissertation, this rhetoric 
has not matched Germany's policy action entirely. While rhetorical com m itm ent to 
alliance solidarity occurred in all cases except Iraq and is part of Germany's constructed 
norms, other norms, such as Germany's domestically accepted norm of antimilitarism, 
resulted in a conflict in norms, causing 'inconsistent' policies. According to  some
83 Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern 
Enlargement of the European Union," ibid.55, no. 1 (2001).
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scholars, these sets of beliefs trum p any drive for leadership, or great power relevance 
in foreign and security policy.
Germany's behavior opposing any military com m itm ent and the use of force by 
German soldiers has been the norm for over ten years, regardless of location and case. 
While the reasons given by German policy makers differed in each case slightly, the  
underlining tone refers back to political decisions far preceding the cases in question.84 
While this may be frustrating and difficult to understand and explain, Germany's 
behavior, German politicians' mindset, and Germany's domestic opinion continues to  be 
influenced and guided by pacifism and military culture of restraint due to  fears of 
militarizing foreign policy. The gradual transformation of Germany's foreign policy, 
regardless of influential variable, can also be explained through the constructivist notion 
that norms and prescribed patterns of behavior can change: patterns of rhetoric, policy, 
or behavior that seem to differ from  continuous foreign policy that has traditionally 
been in line with Germany's norms are, over tim e, reinterpreted. This can be measured 
by Germany's willingness to  use force unilaterally and w ithout international legitimacy 
in the Kosovo case. Further, in order for Germany to  agree and adopt the policies of its 
allies, especially in the case of Iran, Libya, and Iraq, Germany's approaches have to make 
a realist turn which conflicts with Germany's role concepts. A problem within the 
constructivist theory of international relations has been explaining why, how, and when 
political norms emerge. Further, it is difficult to analyze why certain actors conform to
84 Bittner et al., "W ir Tun Doch Nix...".
236
constructed norms despite material constraints.85 Other scholars argue that for 
Germany, these constraints are not material or structural, rather normative only, as 
Germany's Nazi past became an example of violating norms, which can be analyzed 
theoretically through system level variables.86
Germany's recent international behavior has prompted a valid question: Is 
Germany becoming more 'realist'? Germany's relationship with Russia and China, 
Germany's position as the third largest arms exporter, and Germany's behavior during 
Iraq, Libya, Iran, and the European economic crisis all pose interesting cases to  
Germany's focus on national interests. Moreover, while Germany has traditionally  
pursued milieu goals, it most specifically served German interests over those of Europe, 
especially within the economic realm.87 Further, a realist notion of balancing or soft 
balancing approaches employed by Germany is flawed. Germany is not focused on 
balancing U.S. power, rather, Germany's policies are an adopted reaction to  the  
changing platform of alliances in order to  continue Germany's role and ability to  
negotiate its interests. The variable o f 'alliance solidarity' is therefore a preference 
route, but far from unconditional, as exemplified by the cases selected for this 
dissertation.
Scholars using the neorealist, or structural realist approach explain and predict 
Germany's foreign policy behavior in relation to its power, through power politics while
85 Krebs and Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power or Political Rhetoric."
86 James Sperling, "Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post Cold-War 
Europe," British Journal o f Political Science 31, no. 2 (2001).
87 Sperling, "The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic: The Very Model of a Post-Modern M ajor Power? A 
Review Essay".
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the liberalist theory of international relations focuses on sub-systemic determinants to  
foreign and security policy behavior.88 The underlying argument of the school of 
liberalism is tha t the interests of domestic actors shape and influence policy, while  
constructivism claims that behavior is shaped by social norms, more specifically, value- 
based collective ideas about 'appropriate behavior' rather than a logic of 
consequentially.89 In order to evaluate each theory's ability to explain, account, and 
predict Germany's foreign policy behavior, the  below table will depict the theoretical 
argument and prediction and the weaknesses in relation to  the cases selected for this 
analysis.
88 Rittberger, German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies.
89 German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, 105.
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Table 6: Theoretical Analysis of German Foreign Policy
Kosovo
(Combat
troops)
Iraq
(Opposition
)
Afghanistan
(Participation with 
caveats)
Libya
(Opposition)
Iran
(Varied)
Structural
Realism
Emphasis on 
Germany's 
power position
Prediction/ExDe
ctation:
autonomy,
lowering
Bundeswehr
integration into
NATO, hard
balance,
strengthening
of national
military
capabilities. Out 
of area troops 
should remain 
under German 
command.
Would 
predict no 
participation 
(German 
security not 
affected, no 
territorial 
attack)
Would 
predict no 
participatio 
n
(autonomy,
no
repercussio 
ns for 
Germany's 
security, no 
threat, not 
close in 
proximity)
Would predict no 
participation 
(autonomy, lowering 
integration in NATO, 
only few
repercussions for 
German security, no 
threat, not close in 
proximity)
Would
predict no
participation
(autonomy,
reduce
NATO
integration, 
German 
security is 
not
affected, no 
threat on 
territory)
Would 
predict 
opposition to 
use of force 
but would 
predict 
pursuit of 
power 
politics and 
influence on 
other
international
actors
Liberalism
(Utilitarian
Liberalism/lnstit
utional
Liberalism)
Emphasis on
domestic
interests/cost
analysis
Prediction/ExDe
ctation:
Integration into
NATO, no
increase in
national
military
capabilities,
defining
Germany's
security
interests
Would 
predict no 
participation 
(support 
only)
Influenced
by prospect
of re-
election/
domestic
interest/high
cost. Instead
financial
support-
checkbook
diplomacy
Would 
predict no 
participatio 
n (support 
only)
Influenced 
by prospect 
of re- 
election/ 
domestic 
interests/ 
high cost
W ould predict no 
participation 
(support only for 
alliance solidarity 
and to strengthen 
institutions)
Influenced by 
prospect o f re­
election/domestic/in  
terest/high cost. 
Instead, financial 
support-checkbook 
diplomacy
Would 
predict no 
participation 
(support 
only)
Influenced 
by prospect 
of re­
election/do 
mestic 
interest/pot 
entially high 
cost. Instead 
financial 
support- 
checkbook 
diplomacy
Cost-benefit
analysis,
participation
in
negotiation, 
non­
participation 
in military 
operation
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Table 6: Continued
Kosovo
(Combat
troops)
Iraq
(Opposition
)
Afghanistan
(Participation with 
caveats)
Libya
(Opposition)
Iran
(Varied)
Constructivism Would Would Would predict Would Would
predict no predict no participation based predict predict
Emphasis on participation participatio on norms: alliance participation participation
socialnorms (violation of n (violation solidarity, legitimacy based on in
and beliefs international of and if strong norms of negotiation.
law; but internation peacekeeping internationa Would not
Prediction/Expe norms al law) mission. 1 law and predict
ctation allowed for humanitaria military
humanitarian n intervention.
Socialization intervention) intervention
process. (peacekeepi
collective ng vs peace-
identity which enforcing)
can lead to
security
communities
Source: The prediction criteria was adopted from a 2001 publication by Volker Rittberger focusing on 
Kosovo).90
Structural realism cannot account for Germany's readiness to participate in out 
of area operations (Kosovo and Afghanistan) while further integrating the Bundeswehr 
into NATO. Liberalism can also not fully explain Germany's participation in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan. Constructivism would predict German participation in Libya, fulfilling the  
norms for human intervention and the legitimacy of law; however, constructivism would 
also account for the socially-constructed German identity of antimilitarism that would 
prevent domestic support from committing German soldiers to an operation in Libya. As 
such, constructivism focuses on norms-consistent policies influenced by societal norms, 
liberalism emphasizes the causal effect of domestic interests and preferences on gain- 
seeking policy approaches, while structural realism focuses on how Germany's power
90 German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, 176.
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position influences an autonomy seeking-based foreign policy.91 Similarly to  Ostpolitik, 
policies involving the use of force, reflects a continuous social process influenced by the 
norms adopted by policy makers and domestic population and theoretically explained 
by constructivism.92
Structural realism fails almost entirely in explaining and correctly predicting 
German behavior, while liberalism also cannot account for Germany's participation in 
out of area operations. Liberalism correctly emphasizes Germany's focus on foreign 
trade policy and the influence of domestic interests on foreign and security policy. 
Constructivism can largely account for the cases under review by emphasizing 
Germany's distinctive political culture and norms-based behavior. For the case of Libya, 
constructivism would predict participation of German troops based on the strong 
peacekeeping character of the mission based on human rights violations, combined with  
international legitimacy through UNSC Resolution 1973, and multilateral participation. 
The majority of the cases under review fall into the  pattern o f value-based and 
interests-driven foreign policy behavior explained theoretically through norms- 
consistent foreign policy approaches. This behavior can be understood through the  
constructivist notion of appropriate behavior based on shared values and domestic 
expectation. Further, constructivist scholars use non-m aterial factors, such as culture, 
ideas, and values, to explain and predict Germany's foreign policy behavior, succeeding
91 German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies.
92 For more on Ostpolitik, continuity, and the constructivist approach, see Joost Kleuters, "Between 
Continuity and Change: Ostpolitik and the Constructivist Approach Revisited," German Politics 18, no. 4  
(2009).
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in most cases under review. This, combined with the influence of domestic interests, not 
the distribution of power, can theoretically account for some of Germany's policy 
approaches. Falling under the constructivist notion of norms, culture, and identity, 
historical memory continues to shape and influence both rhetoric and action. Despite 
some initial changes in Germany's foreign policy beginning with the out of area 
operations in Kosovo, and most recently, when Germany abolished conscription in 2011, 
the majority of the cases under review were marked by continuity with slight changes, 
whereby none of the theories selected can fully account for Germany's behavior.93
Summary
Germany's recent behavior in international politics has led some scholars to 
suggest that a de-Europeanization has occurred in Germany's approach to foreign and 
security policy. For both policy areas, out of area operations and nuclear 
nonproliferation, the cases under review highlight Germany's approach of value-based  
and interests-driven foreign policy. The methodology applied to the cases focused on 
the importance of four selected independent variables: alliance solidarity, historical 
memory and W W II legacy, domestic influence, and national and economic interests. The 
values that drive and shape German foreign policy can be attributed to Germany's 
difficult past, directly resulting in a continuous com m itm ent to  the culture of restraint. 
Values, culture, and norms are difficult to compromise, especially when involving
93 Conscription was suspended in July 2011. Per Germany's constitution, conscription may be legally 
reintroduced.
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domestic opinion, and further prove to  be non-negotiable at times. This is specifically 
evident in cases involving German Bundeswehr participation for military intervention. As 
such, Germany has largely adhered to  its policy approaches of antimilitarism, shying 
away from participating in out o f area operations while simultaneously only 
strengthening alliance solidarity through rhetorical commitment. These case studies 
further highlighted Germany's singularity and distinctive intersection of guilt and 
responsibility in relation to the demands of the current international security 
environment.
W hat then does this mean for Germany as a potentially 'normal' actor and how  
can we theoretically understand Germany's actions? Germany's behavior can certainly 
not be compared to  France or Great Britain. Some scholars argue that to  Germany and 
Germans, the definition of security is "inconsistent w ith even the weakest form of the  
realist argument" while others explain that the shifts in German foreign policy after 
Kosovo have been political and symbolic rather than militarily.94 Germany's view and 
understanding of its power is still heavily debated; on the one hand some scholars 
declare that Germany is not 'normal' due to Germany's past and German elites' 
unwillingness to act on national interests while on the other hand scholars argue that 
Germany's behavior has become indeed 'normal' as part of the institutionalization
94 Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, The German Predicam ent: M em ory and Power in the New Europe 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), 11. Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian 
Power1?."
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within the EU.95 As such, the theoretical debate about Germany's foreign policy after 
unification addressed how Germany's changing power position influences international 
politics. Scholars wondered whether Germany's approaches could still be understood in 
'civilian power' terms, or whether Germany would become a 'normal' power. The cases 
reviewed for this dissertation showed that German power is still defined largely in terms 
of its post-WWII norm including a com m itm ent to  multilateral approaches and 
adherence to the culture of restraint. However, Germany's abstention in the Libya case, 
opposition to stronger sanctions for Iran, and recent behavior during the bailout crisis in 
Europe, show instances where national and economic interests were considered and 
prioritized, therefore acting more 'norm al', especially due to Germany's relationship 
with Russia.
Germany's relationship with Russia and China and 'siding' with Russia in three  
cases, Iraq, Libya, and the opposition to  stronger sanctions for Iran, highlight Germany's 
economic consideration when debating foreign policy areas. While Germany's foreign 
and security behavior show definite changes, which are likely to continue, these changes 
should not be attributed to Germany practicing or exercising power in realist terms. 
Germany's 'changed' and 'surprising' behavior in recent issue areas can be explained as 
a reaction to changing external security environment. This is also reflected by the  
changing environment within the EU, to include the EU Growth and Stability Pact and
95 Mary N. Hampton, "The Past, Present, and the Perhaps. Is Germany a 'Normal Power'?," Security 
Studies 10, no. 2 (2001). Katzenstein, Tamed Power: Germany in Europe. Regina Karp, "Germany: A 
'Normal' Global Actor?," German Politics 18, no. 1 (2009).
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the strengthened relationship to Russia and China due to  economic problems.96 
Germany has therefore examined its foreign policy approaches based on economic 
considerations and defined its national interests in economic terms while justifying the  
lack of military participation internationally through historical memory-based 
explanations. Some analysts have pointed to  these economic considerations, especially 
when detailing the difficulty in explaining and understanding Germany's foreign policy 
theoretically in recent years. Germany's pursuit of national and economic interests both 
internationally and in Europe, combined with a continued unwillingness to  use force, 
were summarized as an example of "a geo-economic power".97 The reciprocal 
manipulation between the German state and the business world in which German firms 
directly lobby to  the government for policies which advance their interests and then  
contributes to economic growth, shed light on Germany's geo-economic power 
approach towards international politics.98
While Germany's civilian power identity was particularly strong during the  
1990's, the breaks with multilateralism in the past decade along with Germany's use of 
its institutional power to reach national interests based goals weakened the civilian 
power concept as a framework to understand German foreign and security policy. 
Germany' special relationship with Russia and China, Germany's focus on national 
interests outlined in economic concepts, and Germany's careful choosing of
96 Marco Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," SAIS Review 25, no. 2 (Summer- 
Fall 2005).
97 Kundnani, "Germany as a Geo-Economic Power."
98 Ibid.
multilaterally-based policies continue to emphasize that Germany may indeed be 
changing into a 'normal' actor, with the one exception of Germany's refusal to  
participate in out of area military operations. The analysis and application of the  
selected variables shows that alliance solidarity is im portant and evident through 
rhetorical commitment. Further, while historical memory can account for Germany's 
rhetoric and action during several cases involving the use of force, the historical 
memory variable was only present rhetorically during the case of Iran. Moreover, 
historical memory entered the political discussion in the Iran case when military options 
were debated, thus not determining all areas of German foreign policy. A comparison of 
both cases highlighted Germany's national interests, specifically Germany's focus on 
economic goals. Moreover, Germany understands and exercises power through an 
institutional framework with a focus on maintaining and growing economic power 
through previous alliances or newer relationships. Theoretically, German foreign policy 
is difficult to analyze and understand. Constructivism, w ith a focus on normative 
explanations, can account for Germany's emphasis of culture, beliefs, and norms in 
foreign policy approaches, but lacks in explaining the case of Libya fully.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION
SUMMARY
This dissertation examined how  and when historical memory has influenced, 
shaped, and informed contemporary German foreign and security policy and rhetoric by 
examining cases within tw o policy areas. The first policy area, out of area operations 
and the use of force, showed that cases are still largely explained and justified based on 
the culture of restraint, referring back to  historical m emory and W W II legacy. This is 
evident in policy makers' use of rhetoric as well as policy action, which has remained  
antimilitaristic in nature. While this dissertation hypothesized that Germany has a 
ritualized foreign and security policy and rhetoric determ ined by historical memory, 
several other independent variables besides historical memory were included in the  
research. Alliance solidarity and com m itm ent to multilateral organizations was evident 
in Kosovo and Afghanistan while rhetorical com m itm ent to Germany's alliance occurred 
in Libya. The case of Iraq proved to be the first case with a clear break w ith Germany's 
alliance. The domestic influence variable accounted for the importance of German  
public opinion, especially during political debates surrounding use of force cases. 
Germany's national interests, in both policy areas, were marked by economic 
strongholds, reflecting Germany's view and use of institutional power to  serve German 
goals. The cost and benefit of committing German troops was certainly included in all 
cases, especially in light of current Bundeswehr reforms. The research into out of area
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operations also included an analysis of Germany's engagement and responsibility. Here, 
the case of Afghanistan was used to  highlight Germany's involvement in international 
conflicts. Furthermore, rhetoric was analyzed and examined in all cases, while the policy 
action in each case was grouped into categories o f change.
This dissertation argued that use of force cases are sequential and fall into 
Germany's prescribed pattern of foreign and security policy and reflects Germany's and 
understanding of power. Germany's behavior can be explained as a reaction to  its 
external environment whereby selective use of historical memory has become 
instrumental in explaining, informing, and justifying foreign policy choices for out of 
area operations. Historical memory was not the most influential variable in the policy 
area involving nuclear nonproliferation in the case of Iran. Here, historical memory was 
only considered in relation to potential military options. Domestic influence, although 
not as strong as during cases involving the use of force, was influential in the Iran case 
by focusing on the separation of politics and business. W hile similarities between the  
policy areas and cases are evident, German policy makers may simply trea t foreign 
policy issues on a case by case basis. Furthermore, Germany's relationship with Russia, 
and China, was highlighted in the cases of Iraq, Libya, and Iran and falls into the category 
of national and economic interests. Here, an argument can be made for an adjustment 
to policy in order to serve Germany's interests. The evidence in all cases showed that 
there are certain ritualized recourses, often informed by historical memory and other 
times influenced by national interests.
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An argument was made that Germany may not be interested in taking a 
leadership role in foreign policy issue areas, especially in use of force cases. Germany 
uses institutional power to  shape the outcome of policies and to influence behavior in 
cases of interests to Germany, usually within the economic realm. This dissertation also 
examined the validity of international relations theories to explain and predict German 
foreign policy, and found that no theory entirely encompasses the state of German 
politics. Constructivism, with its focus on norms-based behavior, can account for the  
influence of historical memory on contemporary German foreign and security policy, but 
lacks in explaining Germany's abstention on the vote of Libya. This research included an 
examination of scholarly and media analysis about Germany's continuity and change in 
each case. While the majority of scholars criticize Germany's recent behavior, referring 
to recent policies as an 'identity crisis', others argue that Germany can afford to act 
based on national interests.
The cases of Libya and Iran further showed the difficulty over EU policy, 
reflecting an overall split over EU goals. The most recent discontent with Germany's 
behavior was catapulted with Germany's abstention from  Libya, arguably the most 
controversial of all decisions under review. The Libya case also showed the potential 
effects of insufficient diplomatic dialogue. M ore specifically, Germany's decision to  
abstain was made before, and unknowingly of, the United State's changed position to  
establish a no-fly zone. As such, it is im portant to rem em ber that Germany certainly 
continues to  consider its W estern alliances. W hether Germany would have changed its 
vote in light of new information is up to debate; however, Germany, more than any
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other country, needs the ability to fully debate and weigh its options in cases involving 
the use of force. Historical memory, the culture o f restraint, and the intersection of 
responsibility and guilt are sure to remain in place when out of area operations are 
debated within the Bundestag.
This dissertation argued that an understanding of German foreign and security 
policy, especially in regards to out o f area military operations, must include the elem ent 
of historical memory. Germany's history is simply too compelling to  ignore. The issue of 
historical memory is very much alive in contemporary German culture and politics, 
evident through the multitude of television shows, movies, and book releases.1 In most 
cases, the holocaust is treated as a singularity. This study emphasizes th a t the  enduring 
influence of Germany's shameful past results in certain ritualized recourses in political 
behavior. Therefore, there is no new status quo in German foreign and security policy. 
Rather, the slight change that German foreign policy is undergoing is still in process. 
German foreign policy is headed towards an era of self-serving interests while keeping 
within the fram ework of the European Union. German interests are sure to  remain 
economically driven while policies involving the use of force are destined to result in 
lengthy debates, marked by past experiences. Germany's difficulty in resolving its guilt 
with the demands of responsibility are also likely to  continue, especially for out of area 
operations. Here, domestic opinion and influence certainly affect how policy makers
1 Most recently, in 2013, the three parts, widely viewed, TV miniseries, "Our mothers, our fathers"
(Unsere Mutter, Unsere Vater) resulted in much controversy, praise, and criticism. The series tells the  
story of five German friends during their tim e in Nazi Germany and W W II. The series was released in the  
U.S. in January 2014 under the title Generation War.
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behave internationally. This is highlighted by the lack of rhetorical descriptions of w ar in 
German political commentary, inclusive of the rare use of the word 'war' (Krieg) itself. 
Instead, German policy makers refer to  operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere as 
'armed conflict' and 'humanitarian intervention' while focusing on Germany's 
development and peace keeping role. As such, this study showed and argued that cases 
involving the use of force, namely Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya fall into a linear 
sequence of foreign policy pattern, not marked by significant changes or revolutionary 
alteration of previously held ideas.
Historical memory and ritualized rhetoric is used depending on policy area, 
allowing Germany to present reason, argument, and justification to a variety of 
international security challenges, either to support or oppose military involvement by 
German soldiers. As such, political necessities may be converted into and explained by 
normative beliefs. Germany's use of force, beyond ability and capability, is sure to  
remain a question of political will and required to be debated thoroughly. This demands 
time and cooperation among allies, transparency, and continued multilateral 
communication. Furthermore, W W II legacies are no longer solely owned by Germans, 
but have become an international historical memory, held and remembered differently  
worldwide. It is important to note that 'German questions' have been raised precisely in 
moments when Germany's policies were marked by slight changes, rather than  
continuity. Beginning with unification, refusing military action in Iraq and Libya, 
deployment caveats in Afghanistan, opposition to tougher sanctions for Iran, and 
Germany's behavior during the Greek debt crisis, all contributed to international
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criticism for Germany's European vocation and international responsibility. Medal 
award ceremonies for German soldiers and Germany's patriotic presence during the  
2006 World Cup were further critiqued and analyzed as 'nationalistic'. These 'changes' 
in policy or behavior, although slight, resulted in the  questioning of several im portant 
political concepts: Germany's responsibility, predictability, and reliability. These 
questions, critiques, and analyses are certainly not asked of other nations; evidence of 
Germany's complex political existence.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
W ith a focus on historical memory, culture, and normative behavior, path 
dependency may limit research on Germany's foreign and security policy. Specifically, 
path dependency outlines that certain decisions, or behaviors, often affect subsequent 
decisions. Path dependency can therefore aid in explaining the costs of a reversal in 
policy, especially when specific institutional arrangements are in place.2 W ithin the 
chapter detailing Germany's behavior and policy towards Iran's nuclear program, 
difficulties arose when separating the German voice from the EU voice. Distinct German 
policies only became evident when open opposition to stronger sanctions occurred. 
Similarly, consensus in this dissertation m eant an official consensus of German policy 
makers reached after Bundestag debates. At times this dissertation considered the  
conflicting internal political debates, especially over the use of force; however, the
2 Margaret Levi, "A Model, a Method, a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis," in 
Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, ed. Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman 
(Cambridge University Press: 1997).
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influence of norms and ideas on political decision-making remains difficult to measure. 
To overcome this limitation, this study focused on political rhetoric and statements 
directly relating to Germany's culture o f restraint.
International relations theories have struggled to fully understand, explain, and 
predict German foreign policy behavior, resulting in a lengthy and active debate about 
Germany's use and projection of power after unification. The Kosovo case marked an 
important point in Germany's political history, when consensus was reached to  militarily 
intervene in another country's internal conflict w ithout the legitimacy of the United 
Nations. This action temporarily redefined the im portant concept o f 'never again', while 
propelling Germany's status as a security exporter and responsible actor. The breaks 
with the alliance in the case of Iraq and Libya showed that the  use of force remains a 
highly controversial topic that must be debated thoroughly within the Bundestag before 
a consensus is reached. Even then, internal differences w ithin each case further 
complicate Germany's voice. Throughout all cases where the use of force was politically 
debated, Germany faced the critical intersection o f guilt and responsibility in both 
accommodating Germany's traditions while balancing the security demands of the 2 1 st 
century. In these cases, historical m em ory influenced and shaped foreign policy as part 
of the socially constructed norms that guide and inform domestic opinion while serving 
as an explanation and validation of policy /naction.
Apart from this analysis, it is also interesting to note the entirely separate 
examination of guilt and responsibility in use of force debates when examining 
generational changes within the Bundestag. W hile Schroder noted that his generation
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was not plagued with the guilt of his parents' generation, the actual debates and votes 
within the Bundestag, especially for the cases of Iraq and Libya, show just how strongly 
historical memory continues to affect younger generations of policy makers. This 
precisely demonstrates how historical memory has contributed to the construction of a 
distinct German culture and identity, marked by antimilitarism, guilt, and firm  norms. 
Despite this, German foreign policy is certainly undergoing changes, evident by stronger 
rhetoric and policy behavior that places German interests before those of the EU. This 
dissertation searched for information and corroboration while presenting the  academic 
debate and then provided for a link to policy. Further, this research highlighted the  
difficulty in explaining Germany's foreign policy behavior theoretically. Rather than 
arguing that historical memory influences German foreign policy and rhetoric, this 
dissertation focused on how  historical memory accomplishes this.
The importance of historical memory is evident in politicians' continued mention 
of history and history's lessons, congruent across all cases under review. This is partly 
due to Germany's feared militarization of foreign policy. Unfortunately, Germany's 
tension between identity and role complicates German foreign policy. Germany's 
political and cultural identity, combined with a demanding role as a responsible security 
exporter has resulted in stagnant or inactive policy choices. While this dissertation 
explained and showed why and how Germany's policy behavior is marked by inaction at 
times, the purpose of this research was not to  judge policy behavior. Instead, this 
research offers alternative explanations to the puzzling and shocking responses from  the 
international community of analysts and scholars in light of Germany's recent behavior.
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Germany's recent behavior should not prompt analysts and journalists to w onder 
whether Germany has intentions of returning to traditional conceptions of Machtpolitik; 
however, an inquiry into Germany's intentions behind interest-based behavior resulting 
in a decreased role in responsibility in Europe is valid and necessary.
THE FUTURE OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 
During the initial stages of this dissertation research, in the spring of 2012, no 
scholarly research provided a detailed analysis on the case of Libya. Now, three years 
after Germany's abstention from UNSCR 1973, it would be interesting to research how  
precisely this policy inaction affects Germany both internally within the EU an 
internationally as a global power. W hat does the Libya case mean for the future of 
Germany, NATO, and the EU? An initial inquiry offers no 'real' consequences of 
Germany's abstention besides an influx of criticism from both sides of the  Atlantic. The 
Libya case also propelled the idea of the 'new constellation' o f Germany-China-Russia. 
Further research into the economic effects and benefits of this relationship may serve in 
answering questions about the trajectory of Germany's foreign policy. W hile this 
dissertation considered identity and identity studies as a crucial tool to  understanding 
and explain German foreign policy, the fluidity of identity and culture is, of course, 
difficult to measure. Throughout the analyses of political rhetoric and official 
statements, this analysis reflected the statements made based on references to  
historical and collective memories. The field of international relations, and specifically 
German politics would benefit greatly from an in-depth study of ideational and cultural
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influences on rhetoric, policy action, and political practice. While the past decade 
provided much research and analysis for scholars to examine Germany's political 
parties, specifically the red-green dynamic, future research should certainly include a 
more comprehensive analysis to political debates.
In recent years, analyses about German foreign policy have veered from  a focus 
on the puzzling continuity despite changes of increased power, to a 'change through 
continuity'. Further, Germany as a 'normal' actor continues to  be an unresolved area of 
discussion, especially in light of Germany's recent national interests-based behavior. 
Political rhetoric in Germany remains an im portant elem ent to explain, advocate, and 
justify Germany's foreign policy choices. As such, future research should provide insight 
into the continued influence of historical memory, and other factors, on political 
rhetoric which serves as a vehicle for Germany's continued, or changing, strategic 
culture. In 2010, tw enty years after German unification, several journals, to include 
German Politics and German Politics & Society, published articles that addressed this 
change through continuity in light o f German identity and foreign policy. One of the  
articles within this special issue by W illiam Peterson, adequately asked, "Does Germany 
still have a European Vocation?" The author concludes that governmental policy is "less 
European than in the past" and that Germany's European vocation is decreasing and will 
continue to do so while also maintaining a com m itm ent to  th e  basic frameworks of the  
EU.3
3 Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," 51.
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In closing, it is interesting to note the various statements made about Germany's 
responsibility and guilt during the Munich Security Conference in early 2014 by German 
President Joachim Gauck and Germany's new defense minister Ursula von der Leyen. 
Both politicians stressed the importance for Germany to  play a more decisive role in 
resolving international conflicts. Gauck also mentioned the importance of shaking off 
Germany's "sense of guilt stemming from W W II", stating that "Germany will never 
support any purely military solution, but will also approach issues with political 
judiciousness and explore all possible diplomatic options. However, when the last 
resort, of sending in the Bundeswehr, comes to be discussed, Germany should not say 
'no' on principles, nor should it say 'yes' unthinkingly."4 Similarly, Ursula von der Leyen 
argues that "to sit and wait" is not an option, adding that if Germany has the means and 
capabilities to act; Germany has an obligation and responsibility to engage. On the other 
hand, the defense minister, in an interview with German newspaper Der Spiegel, 
explained her support for the Libya decision, outlining the lack of the European voice. 
While arguing for the need of closer EU cooperation and a defined defense and security 
strategy, von der Leyen explained that Germany is engaged in a dozen missions 
worldwide, which demands both a military and financial effort, yet Germany's allies 
"only remember Germany's reluctance, the product of Germany's restraint".5 Echoing 
these expressions, in an interview in January 2014, foreign minister Frank-W alter
4 "Gauck Opens Munich Security Conference with Call for M ore German Engagement," Deutsche Welle, 
January 31, 2014, accessed February 5, 2014, http://www.dw.de/gauck-opens-munich-security- 
conference-with-call-for-more-german-engagement/a-17399048.
5 Rene Pfister and Gordon Repinski, "German Defense Minister: 'W e Can't Look Away'," Spiegel Online, 
January 28, 2014, accessed February 2, 2014, http://w w w .spiegel.de/international/germ any/interview - 
with-german-defense-minister-ursula-von-der-leyen-a-945818.html.
257
Steinmeier explained that the international community rightly expects Germany to 
intervene.6 These recent statements not only emphasize the  lack of understanding of 
Germany's parliament-controlled military by the international community, but further 
highlighted the internal differences within the EU. Germany's attem pt and difficulty in 
resolving the intersection of guilt and responsibility is likely to  persist as previously held 
norms continue to contextualize contemporary security demands. Similarly, 
comparative analysis involving historical memory can explain current foreign policy 
choices of other states. While Germany's history is certainly special, it is not unique. 
Countries have suffered humiliations which are evident in contemporary foreign policy 
choices. As such, successes and failures o f the past will continue to play an im port role 
in current policy choices.
6 "Es Wird Zu Recht Von Uns Erwartet, Dass W ir Uns Einmischen," Suddeutschen Zeitung, January 30, 
2014, accessed February 2, 2014, http://www.auswaertiges- 
amt.de/DE/lnfoservice/Presse/lnterviews/14/140130-BM_SZ.html.
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